How severe is GHSA-c23c-rp3m-vpg3?

GHSA-c23c-rp3m-vpg3 has a CVSS score of 5.3/10, rated MEDIUM. Review your exposure and patch according to your risk tolerance.

Which packages are affected by GHSA-c23c-rp3m-vpg3?

GHSA-c23c-rp3m-vpg3 affects the following packages: github.com/envoyproxy/envoy (Go), github.com/envoyproxy/envoy (Go). Ecosystems affected: Go.

How do I fix GHSA-c23c-rp3m-vpg3?

No patched version of github.com/envoyproxy/envoy has shipped for GHSA-c23c-rp3m-vpg3 yet. Where your build allows, override or pin the dependency away from the vulnerable range, and apply any maintainer-recommended mitigation.

How do I detect GHSA-c23c-rp3m-vpg3 in my Go dependencies?

Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/envoyproxy/envoy. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

How do I mitigate GHSA-c23c-rp3m-vpg3 if there is no patch (or I can't update yet)?

If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

How does O3 Security protect against GHSA-c23c-rp3m-vpg3?

O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-c23c-rp3m-vpg3 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Is GHSA-c23c-rp3m-vpg3 actively exploited in the wild?

No public exploit code has been indexed for GHSA-c23c-rp3m-vpg3 yet. This does not mean the vulnerability cannot be exploited — absence of public exploits does not imply safety. Apply the recommended fix and use O3 Security to monitor your exposure.

What is the EPSS score for GHSA-c23c-rp3m-vpg3?

GHSA-c23c-rp3m-vpg3 has an EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) score of 0.3%, placing it in the 23th percentile of all CVEs. EPSS is maintained by FIRST.org and estimates the probability that a vulnerability will be exploited in the wild within the next 30 days. This score indicates relatively lower exploitation probability, though the CVSS severity should still guide your patching priority.

What type of vulnerability is GHSA-c23c-rp3m-vpg3?

GHSA-c23c-rp3m-vpg3 is classified as Use After Free (CWE-416). This weakness type describe the underlying flaw category, which helps determine the potential impact and the right class of mitigation.

When was GHSA-c23c-rp3m-vpg3 published, and has it been updated?

GHSA-c23c-rp3m-vpg3 was published on March 10, 2026 and was last updated on March 13, 2026. Advisory data evolves as severity scores, affected ranges, and exploit intelligence are revised — always check the latest version of the advisory before acting.

🐹 Go

GHSA-c23c-rp3m-vpg3

MEDIUM

Envoy's global rate limit may crash when the response phase limit is enabled and the response phase request is failed directly

Also known asBIT-envoy-2026-26330CVE-2026-26330

Published

Mar 10, 2026

Updated

Mar 13, 2026

Affected

2 pkgs

Patched

None yet

Exploits

None indexed

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗

0.3%probability of exploitation in next 30 days

Lower Risk23th percentile+0.31%

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Blast Radius

2 pkgs affected

🐹github.com/envoyproxy/envoy🐹github.com/envoyproxy/envoy

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

At the rate limit filter, if we enabled the response phase limit with apply_on_stream_done in the rate limit configuration and the response phase limit request fails directly, it may crash Envoy.

Details

When both the request phase limit and response phase limit are enabled, the safe gRPC client instance will be re-used for both the request phase request and response phase request.

But after the request phase request is done, the inner state of the request phase limit request in gRPC client is not cleaned up. When we send the second limit request at response phase, and the second limit request fails directly, we may access the previous request's inner state and result in crash.

PoC

This need to mock the network failure. But we have reproduced by unit test locally.

Impact

This only happens when both the request phase limit and response phase limit are enabled in the rate limit filter, and requires the request to rate limit service fails directly (For example, if from Envoy's perspective, no healthy endpoint for rate limit service may result the request fails directly). That's say, not easy to trigger this.

To workaround

This could be worked around by splitting the rate limit filter. That is, if there is a rate limit filter that contains normal rate limit configuration (request phase limit, without apply_on_stream_done) and also rate limit configuration with apply_on_stream_done (response phase limit). Splitting them into two rate limit filters and ensure one filter only contains normal rate limit configuration (without apply_on_stream_done), and one only contains rate limit configuration with apply_on_stream_done could avoid this problem.

Credit

Mandar Jog ([email protected])

Affected Packages

2 total

Ecosystem	Package	Vulnerable range	Fix
🐹Go	`github.com/envoyproxy/envoy`	all versions	No fix
🐹Go	`github.com/envoyproxy/envoy`	≥ 1.36.0	No fix

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency

Detect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/envoyproxy/envoy. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Remediation status
No patched version of github.com/envoyproxy/envoy has shipped for GHSA-c23c-rp3m-vpg3 yet. Where your build allows, override or pin the dependency away from the vulnerable range, and apply any maintainer-recommended mitigation.
Mitigate without a patch
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-c23c-rp3m-vpg3 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-c23c-rp3m-vpg3. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary At the rate limit filter, if we enabled the response phase limit with `apply_on_stream_done` in the rate limit configuration and the response phase limit request fails directly, it may crash Envoy. ### Details When both the request phase limit and response phase limit are enabled, the safe gRPC client instance will be re-used for both the request phase request and response phase request. But after the request phase request is done, the inner state of the request phase limit request in gRPC client is not cleaned up. When we send the second limit request at response phase, and th

O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-c23c-rp3m-vpg3 in your dependencies?

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