GHSA-fwj3-42wh-8673
CRITICALGHSA-fwj3-42wh-8673 is a critical-severity (CVSS 9.1) vulnerability in github.com/gtsteffaniak/filebrowser. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-fwj3-42wh-8673 is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.
FileBrowser Public Share DELETE API Path Traversal Allows Unauthenticated Arbitrary File Deletion
Blast Radius
github.com/gtsteffaniak/filebrowserReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
Attacker-controlled path input is joined with a trusted base path prior to sanitization, allowing traversal sequences (e.g., ../) to escape the intended shared directory. As a result, an unauthenticated attacker possessing a valid public share hash with delete permissions enabled can delete arbitrary files outside the shared directory within the share owner’s configured storage scope.
Affected Components
Two distinct vulnerable code paths:
- Stable versions (e.g., gtstef/filebrowser:stable)
DELETE /public/api/resources?hash=<hash>&path=../victimRoot cause: middleware.go:111 Issue: path query parameter is joined before SanitizeUserPath() - Development / HEAD (e.g., commit eabdfd9)
DELETE /public/api/resources/bulk?hash=<hash>Body: [{"path":"../victim"}] Root cause: resource.go:274 Issue: item.Path is joined before SanitizeUserPath()
Steps to reproduce (Stable Version)
1. Create a directory structure:
/folder/shared_subdir/ (shared)
/folder/protected.txt (outside shared directory)
2. Create a public share:
Path: /shared_subdir
AllowDelete=true
3. Send request:
curl -X DELETE "http://localhost/public/api/resources?hash=<HASH>&path=../protected.txt"
#Observe:
#protected.txt is deleted despite being outside the shared directory
Proof of Concept (HEAD / bulk endpoint)
curl -X DELETE "http://localhost/public/api/resources/bulk?hash=<HASH>" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '[{"path":"../protected.txt"}]'
Alternative PoC Scripts:
poc_v3.sh (If the script fails due to environment differences, the manual PoC above reliably reproduces the issue.)
Impact
An unauthenticated attacker with access to a public share link configured with delete permissions enabled can delete attacker-chosen files outside the shared directory, anywhere within the share owner’s storage scope. This results in unauthorized data loss and potential service disruption.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐹Go | github.com/gtsteffaniak/filebrowser | all versions | 0.0.0-20260501183844-112740bdd41d |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/gtsteffaniak/filebrowser. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update github.com/gtsteffaniak/filebrowser to 0.0.0-20260501183844-112740bdd41d or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-fwj3-42wh-8673 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-fwj3-42wh-8673 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-fwj3-42wh-8673. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-fwj3-42wh-8673 in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-fwj3-42wh-8673 across Go dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.