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🐍 PyPI

GHSA-f7qq-56ww-84cr

HIGH

Picklescan is Vulnerable to Unsafe Globals Check Bypass through Subclass Imports

Also known asCVE-2025-10157PYSEC-2025-153
Published
Sep 10, 2025
Updated
Jun 6, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.8%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk51th percentile+0.54%
0.00%0.42%0.84%1.26%0.2%0.8%Dec 25Apr 26Jun 26

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected
🐍picklescan

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

The vulnerability allows malicious actors to bypass PickleScan's unsafe globals check, leading to potential arbitrary code execution. The issue stems from PickleScan's strict check for full module names against its list of unsafe globals. By using subclasses of dangerous imports instead of the exact module names, attackers can circumvent the check and inject malicious payloads.

PoC

  1. Download a model that uses the asyncio package:

wget https://huggingface.co/iluem/linux_pkl/resolve/main/asyncio_asyncio_unix_events___UnixSubprocessTransport__start.pkl

  1. Check with PickleScan: picklescan -p asyncio_asyncio_unix_events___UnixSubprocessTransport__start.pkl -g

Expected Result:

PickleScan should identify all asyncio import as dangerous and flag the pickle file as malicious as asyncio is in _unsafe_globals dictionary.

Actual Result: Screenshot 2025-06-29 at 14 13 38

PickleScan marked the import as Suspicious, failing to identify it as a dangerous import.

Impact

Severity: High Affected Users: Any organization, like HuggingFace, or individual using PickleScan to analyze PyTorch models or other files distributed as ZIP archives for malicious pickle content. Impact Details: Attackers can craft malicious PyTorch models containing embedded pickle payloads, package them into ZIP archives, and bypass the PickleScan check by using subclasses of dangerous imports. This could lead to arbitrary code execution on the user's system when these malicious files are processed or loaded.

Recommendations:

Replace: https://github.com/mmaitre314/picklescan/blob/2a8383cfeb4158567f9770d86597300c9e508d0f/src/picklescan/scanner.py#L309C9-L309C54

unsafe_filter = _unsafe_globals.get(g.module)

by:

      matched_key = None
        if imported_global.module:
            for key_in_globals in unsafe_globals.keys():
                # Check if imported_global.module starts with the key_in_globals AND
                # (it's the first match OR this key is more specific than the previous match)
                # AND imported_global.module is exactly the key or imported_global.module is key + '.' + something
                if imported_global.module.startswith(key_in_globals):
                    if (imported_global.module == key_in_globals or # Exact match
                            (len(imported_global.module) > len(key_in_globals) and imported_global.module[len(key_in_globals)] == '.')): # Submodule match
                        if matched_key is None or len(key_in_globals) > len(matched_key):
                            matched_key = key_in_globals

        if matched_key:
            unsafe_filter = unsafe_globals[matched_key]

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐍PyPIpicklescanall versions0.0.31

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for picklescan. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update picklescan to 0.0.31 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-f7qq-56ww-84cr is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-f7qq-56ww-84cr is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-f7qq-56ww-84cr. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary The vulnerability allows malicious actors to bypass PickleScan's unsafe globals check, leading to potential arbitrary code execution. The issue stems from PickleScan's strict check for full module names against its list of unsafe globals. By using subclasses of dangerous imports instead of the exact module names, attackers can circumvent the check and inject malicious payloads. ### PoC 1. Download a model that uses the `asyncio` package: ```wget https://huggingface.co/iluem/linux_pkl/resolve/main/asyncio_asyncio_unix_events___UnixSubprocessTransport__start.pkl``` 2. Check with
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-f7qq-56ww-84cr in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-f7qq-56ww-84cr across PyPI dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.