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OpenZeppelin Contracts Wizard: Line terminators in info.securityContact / info.license can inject lines into generated sourceGHSA-9wxg-vf3r-56hc

LOW

GHSA-9wxg-vf3r-56hc is a low-severity (CVSS 3.3) Code Injection vulnerability in @openzeppelin/wizard. A fix is available for @openzeppelin/wizard — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Also known asCVE-2026-57583
Published
Updated
Affected
4 pkgs
Patched
4 / 4
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Oct 23, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

No confirmed exploitation observed yet

  • CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-9wxg-vf3r-56hc.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.2%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs8th percentile — riskier than 8% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.00%0.23%0.46%0.69%0.2%0.2%Oct 26Oct 26

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

How urgent is this, really

Where this sits among everything scored

Real-World Exposure

4 pkgs affected

How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.

17other npm packages depend on this — each one inherits the vulnerability until it's patched upstream
@openzeppelin/wizardnpm
423downloads / week
@openzeppelin/wizard-caironpm
80downloads / week
@openzeppelin/wizard-stellarnpm
88downloads / week

Description

Summary

The Contracts Wizard generators printed info.securityContact and info.license verbatim into a single-line comment of the generated Solidity, Cairo, Stellar/Soroban, and Stylus source without rejecting line terminators. A newline (\n or \r\n) in either field ends the comment, so the text after it is emitted as source rather than remaining inside the comment — allowing arbitrary declarations to be injected into the generated contract.

Impact

This only matters when these fields are filled from input other than the user who will use the generated contract. Normal self-service use does not meet that condition:

  • Web app, AI assistant, and CLI: the user supplies these fields and uses their own output, so a line break only affects their own contract. (These fields are not URL-derived, so shared links cannot set them.)
  • Self-hosted API: same — the end user supplies the options and consumes the result.

The case that matters is an integration that fills these fields from untrusted input — for example, an MCP agent whose tool arguments are derived from content it processed. There, a newline in the value can add lines to output that otherwise looks like normal Wizard source. Impact is integrity-only; there is no execution on any Wizard service.

Patches

Fixed by rejecting line terminators in setInfo — the single code path all surfaces use — so the value can no longer break out of the comment. Upgrade to the patched versions. @openzeppelin/wizard-confidential and @openzeppelin/wizard-uniswap-hooks reuse this setInfo through their @openzeppelin/wizard dependency and receive the fix once that dependency is updated to a patched version.

Affected Packages

4 total 4 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
📦npm@openzeppelin/wizardall versions0.10.11npm install @openzeppelin/wizard@0.10.11
📦npm@openzeppelin/wizard-cairoall versions3.0.1npm install @openzeppelin/wizard-cairo@3.0.1
📦npm@openzeppelin/wizard-stellarall versions0.6.2npm install @openzeppelin/wizard-stellar@0.6.2
📦npm@openzeppelin/wizard-stylusall versions0.3.1npm install @openzeppelin/wizard-stylus@0.3.1

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for @openzeppelin/wizard, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update @openzeppelin/wizard to 0.10.11 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-9wxg-vf3r-56hc is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    Stop passing untrusted input into the interpreter or shell: call the affected binary with an argument array rather than a composed command string, reject anything outside a strict allowlist of expected values, and run the component under an account that cannot reach beyond the work it legitimately does.

Frequently Asked Questions

## Summary The Contracts Wizard generators printed `info.securityContact` and `info.license` verbatim into a single-line comment of the generated Solidity, Cairo, Stellar/Soroban, and Stylus source without rejecting line terminators. A newline (`\n` or `\r\n`) in either field ends the comment, so the text after it is emitted as source rather than remaining inside the comment — allowing arbitrary declarations to be injected into the generated contract. ## Impact This only matters when these fields are filled from input other than the user who will use the generated contract. Normal self-serv
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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