GHSA-g794-3fmp-753h
GHSA-g794-3fmp-753h is a Path Traversal vulnerability in asyncssh. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-g794-3fmp-753h is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.
AsyncSSH `AuthorizedKeysFile %u` path traversal allows attacker-selected authorized keys to authenticate a traversal username
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
- CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-g794-3fmp-753h.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
Real-World Exposure
asyncsshReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
AsyncSSH 2.22.0 expands the OpenSSH-compatible AuthorizedKeysFile %u token with the raw SSH username during pre-authentication server config reload. A server configured with a documented per-user key pattern such as AuthorizedKeysFile authorized_keys/%u can be made to read an authorized-keys file outside the intended directory when the SSH username contains path traversal segments. If the attacker can place or reference a readable authorized-keys-format file containing their public key, the attacker can authenticate over SSH as the traversal username.
Affected Product
- Package: asyncssh
- Ecosystem: pip
- Affected versions: confirmed on 2.22.0; exact lower bound not finalized
- Tested version: 2.22.0
- Audit commit/tag: tag
v2.22.0, commitaf5a81e669633d83d535163f93b6bf3f957c9238 - PyPI sdist SHA256:
c3ce72b01be4f97b40e62844dd384227e5ff5a401a3793007c42f86a5c8eb537
Vulnerability Details
- CWE: CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory
- Component: AsyncSSH server config reload and public-key authentication (
asyncssh/config.py,asyncssh/connection.py,asyncssh/auth_keys.py,asyncssh/misc.py) - Root cause:
%uinAuthorizedKeysFileis expanded from the remote username without rejecting path separators or..segments, and the resulting path is opened without constraining it to the intended authorized-keys directory. - Security boundary violated: the configured authorized-keys directory and public-key authentication trust boundary.
- Direct impact: public-key authentication succeeds using an attacker-selected authorized-keys file outside the intended directory.
- Chain impact, if any: none claimed; direct authentication impact is primary.
Attack Preconditions
- The AsyncSSH server uses a config or equivalent pattern where
AuthorizedKeysFilecontains%u, for exampleAuthorizedKeysFile authorized_keys/%u. - Public-key authentication is enabled.
- The attacker can place or reference a readable authorized-keys-format file outside the intended directory, such as a file in a world-writable or application-writable location.
- The application does not separately reject usernames containing
/,\, or..before AsyncSSH uses the username for key-file selection.
Reproduction
The run-scoped evidence contains a safe localhost proof:
-
Start the proof harness saved at harness_app.py
-
Run exploit_proof.py through run_proof.sh
-
The harness creates
sshd_configwithAuthorizedKeysFile authorized_keys/%u, writes the attacker's public key to a file outsideauthorized_keys/, starts a real AsyncSSH server, and attempts two SSH logins. -
Expected result: the normal username
victimfails, while the traversal username authenticates with the same attacker key.
Observed proof output:
[CONTROL] username=victim success=False
[ATTACK] username=../../../asyncssh-proof-exploit-proof-8b2bd23daeeb.pub success=True
[ATTACK] output=AUTH_BYPASS_SUCCESS username=../../../asyncssh-proof-exploit-proof-8b2bd23daeeb.pub
PASS: traversal username authenticated with attacker-controlled authorized_keys file
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐍PyPI | asyncssh | ≥ 2.22.0&&< 2.23.0 | 2.23.0 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for asyncssh. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update asyncssh to 2.23.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-g794-3fmp-753h is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-g794-3fmp-753h is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-g794-3fmp-753h. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-g794-3fmp-753h in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-g794-3fmp-753h across PyPI dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.