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Not in CISA KEV

GHSA-g7gw-m874-7rmf

Fix: akuity/kargo@0b89215

GHSA-g7gw-m874-7rmf is a Open Redirect vulnerability in github.com/akuity/kargo. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-g7gw-m874-7rmf is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.

Kargo has Open Redirect in UI OIDC Login Flow via redirectTo Query Parameter

Also known asCVE-2026-42350GO-2026-6301
Published
Aug 27, 2026
Updated
Aug 27, 2026
Affected
4 pkgs
Patched
4 / 4
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Aug 27, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

No confirmed exploitation observed yet

  • CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-g7gw-m874-7rmf.

Real-World Exposure

4 pkgs affected
🐹github.com/akuity/kargo🐹github.com/akuity/kargo🐹github.com/akuity/kargo🐹github.com/akuity/kargo

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

The Kargo UI reads a redirectTo query parameter on the /login and /token-renew routes and, following a successful OIDC authentication, uses its value as the destination for client-side navigation. The parameter is treated as a path string but is not constrained to targets within the UI's own origin. Protocol-relative values (e.g. //attacker.example.com) and values using a backslash prefix (e.g. /\attacker.example.com) are accepted and result in navigation to an external origin.

An attacker can exploit this by crafting a URL of the form https://kargo.example.com/login?redirectTo=/token-renew?redirectTo=/\attacker.example.com and delivering it to a victim through any channel that permits link sharing. When the victim follows the link and signs in to Kargo, the browser is redirected to the attacker-controlled origin. Because the initial URL resolves to the legitimate Kargo host and the user is genuinely authenticated in the process, the redirect inherits the perceived trust of the user's own Kargo instance.

The principal risk is that such a redirect can serve as a stepping stone for credentials phishing. The attacker-controlled page can present a UI resembling Kargo or an associated identity provider and solicit credentials from the user. The vulnerability does not, by itself, expose any data from Kargo or permit modification of Kargo resources, and it does not affect authentication when Kargo's built-in admin credentials are used.

Base Metrics

The following sections provide the rationale for the values selected for each of CVSS v4's base metrics. The resulting vector is CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N, which scores 0.0 (None). This reflects a known limitation of CVSS v4: the standard scopes impact to direct consequences of exploitation, and so does not capture vulnerabilities whose operational significance lies in enabling multi-step attacks. The open redirect here fits that pattern — its immediate effect is benign navigation, and any meaningful harm depends on additional attacker-controlled infrastructure and voluntary actions by the victim. Kargo classifies this vulnerability's severity as Low on a qualitative basis, reflecting the real but bounded operational risk that open redirects pose.

Attack Vector (AV): Network

The Kargo UI is served by the Kargo API server over HTTP/HTTPS. No local, adjacent network, or physical access is required.

Attack Complexity (AC): Low

Exploitation requires only a crafted URL. No race conditions, non-default configurations, or prior information gathering are required.

Attack Requirements (AT): None

No specific environmental conditions are required beyond a Kargo deployment configured for OIDC authentication, which is the expected configuration for any non-development deployment.

Privileges Required (PR): None

The attacker does not need to authenticate to Kargo or hold any permissions. The victim's own authentication completes the redirect.

User Interaction (UI): Active

Exploitation requires a victim to follow the crafted link and then complete the OIDC sign-in flow. Absent this interaction, no redirect occurs.

Confidentiality Impact to Vulnerable System (VC): None

The vulnerability does not expose any data from the Kargo control plane.

Integrity Impact to Vulnerable System (VI): None

The vulnerability does not permit modification of any data or configuration within Kargo.

Availability Impact to Vulnerable System (VA): None

The vulnerability does not provide any mechanism for denial of service against Kargo.

Confidentiality Impact to Subsequent Systems (SC): None

The direct consequence of exploitation is navigation to an attacker-controlled URL. Any resulting compromise of the victim's credentials or other data requires the attacker to stage a convincing phishing page and the victim to voluntarily submit information to it — neither action is performed by the exploit itself. CVSS v4 scopes impact to direct consequences of exploitation, so the enabled phishing scenario is not reflected here.

Integrity Impact to Subsequent Systems (SI): None

The vulnerability does not modify any data on downstream systems. Tampering an attacker might perform using credentials phished via the enabled redirect would be a consequence of a follow-on attack, not of this vulnerability.

Availability Impact to Subsequent Systems (SA): None

The vulnerability does not provide any mechanism to degrade the availability of downstream systems.

Mitigating Factors

  • Exploitation is contingent on social engineering. A victim must both follow the crafted link and complete an authentication flow for the redirect to fire.

  • The vulnerability does not directly compromise Kargo or expose any Kargo-held data. Impact is limited to enabling an attacker-controlled destination to be reached via a legitimate Kargo URL.

  • There is no evidence of exploitation in the wild.

Affected Packages

4 total 4 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐹Gogithub.com/akuity/kargoall versions1.7.10
🐹Gogithub.com/akuity/kargo1.8.0&&< 1.8.131.8.13
🐹Gogithub.com/akuity/kargo1.9.0&&< 1.9.81.9.8
🐹Gogithub.com/akuity/kargo1.10.0&&< 1.10.21.10.2

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/akuity/kargo. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update github.com/akuity/kargo to 1.7.10 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-g7gw-m874-7rmf is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-g7gw-m874-7rmf is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-g7gw-m874-7rmf. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

## Summary The Kargo UI reads a `redirectTo` query parameter on the `/login` and `/token-renew` routes and, following a successful OIDC authentication, uses its value as the destination for client-side navigation. The parameter is treated as a path string but is not constrained to targets within the UI's own origin. Protocol-relative values (e.g. `//attacker.example.com`) and values using a backslash prefix (e.g. `/\attacker.example.com`) are accepted and result in navigation to an external origin. An attacker can exploit this by crafting a URL of the form `https://kargo.example.com/login?re
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-g7gw-m874-7rmf in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-g7gw-m874-7rmf across Go dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.

GHSA-g7gw-m874-7rmf: kargo Denial of… | O3 Security