How severe is GHSA-fgx4-p8xf-qhp9?

GHSA-fgx4-p8xf-qhp9 has a CVSS score of 3/10, rated LOW. Review your exposure and patch according to your risk tolerance.

Which packages are affected by GHSA-fgx4-p8xf-qhp9?

GHSA-fgx4-p8xf-qhp9 affects the following packages: @lobehub/chat (npm). Ecosystems affected: npm.

How do I fix GHSA-fgx4-p8xf-qhp9?

Update @lobehub/chat to 1.136.2 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-fgx4-p8xf-qhp9 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

How do I detect GHSA-fgx4-p8xf-qhp9 in my npm dependencies?

Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for @lobehub/chat. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

How do I mitigate GHSA-fgx4-p8xf-qhp9 if there is no patch (or I can't update yet)?

If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

How does O3 Security protect against GHSA-fgx4-p8xf-qhp9?

O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-fgx4-p8xf-qhp9 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Is GHSA-fgx4-p8xf-qhp9 actively exploited in the wild?

No public exploit code has been indexed for GHSA-fgx4-p8xf-qhp9 yet. This does not mean the vulnerability cannot be exploited — absence of public exploits does not imply safety. Apply the recommended fix and use O3 Security to monitor your exposure.

What is the EPSS score for GHSA-fgx4-p8xf-qhp9?

GHSA-fgx4-p8xf-qhp9 has an EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) score of 0.3%, placing it in the 21th percentile of all CVEs. EPSS is maintained by FIRST.org and estimates the probability that a vulnerability will be exploited in the wild within the next 30 days. This score indicates relatively lower exploitation probability, though the CVSS severity should still guide your patching priority.

What type of vulnerability is GHSA-fgx4-p8xf-qhp9?

GHSA-fgx4-p8xf-qhp9 is classified as Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) (CWE-918). This weakness type describe the underlying flaw category, which helps determine the potential impact and the right class of mitigation. This is a high-impact weakness class that often enables remote code execution or data exposure.

When was GHSA-fgx4-p8xf-qhp9 published, and has it been updated?

GHSA-fgx4-p8xf-qhp9 was published on October 17, 2025 and was last updated on October 17, 2025. Advisory data evolves as severity scores, affected ranges, and exploit intelligence are revised — always check the latest version of the advisory before acting.

📦 npm

GHSA-fgx4-p8xf-qhp9

LOW

Lobe Chat vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery with native web fetch module

Also known asCVE-2025-62505

Published

Oct 17, 2025

Updated

Oct 17, 2025

Affected

1 pkg

Patched

1 / 1

Exploits

None indexed

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗

0.3%probability of exploitation in next 30 days

Lower Risk21th percentile+0.27%

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected

Weekly download volume for affected packages — a proxy for how broadly this vulnerability is deployed.

@lobehub/chatnpm

13Kdownloads / week

Description

Vulnerability Description

Vulnerability Overview

When the client sends an arbitrary URL array and impl: ["naive"] to the tRPC endpoint tools.search.crawlPages, the server issues outbound HTTP requests directly to those URLs. There is no defensive logic that restricts or validates requests to internal networks (127.0.0.1, localhost, private ranges) or metadata endpoints (169.254.169.254).
Flow: client input (urls, impls) → service invocation in the tRPC router → the service passes the URLs to Crawler.crawl → the Crawler prioritizes the user-specified impls (naive) → the naive implementation performs a server-side fetch(url) as-is (SSRF) → the server collects responses from internal resources.
In the dev environment, authentication can be bypassed using the lobe-auth-dev-backend-api: 1 header (production requires a valid token). In the PoC, this was used to successfully retrieve the internal API at localhost:8889 from the server side.

Vulnerable Code

https://github.com/lobehub/lobe-chat/blob/d942a635b36a231156c60d824afa573af8032572/packages/web-crawler/src/crawImpl/naive.ts#L39-L45

PoC

PoC Description

In dev mode, we made a single tRPC call using the auth-bypass header lobe-auth-dev-backend-api: 1. Since tRPC requires the body to be in the form {"json": { ... }}, we placed urls and impls: ["naive"] inside json to induce the server to request the internal URL (http://localhost:8889/internel-api).
The response follows tRPC’s wrapping structure, so the actual body of the internal API is included as a string (JSON string) at result.data.json.results[0].data.content. We post-process it with jq for readability.

curl Example

curl -sS -X POST 'http://localhost:3010/trpc/tools/search.crawlPages' \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -H 'lobe-auth-dev-backend-api: 1' \
  --data '{"json":{"urls":["http://localhost:8889/internal-api"],"impls":["naive"]}}' | jq -r '.result.data.json.results[0].data.content' | jq .

Impact

Since the server performs outbound requests to internal networks, localhost, and metadata endpoints, an attacker can abuse the server’s network position to access internal resources (internal APIs, management ports, cloud metadata, etc.).
As a result, this can lead to exposure of internal system information, leakage of authentication tokens/secret keys (e.g., IMDSv1/v2), misuse of internal admin interfaces, and provide a foothold for further lateral movement.
By leveraging user-supplied impls to force the unfiltered naive implementation, SSRF defenses—such as blocking private/metadata IPs, DNS re-validation/re-resolution, and redirect restrictions—can be bypassed.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed

Ecosystem	Package	Vulnerable range	Fix
📦npm	`@lobehub/chat`	all versions	1.136.2

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency

Detect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for @lobehub/chat. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update @lobehub/chat to 1.136.2 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-fgx4-p8xf-qhp9 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-fgx4-p8xf-qhp9 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-fgx4-p8xf-qhp9. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Vulnerability Description --- Vulnerability Overview - When the client sends an arbitrary URL array and impl: ["naive"] to the tRPC endpoint tools.search.crawlPages, the server issues outbound HTTP requests directly to those URLs. There is no defensive logic that restricts or validates requests to internal networks (127.0.0.1, localhost, private ranges) or metadata endpoints (169.254.169.254). - Flow: client input (urls, impls) → service invocation in the tRPC router → the service passes the URLs to Crawler.crawl → the Crawler prioritizes the user-specified impls (naive) → the naive im

O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-fgx4-p8xf-qhp9 in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-fgx4-p8xf-qhp9 across npm dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.

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