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GHSA-cfhh-xgwq-5r67

MEDIUM

GHSA-cfhh-xgwq-5r67 is a medium-severity (CVSS 5) Improper Authentication vulnerability in @plone/volto. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-cfhh-xgwq-5r67 is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.

Sudden swap of user auth tokens in Volto

Also known asCVE-2022-24740
Published
Mar 14, 2022
Updated
Nov 8, 2023
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected

Weekly download volume for affected packages — a proxy for how broadly this vulnerability is deployed.

@plone/voltonpm
5Kdownloads / week

Description

Impact

Due to the usage of an outdated version of the react-cookie library, under the circumstances of given a server high load, it is possible that a user could get his/her auth cookie replaced with the auth cookie from another user, effectively giving him full access to the other users account and privileges. A proven exploit for this vulnerability does not exist, since the exact requisites for it to happen have not been fully clarified, and the attempts to reproduce it under testing conditions have been unsuccessful, but it still can happen randomly and unintentionally in the wild.

Patches

The patch and fix is present in Volto 15.0.0-alpha.0 (or later). See PR: https://github.com/plone/volto/pull/3051. We recommend upgrading to the final release of Volto 15 as soon as possible if running an affected version. See the upgrade guide https://6-dev-docs.plone.org/volto/upgrade-guide/index.html#upgrading-to-volto-15-x-x

Workarounds

It is possible to create a fix by manually upgrading the react-cookie package to 4.1.1 and then overriding all Volto components that use this library as in https://github.com/plone/volto/pull/3051. As this is substantial work, an update to the Volto 15 is recommended. The upgrade steps for going from Volto 14 to Volto 15 are quite easy and do not involve any complexity. Please take a look at the upgrade guide: https://6-dev-docs.plone.org/volto/upgrade-guide/index.html#upgrading-to-volto-15-x-x

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
📦npm@plone/volto14.0.0-alpha.6&&< 15.0.0-alpha.015.0.0-alpha.0

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for @plone/volto. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update @plone/volto to 15.0.0-alpha.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-cfhh-xgwq-5r67 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-cfhh-xgwq-5r67 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-cfhh-xgwq-5r67. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Impact Due to the usage of an outdated version of the react-cookie library, under the circumstances of given a server high load, it is possible that a user could get his/her auth cookie replaced with the auth cookie from another user, effectively giving him full access to the other users account and privileges. A proven exploit for this vulnerability does not exist, since the exact requisites for it to happen have not been fully clarified, and the attempts to reproduce it under testing conditions have been unsuccessful, but it still can happen randomly and unintentionally in the wild. ##
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-cfhh-xgwq-5r67 in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-cfhh-xgwq-5r67 across npm dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.