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@vendure/core's insecure currencyCode handling allows wrong payment amountsGHSA-wm63-7627-ch33

MEDIUMFix: vendure-ecommerce/vendure@5e506fd

GHSA-wm63-7627-ch33 is a medium-severity (CVSS 5.3) vulnerability in @vendure/core. A fix is available for @vendure/core — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Published
Updated
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Nov 17, 2023 · OSV.dev, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected

How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.

59other npm packages depend on this — each one inherits the vulnerability until it's patched upstream
@vendure/corenpm
63Kdownloads / week

Description

Impact

Currently, in many Vendure deployments it's possible to select any currencyCode (really any, doesn't need to be assigned to the channel) and pay through Mollie and Stripe in that particular currencyCode. The prices are not transformed. The result is the Order is in Payment Settled in the foreign currency. See SS, CZK is not in the channel. I've tested with Mollie and Stripe it both works.

Further notes

After looking into this further and with help from the comments below, the root cause of this vulnerability is the ability to specify an arbitrary currencyCode as a query parameter to an API call, and then Vendure will use this and pass it to the rest of the system as RequestContext.currencyCode.

The solution is to add validation to the passed currencyCode to ensure that it matches one of the available availableCurrencyCodes of the active Channel.

Furthermore, an additional check has been added for when the currencyCode changes during the AddingItems stage - in this case we need to re-calculate the prices in the new currency.

Patches

v2.1.3

Workarounds

You can define a custom OrderProcess onTransitionStart function which can verify the order's currencyCode is as expected before allowing the transition to the ArrangingPayment state.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
📦npm@vendure/coreall versions2.1.3npm install @vendure/core@2.1.3

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for @vendure/core, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update @vendure/core to 2.1.3 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-wm63-7627-ch33 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Impact Currently, in many Vendure deployments it's possible to select any currencyCode (really any, doesn't need to be assigned to the channel) and pay through Mollie and Stripe in that particular currencyCode. The prices are not transformed. The result is the Order is in Payment Settled in the foreign currency. See SS, CZK is not in the channel. I've tested with Mollie and Stripe it both works. **Further notes** After looking into this further and with help from the comments below, the root cause of this vulnerability is the ability to specify an arbitrary `currencyCode` as a query par
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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