Your RSA-2048 keys break in 2030. Find every one of them before attackers do.
📦
📦 npm
Not in CISA KEV
MEDIUM severity

adm-zip: getDataAsync() bypasses the maxOutputLength size guard enforced by the synchronous getData() pathGHSA-c6fg-446q-cg94

MEDIUMFix: cthackers/adm-zip@4916006

GHSA-c6fg-446q-cg94 is a medium-severity (CVSS 5.3) Uncontrolled Resource Consumption vulnerability in adm-zip. A fix is available for adm-zip — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Also known asCVE-2026-114103
Published
Updated
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Oct 22, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.3%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs18th percentile — riskier than 18% of all scored CVEsHighest risk

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

How urgent is this, really

GHSA-c6fg-446q-cg94 by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). Outside the shaded patch-first corner.

Where this sits among everything scored

Of 394,803 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Counts from FIRST.org, log-scaled.

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected

How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.

6Kother npm packages depend on this — each one inherits the vulnerability until it's patched upstream
adm-zipnpm
13.2Mdownloads / week

Description

Summary

adm-zip enforces a maxOutputLength guard against decompression bombs on its synchronous getData() path, but the equivalent asynchronous getDataAsync() path does not enforce it — it accumulates and returns the entire decompressed output regardless of the entry's declared size. An application that checks an entry's declared size before deciding to process it, then reads the entry via getDataAsync() (a completely ordinary, often-recommended choice for I/O in Node.js), gets none of the protection it believes it has.

Details

  • methods/inflater.js:3-10 passes {maxOutputLength: expectedLength} to inflateRawSync, which Node enforces.
  • methods/inflater.js:12-31 passes the same option to createInflateRaw but never enforces it on the streaming path — it just accumulates every chunk and allocates a final Buffer of whatever size resulted.

PoC

const AdmZip = require('adm-zip');
const zip = new AdmZip();
zip.addFile('p', Buffer.alloc(64 * 1024 * 1024, 0x41)); // 64 MiB
const raw = Buffer.from(zip.toBuffer());
// patch the local + central declared uncompressed size to 1 byte
raw.writeUInt32LE(1, localHeaderSizeOffset);
raw.writeUInt32LE(1, centralHeaderSizeOffset);
const entry = new AdmZip(raw).getEntry('p');

entry.getData();
// throws: ERR_BUFFER_TOO_LARGE: Cannot create a Buffer larger than 1 bytes

entry.getDataAsync((data, error) => { ... });
// returns the full 67,108,864-byte buffer, error is undefined

Impact

An application that validates a declared size before reading an entry, then uses the async API, gets no protection against a high-ratio DEFLATE payload. Repeated or larger requests could contribute to memory exhaustion.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
📦npmadm-zipall versions0.6.1npm install adm-zip@0.6.1

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for adm-zip, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update adm-zip to 0.6.1 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-c6fg-446q-cg94 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    Cap what an attacker can consume: apply request size, rate and timeout limits in front of the affected component, and run it with memory and CPU limits so exhaustion degrades one worker rather than the whole service.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary adm-zip enforces a `maxOutputLength` guard against decompression bombs on its synchronous `getData()` path, but the equivalent asynchronous `getDataAsync()` path does not enforce it — it accumulates and returns the entire decompressed output regardless of the entry's declared size. An application that checks an entry's declared size before deciding to process it, then reads the entry via `getDataAsync()` (a completely ordinary, often-recommended choice for I/O in Node.js), gets none of the protection it believes it has. ### Details - `methods/inflater.js:3-10` passes `{maxOutput
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-c6fg-446q-cg94 in your dependencies?

Find it across npm, including transitive dependencies.

adm-zip: getDataAsync() bypasses the maxOutputLength…