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Not in CISA KEV
HIGH severity

CVE-2026-54592 — oj

HIGH

CVE-2026-54592 is a high-severity (CVSS 7.5) Out-of-bounds Read vulnerability in oj. A fix is available for oj — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Oj: Stack Buffer Overflow in Oj::Doc#each_child via Deeply Nested Input

Also known asGHSA-3m6q-jj5j-38c9
Published
Jun 30, 2026
Updated
Aug 12, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Sep 27, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

Proof-of-concept exploit code exists

  • CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
  • CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-54592.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.5%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs37th percentile — riskier than 37% of all scored CVEsHighest risk

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

How urgent is this, really

CVE-2026-54592 by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). Outside the shaded patch-first corner.

Where this sits among everything scored

Of 380,066 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Counts from FIRST.org, log-scaled.

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
💎oj

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects RubyGems packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

Oj::Doc#each_child, when invoked recursively over a deeply nested JSON document, overflows a fixed-size stack buffer and aborts the process. This is a denial of service reachable from untrusted JSON.

Details

Two-step chain in ext/oj/fast.c:

  1. doc_each_child (~line 1501) increments doc->where past the where_path[MAX_STACK = 100] array with no bounds check, and never restores it (doc->where-- is missing). Calling each_child recursively from inside the yield block therefore drives doc->where beyond the array.

  2. On the next entry (~line 1478) the function copies the path into a stack-local buffer:

    Leaf  save_path[MAX_STACK];           // 800-byte stack buffer
    size_t wlen = doc->where - doc->where_path;
    if (0 < wlen) {
        memcpy(save_path, doc->where_path, sizeof(Leaf) * (wlen + 1));
    }
    

    When the previous recursive call left doc->where past where_path[100], wlen exceeds MAX_STACK and the memcpy overflows save_path on the C stack.

The Oj::Doc parser imposes no JSON nesting-depth limit (it relies on a C-stack pressure check), so deeply nested attacker input reaches this path.

Proof of Concept

require 'oj'
depth = 200
payload = '[' * depth + '1' + ']' * depth
Oj::Doc.open(payload) do |doc|
  r = lambda { doc.each_child { |_| r.call } }
  r.call
end

Recursion depth <= 99 iterates normally; depth >= 101 aborts. lldb backtrace on the affected build (ruby 3.3.8 / arm64-darwin24):

SIGABRT
#2 __abort
#3 __stack_chk_fail
#4 doc_each_child   (oj.bundle, fast.c)

Impact

Reliable denial of service: any endpoint that calls Oj::Doc.open(untrusted) { |d| d.each_child ... } recursively can be crashed with a small deeply-nested payload. On builds with a stack protector (the default, -fstack-protector-strong) the canary aborts the process before the saved return address is used. The Step-1 heap OOB writes into struct _doc fields do occur, but are masked in practice because the Step-2 stack overflow crashes first; turning them into anything beyond a crash has not been demonstrated.

Patches

Fixed in 3.17.3: doc_each_child now bounds-checks before incrementing doc->where (raising Oj::DepthError) and restores doc->where after the loop, matching the existing each_leaf pattern. Verified on the fixed build: depth >= 101 raises a clean Oj::DepthError instead of aborting.

Credit

Reported by Zac Wang (@7a6163).

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
💎RubyGemsojall versions3.17.3bundle update oj --conservative

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for oj, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update oj to 3.17.3 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-54592 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    Stop feeding it untrusted input: reject or quarantine files and payloads from unverified sources until you can upgrade, restrict accepted formats to the ones you actually need, and run the parsing or decoding step in a least-privileged sandbox or short-lived worker so a crash or corrupted read cannot reach the rest of the process.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary `Oj::Doc#each_child`, when invoked recursively over a deeply nested JSON document, overflows a fixed-size stack buffer and aborts the process. This is a denial of service reachable from untrusted JSON. ### Details Two-step chain in `ext/oj/fast.c`: 1. **`doc_each_child` (~line 1501)** increments `doc->where` past the `where_path[MAX_STACK = 100]` array with no bounds check, and never restores it (`doc->where--` is missing). Calling `each_child` recursively from inside the yield block therefore drives `doc->where` beyond the array. 2. **On the next entry (~line 1478)**
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is CVE-2026-54592 in your dependencies?

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CVE-2026-54592: oj DoS (High 7.5) | O3 Security