GHSA-cj8g-prcm-mfg5
Fix: kerberosmansour/hulumi#178GHSA-cj8g-prcm-mfg5 is a CWE-693 vulnerability in @hulumi/baseline. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-cj8g-prcm-mfg5 is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.
@hulumi/baseline: AccountFoundation reuse paths silently downgrade GuardDuty / Security Hub posture
Exploitation Status
No confirmed exploitation observed yet
- CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-cj8g-prcm-mfg5.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
Real-World Exposure
How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.
@hulumi/baselinenpmDescription
Affected: @hulumi/baseline < 1.4.0 — Fixed in: 1.4.0 — Severity: Medium — CWE-693 (Protection Mechanism Failure)
Summary
AccountFoundation can either create AWS detective services (GuardDuty for threat detection, Security Hub for compliance dashboards) or reuse pre-existing ones via opt-in flags. The reuse paths just imported the existing resources and reported success — they never checked whether the existing services were actually doing their job.
- GuardDuty reuse. If the existing detector was suspended, or set to the slower 6-hour publishing cadence instead of the baseline 15-minute one, or otherwise misconfigured — Hulumi never noticed. The deployment succeeded with a misleadingly-positive
guardDutyDetectorIdoutput as if the baseline were active. - Security Hub reuse. Although the account import was read-only, Hulumi unconditionally created the CIS / NIST
StandardsSubscriptionresources with default delete behaviour. Pulumi then treated those subscriptions as its own — a laterpulumi destroyof the stack would callBatchDisableStandards, unsubscribing the account from CIS / NIST compliance monitoring even on accounts that had those subscriptions before Hulumi ever ran.
Impact
Consumers using AccountFoundation's reuse mode could:
- ship deployments that appeared to enable a detective baseline but actually weren't (case 1), or
- accidentally turn off CIS / NIST compliance monitoring on an existing account just by destroying a Hulumi stack (case 2 — no malicious intent needed; a normal stack teardown was enough).
Patches
Upgrade to @hulumi/[email protected].
- GuardDuty reuse now asserts the imported detector is
ENABLEDwithfindingPublishingFrequency: FIFTEEN_MINUTES. Wrong posture fails the deploy at preview time. - Security Hub reuse creates the CIS / NIST
StandardsSubscriptionresources withretainOnDelete: true, so destroying a reused stack no longer unsubscribes the account.
Net-new (non-reuse) deployments are unchanged.
Workarounds
Don't reuse pre-existing detective services with AccountFoundation before upgrading. If reuse is unavoidable, manually verify detector posture out-of-band.
Resources
- PR #178 (Cluster G); regression tests in
packages/baseline/tests/guardduty-reuse-posture.test.tsandpackages/baseline/tests/securityhub-reuse-retain.test.ts.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 📦npm | @hulumi/baseline | all versions | 1.4.0 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for @hulumi/baseline. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update @hulumi/baseline to 1.4.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-cj8g-prcm-mfg5 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-cj8g-prcm-mfg5 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-cj8g-prcm-mfg5. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-cj8g-prcm-mfg5 in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-cj8g-prcm-mfg5 across npm dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.