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📦 npm

GHSA-g34w-4xqq-h79m

MEDIUM

OpenClaw iMessage group allowlist authorization inherited DM pairing-store identities

Also known asCVE-2026-26328
Published
Feb 18, 2026
Updated
Feb 20, 2026
Affected
2 pkgs
Patched
2 / 2
Exploits
None indexed

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.3%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk20th percentile+0.27%
0.00%0.26%0.52%0.78%0.0%0.0%0.0%0.0%0.3%Mar 26May 26Jun 26

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Blast Radius

2 pkgs affected

Weekly download volume for affected packages — a proxy for how broadly this vulnerability is deployed.

openclawnpm
4.4Mdownloads / week
clawdbotnpm
10Kdownloads / week

Description

Summary

Under iMessage groupPolicy=allowlist, group authorization could be satisfied by sender identities coming from the DM pairing store, broadening DM trust into group contexts.

Details

Affected component: src/imessage/monitor/monitor-provider.ts.

Vulnerable logic derived effectiveGroupAllowFrom using both the static group allowlist and DM pairing-store identities (storeAllowFrom). This allowed a sender approved via DM pairing to satisfy group authorization in groups even if the sender/chat was not explicitly present in groupAllowFrom.

This weakens boundary separation between DM pairing and group allowlist authorization.

Affected Packages / Versions

  • openclaw (npm): affected <= 2026.2.13
  • clawdbot (npm): affected <= 2026.1.24-3

Fix Commit(s)

  • openclaw/openclaw@872079d42fe105ece2900a1dd6ab321b92da2d59
  • openclaw/openclaw@90d1e9cd71419168b2faa54a759b124a3eacfae7

Thanks @vincentkoc for reporting.

Affected Packages

2 total 2 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
📦npmopenclawall versions2026.2.14
📦npmclawdbotall versions2026.2.14

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for openclaw. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update openclaw to 2026.2.14 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-g34w-4xqq-h79m is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-g34w-4xqq-h79m is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-g34w-4xqq-h79m. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

## Summary Under iMessage `groupPolicy=allowlist`, group authorization could be satisfied by sender identities coming from the DM pairing store, broadening DM trust into group contexts. ## Details Affected component: `src/imessage/monitor/monitor-provider.ts`. Vulnerable logic derived `effectiveGroupAllowFrom` using both the static group allowlist and DM pairing-store identities (`storeAllowFrom`). This allowed a sender approved via DM pairing to satisfy group authorization in groups even if the sender/chat was not explicitly present in `groupAllowFrom`. This weakens boundary separation bet
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-g34w-4xqq-h79m in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-g34w-4xqq-h79m across npm dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.