CVE-2025-62505 is a low-severity (CVSS 3) Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in @lobehub/chat. A fix is available for @lobehub/chat — see the affected versions and patch details below.
SSRF in lobehub/lobe-chat with native web fetch module
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2025-62505.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
How urgent is this, really
CVE-2025-62505 plotted by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). The shaded corner — EPSS 50%+ and CVSS 7.0+ — is where this CVE doesn't sit, though severity or exploitability alone can still warrant action.
Where this sits among everything scored
Of 378,156 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Real counts from FIRST.org, not a sample — log-scaled since the landscape is heavily right-skewed.
Real-World Exposure
How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.
@lobehub/chatnpmDescription
Vulnerability Description
Vulnerability Overview
-
When the client sends an arbitrary URL array and impl: ["naive"] to the tRPC endpoint tools.search.crawlPages, the server issues outbound HTTP requests directly to those URLs. There is no defensive logic that restricts or validates requests to internal networks (127.0.0.1, localhost, private ranges) or metadata endpoints (169.254.169.254).
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Flow: client input (urls, impls) → service invocation in the tRPC router → the service passes the URLs to Crawler.crawl → the Crawler prioritizes the user-specified impls (naive) → the naive implementation performs a server-side fetch(url) as-is (SSRF) → the server collects responses from internal resources.
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In the dev environment, authentication can be bypassed using the lobe-auth-dev-backend-api: 1 header (production requires a valid token). In the PoC, this was used to successfully retrieve the internal API at localhost:8889 from the server side.
Vulnerable Code
PoC
PoC Description
-
In dev mode, we made a single tRPC call using the auth-bypass header lobe-auth-dev-backend-api: 1. Since tRPC requires the body to be in the form {"json": { ... }}, we placed urls and impls: ["naive"] inside json to induce the server to request the internal URL (http://localhost:8889/internel-api).
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The response follows tRPC’s wrapping structure, so the actual body of the internal API is included as a string (JSON string) at result.data.json.results[0].data.content. We post-process it with jq for readability.
curl Example
curl -sS -X POST 'http://localhost:3010/trpc/tools/search.crawlPages' \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-H 'lobe-auth-dev-backend-api: 1' \
--data '{"json":{"urls":["http://localhost:8889/internal-api"],"impls":["naive"]}}' | jq -r '.result.data.json.results[0].data.content' | jq .
Impact
-
Since the server performs outbound requests to internal networks, localhost, and metadata endpoints, an attacker can abuse the server’s network position to access internal resources (internal APIs, management ports, cloud metadata, etc.).
-
As a result, this can lead to exposure of internal system information, leakage of authentication tokens/secret keys (e.g., IMDSv1/v2), misuse of internal admin interfaces, and provide a foothold for further lateral movement.
-
By leveraging user-supplied impls to force the unfiltered naive implementation, SSRF defenses—such as blocking private/metadata IPs, DNS re-validation/re-resolution, and redirect restrictions—can be bypassed.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 📦npm | @lobehub/chat | all versions | 1.136.2npm install @lobehub/chat@1.136.2 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for @lobehub/chat, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update @lobehub/chat to 1.136.2 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2025-62505 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 Security's impact-aware SCA analyses which vulnerable code paths your application actually calls, so a match like CVE-2025-62505 can be triaged on real exposure rather than presence alone.
Tailored to CVE-2025-62505. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is CVE-2025-62505 in your dependencies?
O3 Security finds CVE-2025-62505 across npm dependencies, including transitive ones, and its impact-aware SCA ranks findings by whether your code actually calls the vulnerable path.