adm-zip: getDataAsync() bypasses the maxOutputLength size guard enforced by the synchronous getData() pathGHSA-c6fg-446q-cg94
MEDIUMFix: cthackers/adm-zip@4916006GHSA-c6fg-446q-cg94 is a medium-severity (CVSS 5.3) Uncontrolled Resource Consumption vulnerability in adm-zip. A fix is available for adm-zip — see the affected versions and patch details below.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
How urgent is this, really
GHSA-c6fg-446q-cg94 by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). Outside the shaded patch-first corner.
Where this sits among everything scored
Of 394,803 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Counts from FIRST.org, log-scaled.
Real-World Exposure
How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.
adm-zipnpmDescription
Summary
adm-zip enforces a maxOutputLength guard against decompression bombs on its synchronous getData() path, but the equivalent asynchronous getDataAsync() path does not enforce it — it accumulates and returns the entire decompressed output regardless of the entry's declared size. An application that checks an entry's declared size before deciding to process it, then reads the entry via getDataAsync() (a completely ordinary, often-recommended choice for I/O in Node.js), gets none of the protection it believes it has.
Details
methods/inflater.js:3-10passes{maxOutputLength: expectedLength}toinflateRawSync, which Node enforces.methods/inflater.js:12-31passes the same option tocreateInflateRawbut never enforces it on the streaming path — it just accumulates every chunk and allocates a final Buffer of whatever size resulted.
PoC
const AdmZip = require('adm-zip');
const zip = new AdmZip();
zip.addFile('p', Buffer.alloc(64 * 1024 * 1024, 0x41)); // 64 MiB
const raw = Buffer.from(zip.toBuffer());
// patch the local + central declared uncompressed size to 1 byte
raw.writeUInt32LE(1, localHeaderSizeOffset);
raw.writeUInt32LE(1, centralHeaderSizeOffset);
const entry = new AdmZip(raw).getEntry('p');
entry.getData();
// throws: ERR_BUFFER_TOO_LARGE: Cannot create a Buffer larger than 1 bytes
entry.getDataAsync((data, error) => { ... });
// returns the full 67,108,864-byte buffer, error is undefined
Impact
An application that validates a declared size before reading an entry, then uses the async API, gets no protection against a high-ratio DEFLATE payload. Repeated or larger requests could contribute to memory exhaustion.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 📦npm | adm-zip | all versions | 0.6.1npm install adm-zip@0.6.1 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for adm-zip, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update adm-zip to 0.6.1 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-c6fg-446q-cg94 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
Cap what an attacker can consume: apply request size, rate and timeout limits in front of the affected component, and run it with memory and CPU limits so exhaustion degrades one worker rather than the whole service.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-c6fg-446q-cg94 in your dependencies?
Find it across npm, including transitive dependencies.