GHSA-9pp3-53p2-ww9v
CRITICALGHSA-9pp3-53p2-ww9v is a critical-severity (CVSS 9.1) SQL Injection vulnerability in @vendure/core. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-9pp3-53p2-ww9v is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.
@vendure/core has a SQL Injection vulnerability
Real-World Exposure
@vendure/core📦@vendure/core📦@vendure/coreReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects npm packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
An unauthenticated SQL injection vulnerability exists in the Vendure Shop API. A user-controlled query string parameter is interpolated directly into a raw SQL expression without parameterization or validation, allowing an attacker to execute arbitrary SQL against the database. This affects all supported database backends (PostgreSQL, MySQL/MariaDB, SQLite).
The Admin API is also affected, though exploitation there requires authentication.
Affected versions
@vendure/core< 2.3.4@vendure/core>= 3.0.0, < 3.5.7@vendure/core>= 3.6.0, < 3.6.2
Note: versions 2.3.4 and above in the 2.x line are patched. There were no 2.4.x or 2.x releases between 2.3.x and 3.0.0.
Patched versions
@vendure/core2.3.4@vendure/core3.5.7@vendure/core3.6.2
Details
In ProductService.findOneBySlug, the request context's languageCode value is interpolated into a SQL CASE expression via a JavaScript template literal:
.addSelect(
`CASE translation.languageCode WHEN '${ctx.languageCode}' THEN 2 WHEN '${ctx.channel.defaultLanguageCode}' THEN 1 ELSE 0 END`,
'sort_order',
)
TypeORM has no opportunity to parameterize this value because it is embedded directly into the SQL string before being passed to the query builder.
The languageCode value can originate from the HTTP query string and is set on the request context for every incoming API request. The value is cast to the LanguageCode TypeScript type at compile time, but no runtime validation is performed -- the raw query string value is used as-is.
Attack vector
An unauthenticated attacker can append a crafted languageCode query parameter to any Shop API request to inject arbitrary SQL into the query. No user interaction is required. The vulnerable endpoint is exposed on every default Vendure installation.
Mitigation
Upgrade to a patched version immediately.
If you cannot upgrade right away, apply the following hotfix to RequestContextService.getLanguageCode to validate the languageCode input at the boundary. This blocks injection payloads before they can reach any query:
private getLanguageCode(req: Request, channel: Channel): LanguageCode | undefined {
const queryLanguageCode = req.query?.languageCode as string | undefined;
const isValidFormat = queryLanguageCode && /^[a-zA-Z0-9_-]+$/.test(queryLanguageCode);
return (
(isValidFormat ? (queryLanguageCode as LanguageCode) : undefined) ??
channel.defaultLanguageCode ??
this.configService.defaultLanguageCode
);
}
This replaces the existing getLanguageCode method in packages/core/src/service/helpers/request-context/request-context.service.ts. Invalid values are silently dropped and the channel's default language is used instead.
The patched versions additionally convert the vulnerable SQL interpolation to a parameterized query as defense in depth.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 📦npm | @vendure/core | ≥ 3.0.0&&< 3.5.7 | 3.5.7 |
| 📦npm | @vendure/core | ≥ 3.6.0&&< 3.6.2 | 3.6.2 |
| 📦npm | @vendure/core | ≥ 1.7.4&&< 2.3.4 | 2.3.4 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for @vendure/core. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update @vendure/core to 3.5.7 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-9pp3-53p2-ww9v is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-9pp3-53p2-ww9v is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-9pp3-53p2-ww9v. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-9pp3-53p2-ww9v in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-9pp3-53p2-ww9v across npm dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.