GHSA-wm63-7627-ch33
MEDIUM@vendure/core's insecure currencyCode handling allows wrong payment amounts
Blast Radius
Weekly download volume for affected packages — a proxy for how broadly this vulnerability is deployed.
@vendure/corenpmDescription
Impact
Currently, in many Vendure deployments it's possible to select any currencyCode (really any, doesn't need to be assigned to the channel) and pay through Mollie and Stripe in that particular currencyCode. The prices are not transformed. The result is the Order is in Payment Settled in the foreign currency. See SS, CZK is not in the channel. I've tested with Mollie and Stripe it both works.
Further notes
After looking into this further and with help from the comments below, the root cause of this vulnerability is the ability to specify an arbitrary currencyCode as a query parameter to an API call, and then Vendure will use this and pass it to the rest of the system as RequestContext.currencyCode.
The solution is to add validation to the passed currencyCode to ensure that it matches one of the available availableCurrencyCodes of the active Channel.
Furthermore, an additional check has been added for when the currencyCode changes during the AddingItems stage - in this case we need to re-calculate the prices in the new currency.
Patches
v2.1.3
Workarounds
You can define a custom OrderProcess onTransitionStart function which can verify the order's currencyCode is as expected before allowing the transition to the ArrangingPayment state.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 📦npm | @vendure/core | all versions | 2.1.3 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for @vendure/core. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update @vendure/core to 2.1.3 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-wm63-7627-ch33 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-wm63-7627-ch33 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-wm63-7627-ch33. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-wm63-7627-ch33 in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-wm63-7627-ch33 across npm dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.