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GHSA-f78j-4w3g-4q65

HIGH

StimulusReflex arbitrary method call

Also known asCVE-2024-28121
Published
Mar 12, 2024
Updated
Sep 25, 2024
Affected
4 pkgs
Patched
4 / 4
Exploits
None indexed

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
1.6%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk72th percentile+0.10%
0.00%0.68%1.37%2.05%0.3%1.6%Dec 25Apr 26Jun 26

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Blast Radius

4 pkgs affected
📦stimulus_reflex📦stimulus_reflex💎stimulus_reflex💎stimulus_reflex

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects npm, RubyGems packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

More methods than expected can be called on reflex instances. Being able to call some of them has security implications.

Details

To invoke a reflex a websocket message of the following shape is sent:

{ 
  "target": "[class_name]#[method_name]", 
  "args": [] 
}

The server will proceed to instantiate reflex using the provided class_name as long as it extends StimulusReflex::Reflex. It then attempts to call method_name on the instance with the provided arguments ref:

method = reflex.method method_name
required_params = method.parameters.select { |(kind, _)| kind == :req }
optional_params = method.parameters.select { |(kind, _)| kind == :opt }

if arguments.size >= required_params.size && arguments.size <= required_params.size + optional_params.size
  reflex.public_send(method_name, *arguments)
end

This is problematic as reflex.method(method_name) can be more methods than those explicitly specified by the developer in their reflex class. A good example is the instance_variable_set method.

<details> <summary>Read more</summary> Let's imagine a reflex that uses `@user` as a trusted variable in an `after_reflex` callback.

This variable can be overwritten using the following message:

{
  "target": "ChatReflex#instance_variable_set", 
  "args": ["@user", "<admin-id>"]
}

Here are other interesting methods that were found to be available for the ChatReflex sample reflex

  • remote_byebug: bind a debugging server
  • pry: drop the process in a REPL session

All in all, only counting :req and :opt parameters helps. For example around version 1.0 only .arity was checked which allowed access to the system method (.arity == -1)

{
  "target": "ChatReflex#system", 
  "args": ["[command here]"]
}

Using public_send instead of send does not help but the following payloads do not work since :rest parameters are not counted in the current version

{
  "target": "ChatReflex#send", 
  "args": ["system", "[command here]"] 
}
{ 
  "target": "ChatReflex#instance_eval", 
  "args": ["system('[command here]')"]
}
</details>

Pre-versions of 3.5.0 added a render_collection method on reflexes with a :req parameter. Calling this method could lead to arbitrary code execution:

{
  "target": "StimulusReflex::Reflex#render_collection", 
  "args": [
    { "inline":  "<% system('[command here]') %>" }
  ]
}

Patches

Patches are available on RubyGems and on NPM.

The patched versions are:

Workaround

You can add this guard to mitigate the issue if running an unpatched version of the library.

1.) Make sure all your reflexes inherit from the ApplicationReflex class 2.) Add this before_reflex callback to your app/reflexes/application_reflex.rb file:

class ApplicationReflex < StimulusReflex::Reflex
  before_reflex do
    ancestors = self.class.ancestors[0..self.class.ancestors.index(StimulusReflex::Reflex) - 1]
    allowed = ancestors.any? { |a| a.public_instance_methods(false).any?(method_name.to_sym) }

    raise ArgumentError.new("Reflex method '#{method_name}' is not defined on class '#{self.class.name}' or on any of its ancestors") if !allowed
  end
end

Affected Packages

4 total 4 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
📦npmstimulus_reflex3.5.0-pre0&&< 3.5.0-rc43.5.0-rc4
📦npmstimulus_reflexall versions3.4.2
💎RubyGemsstimulus_reflex3.5.0.pre0&&< 3.5.0.rc43.5.0.rc4
💎RubyGemsstimulus_reflexall versions3.4.2

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for stimulus_reflex. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update stimulus_reflex to 3.5.0-rc4 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-f78j-4w3g-4q65 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-f78j-4w3g-4q65 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-f78j-4w3g-4q65. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary More methods than expected can be called on reflex instances. Being able to call some of them has security implications. ### Details To invoke a reflex a websocket message of the following shape is sent: ```json { "target": "[class_name]#[method_name]", "args": [] } ``` The server will proceed to instantiate `reflex` using the provided `class_name` as long as it extends `StimulusReflex::Reflex`. It then attempts to call `method_name` on the instance with the provided arguments [ref](https://github.com/stimulusreflex/stimulus_reflex/blob/0211cad7d60fe96838587f159d657e44cee51
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-f78j-4w3g-4q65 in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-f78j-4w3g-4q65 across npm, RubyGems dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.