GHSA-9wj2-4hcm-r74j
HIGHphpMyFAQ duplicate email registration allows multiple accounts with the same email
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
Blast Radius
thorsten/phpmyfaqReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Packagist packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
phpMyFAQ does not enforce uniqueness of email addresses during user registration. This allows multiple distinct accounts to be created with the same email. Because email is often used as an identifier for password resets, notifications, and administrative actions, this flaw can cause account ambiguity and, in certain configurations, may lead to privilege escalation or account takeover.
Details
An account management logic flaw in phpMyFAQ allows attackers to register multiple accounts under the same email address. If email is used for password reset or administrative flows, this may result in account takeover, loss of accountability, and abuse of business logic.
PoC
1.Register a user with email [email protected] 2.Register another user with the same email. 3.Both accounts appear in /admin/?action=user&user_action=listallusers. <img width="1150" height="628" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/8c19f01a-e897-4ca7-b3f8-fcf83e6ff952" />
Impact
-Data integrity loss: Multiple accounts mapped to one email break auditability. -Password reset ambiguity: If reset flow relies on email only, attackers can target or take over accounts. -Privilege escalation: If one account with the same email has admin privileges, an attacker controlling the email may escalate. -Spam / DoS: Attackers can mass-register accounts with a single email to pollute the system.
This is a business logic / authentication vulnerability. Impacted users are anyone relying on phpMyFAQ’s account system where email is assumed to be unique.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐘Packagist | thorsten/phpmyfaq | ≥ 4.0.7&&< 4.0.13 | 4.0.13 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for thorsten/phpmyfaq. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update thorsten/phpmyfaq to 4.0.13 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-9wj2-4hcm-r74j is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-9wj2-4hcm-r74j is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-9wj2-4hcm-r74j. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-9wj2-4hcm-r74j in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-9wj2-4hcm-r74j across Packagist dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.