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💎 RubyGems

GHSA-fm7p-mprw-wjm9

MEDIUM

Oj: intern.c form_attr (uninitialized stack read)

Also known asCVE-2026-54500
Published
Jun 19, 2026
Updated
Jun 26, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected
💎oj

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Description

Summary

Oj.load in :object mode reads uninitialized stack memory (and, for long keys, reads out of bounds) when parsing a JSON object whose key is 254 bytes or longer. The interned bytes can surface to the caller, disclosing process stack memory.

Details

In ext/oj/intern.c, form_attr() handles the long-key path by allocating a heap buffer b, populating it with the attribute name, and then freeing it — but it passed the uninitialized stack buffer buf (not b) to rb_intern3():

static VALUE form_attr(const char *str, size_t len) {
    char buf[256];
    if (sizeof(buf) - 2 <= len) {        // long-key path (len >= 254)
        char *b = OJ_R_ALLOC_N(char, len + 2);
        // ... b is filled correctly ...
        id = rb_intern3(buf, len + 1, oj_utf8_encoding);   // BUG: reads `buf`
        OJ_R_FREE(b);
        return id;
    }
    // ...
}

rb_intern3 therefore reads len + 1 bytes of uninitialized stack memory. When the key length is >= 256, it also reads out of bounds past the 256-byte buf (CWE-125). The resulting bytes are interned and can reach the caller via the produced Symbol or via the EncodingError message raised on invalid UTF-8, leaking process stack contents.

This is the same defect previously fixed in ext/oj/usual.c; intern.c held a duplicated copy of form_attr that was missed.

Proof of Concept

require 'oj'
key  = "A" * 300
json = %Q[{"^o":"Object","#{key}":1}]
Oj.load(json, mode: :object)

On affected versions this raises an EncodingError whose message contains ~1500 bytes of uninitialized stack memory (not the supplied "A"s). The leaked byte count varies between runs with the identical payload (e.g. 1491 vs 1516 bytes), confirming the content is uninitialized memory rather than fixed data.

Impact

Information disclosure of process stack memory to a caller that parses untrusted JSON with Oj.load(..., mode: :object). For keys >= 256 bytes it is also an out-of-bounds read (CWE-125).

Severity is bounded by several preconditions: it requires :object mode (which is already discouraged for untrusted input), the leaked bytes are uncontrolled (the attacker cannot choose what is disclosed), and the data only reaches an attacker if the application surfaces the resulting Symbol or EncodingError back to them. Scored CVSS 5.3 (Medium) on that basis.

Patches

Fixed in 3.17.3: form_attr() now passes b to rb_intern3 (a one-character change mirroring the earlier usual.c fix). Verified on the fixed build: the same payload returns cleanly with no leak across repeated runs.

Credit

Reported by Zac Wang (@7a6163).

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
💎RubyGemsojall versions3.17.3

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for oj. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update oj to 3.17.3 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-fm7p-mprw-wjm9 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-fm7p-mprw-wjm9 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-fm7p-mprw-wjm9. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary `Oj.load` in `:object` mode reads uninitialized stack memory (and, for long keys, reads out of bounds) when parsing a JSON object whose key is 254 bytes or longer. The interned bytes can surface to the caller, disclosing process stack memory. ### Details In `ext/oj/intern.c`, `form_attr()` handles the long-key path by allocating a heap buffer `b`, populating it with the attribute name, and then freeing it — but it passed the **uninitialized stack buffer `buf`** (not `b`) to `rb_intern3()`: ```c static VALUE form_attr(const char *str, size_t len) { char buf[256]; if (siz
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-fm7p-mprw-wjm9 in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-fm7p-mprw-wjm9 across RubyGems dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.