CVE-2024-52587 — harden-runner
Fix: step-security/harden-runner@0080882CVE-2024-52587 is a OS Command Injection vulnerability in step-security/harden-runner. A fix is available for step-security/harden-runner — see the affected versions and patch details below.
Harden-Runner has command injection weaknesses in `setup.ts` and `arc-runner.ts`
Exploitation Status
No confirmed exploitation observed yet
- A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.
- CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2024-52587.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
Real-World Exposure
step-security/harden-runnerReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects GitHub Actions packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
Versions of step-security/harden-runner prior to v2.10.2 contain multiple command injection weaknesses via environment variables that could potentially be exploited under specific conditions. However, due to the current execution order of pre-steps in GitHub Actions and the placement of harden-runner as the first step in a job, the likelihood of exploitation is low as the Harden-Runner action reads the environment variable during the pre-step stage. There are no known exploits at this time.
Details
-
setup.ts:169 1 performs
execSyncwith a command that gets invoked after interpretation by the shell. This command includes an interpolatedprocess.env.USERvariable, which an attacker could modify (without actually creating a new user) to inject arbitrary shell expressions into thisexecSync. This may or may not be likely in practice, but I believe the hygienic way to perform the underlying operation is to useexecFileSyncor similar and bypass the underlying shell evaluation. -
setup.ts:229 2 has a nearly identical
execSyncto (1) above, but with$USERfor shell-level interpolation rather than string interpolation. However, this is still injectable and would be best replaced by anexecFileSync, per above. -
arc-runner:40-44 3 has an
execSyncwith multiple string interpolations. Most of these do not appear immediately injectible (since they appear to come from presumed trusted API responses), but the expansion ofgetRunnerTempDir()may be injectable due to its dependence on potentially attacker-controllable environment variables (e.g.RUNNER_TEMP). The underlying operation appears to be a trivial file copy, so this entire subprocess should in theory be replaceable with ordinary NodeJSfsAPI calls instead. -
arc-runner:53 4 demonstrates the same weakness, and has the same resolution as (3).
-
arc-runner:57 demonstrates the same weakness as (3) and (4), and has the same resolution.
-
arc-runner:61 demonstrates the same weakness as (3), (4), and (5), and has the same resolution.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 📦GitHub Actions | step-security/harden-runner | all versions | 2.10.2 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for step-security/harden-runner, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update step-security/harden-runner to 2.10.2 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2024-52587 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
Stop passing untrusted input into the interpreter or shell: call the affected binary with an argument array rather than a composed command string, reject anything outside a strict allowlist of expected values, and run the component under an account that cannot reach beyond the work it legitimately does.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is CVE-2024-52587 in your dependencies?
Find it across GitHub Actions, including transitive dependencies.