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Not in CISA KEV
HIGH severity

CVE-2024-28121 stimulus_reflex

HIGHFix: stimulusreflex/stimulus_reflex@538582d

CVE-2024-28121 is a high-severity (CVSS 8.8) CWE-470 vulnerability in stimulus_reflex. A fix is available for stimulus_reflex — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Reflex arbitrary method call in stimulus_reflex

Also known asGHSA-f78j-4w3g-4q65
Published
Mar 12, 2024
Updated
Aug 12, 2026
Affected
4 pkgs
Patched
4 / 4
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Sep 22, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

No confirmed exploitation observed yet

  • A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.
  • CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2024-28121.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
1.6%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs74th percentile — riskier than 74% of all scored CVEsHighest risk

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

How urgent is this, really

CVE-2024-28121 plotted by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). The shaded corner — EPSS 50%+ and CVSS 7.0+ — is where this CVE doesn't sit, though severity or exploitability alone can still warrant action.

Where this sits among everything scored

Of 378,156 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Real counts from FIRST.org, not a sample — log-scaled since the landscape is heavily right-skewed.

Real-World Exposure

4 pkgs affected

How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.

1other npm packages depend on this — each one inherits the vulnerability until it's patched upstream
stimulus_reflexnpm
8Kdownloads / week

Description

Summary

More methods than expected can be called on reflex instances. Being able to call some of them has security implications.

Details

To invoke a reflex a websocket message of the following shape is sent:

{ 
  "target": "[class_name]#[method_name]", 
  "args": [] 
}

The server will proceed to instantiate reflex using the provided class_name as long as it extends StimulusReflex::Reflex. It then attempts to call method_name on the instance with the provided arguments ref:

method = reflex.method method_name
required_params = method.parameters.select { |(kind, _)| kind == :req }
optional_params = method.parameters.select { |(kind, _)| kind == :opt }

if arguments.size >= required_params.size && arguments.size <= required_params.size + optional_params.size
  reflex.public_send(method_name, *arguments)
end

This is problematic as reflex.method(method_name) can be more methods than those explicitly specified by the developer in their reflex class. A good example is the instance_variable_set method.

<details> <summary>Read more</summary> Let's imagine a reflex that uses `@user` as a trusted variable in an `after_reflex` callback.

This variable can be overwritten using the following message:

{
  "target": "ChatReflex#instance_variable_set", 
  "args": ["@user", "<admin-id>"]
}

Here are other interesting methods that were found to be available for the ChatReflex sample reflex

  • remote_byebug: bind a debugging server
  • pry: drop the process in a REPL session

All in all, only counting :req and :opt parameters helps. For example around version 1.0 only .arity was checked which allowed access to the system method (.arity == -1)

{
  "target": "ChatReflex#system", 
  "args": ["[command here]"]
}

Using public_send instead of send does not help but the following payloads do not work since :rest parameters are not counted in the current version

{
  "target": "ChatReflex#send", 
  "args": ["system", "[command here]"] 
}
{ 
  "target": "ChatReflex#instance_eval", 
  "args": ["system('[command here]')"]
}
</details>

Pre-versions of 3.5.0 added a render_collection method on reflexes with a :req parameter. Calling this method could lead to arbitrary code execution:

{
  "target": "StimulusReflex::Reflex#render_collection", 
  "args": [
    { "inline":  "<% system('[command here]') %>" }
  ]
}

Patches

Patches are available on RubyGems and on NPM.

The patched versions are:

Workaround

You can add this guard to mitigate the issue if running an unpatched version of the library.

1.) Make sure all your reflexes inherit from the ApplicationReflex class 2.) Add this before_reflex callback to your app/reflexes/application_reflex.rb file:

class ApplicationReflex < StimulusReflex::Reflex
  before_reflex do
    ancestors = self.class.ancestors[0..self.class.ancestors.index(StimulusReflex::Reflex) - 1]
    allowed = ancestors.any? { |a| a.public_instance_methods(false).any?(method_name.to_sym) }

    raise ArgumentError.new("Reflex method '#{method_name}' is not defined on class '#{self.class.name}' or on any of its ancestors") if !allowed
  end
end

Affected Packages

4 total 4 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
📦npmstimulus_reflex3.5.0-pre0&&< 3.5.0-rc43.5.0-rc4npm install stimulus_reflex@3.5.0-rc4
📦npmstimulus_reflexall versions3.4.2npm install stimulus_reflex@3.4.2
💎RubyGemsstimulus_reflex3.5.0.pre0&&< 3.5.0.rc43.5.0.rc4bundle update stimulus_reflex --conservative
💎RubyGemsstimulus_reflexall versions3.4.2bundle update stimulus_reflex --conservative

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for stimulus_reflex, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update stimulus_reflex to 3.5.0-rc4 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2024-28121 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 Security's impact-aware SCA analyses which vulnerable code paths your application actually calls, so a match like CVE-2024-28121 can be triaged on real exposure rather than presence alone.

Tailored to CVE-2024-28121. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary More methods than expected can be called on reflex instances. Being able to call some of them has security implications. ### Details To invoke a reflex a websocket message of the following shape is sent: ```json { "target": "[class_name]#[method_name]", "args": [] } ``` The server will proceed to instantiate `reflex` using the provided `class_name` as long as it extends `StimulusReflex::Reflex`. It then attempts to call `method_name` on the instance with the provided arguments [ref](https://github.com/stimulusreflex/stimulus_reflex/blob/0211cad7d60fe96838587f159d657e44cee51
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is CVE-2024-28121 in your dependencies?

O3 Security finds CVE-2024-28121 across npm, RubyGems dependencies, including transitive ones, and its impact-aware SCA ranks findings by whether your code actually calls the vulnerable path.

CVE-2024-28121: stimulus RCE (High 8.8) | O3 Security