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📦 npm

GHSA-9g8x-92q2-p28f

NodeVM observability builtins leak host process and HTTP request data

Also known asCVE-2026-47141
Published
May 29, 2026
Updated
Jun 12, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.3%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk23th percentile0.00%
0.00%0.27%0.54%0.81%0.3%0.3%Jul 26Jul 26

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected

Weekly download volume for affected packages — a proxy for how broadly this vulnerability is deployed.

vm2npm
1.4Mdownloads / week

Description

Summary

NodeVM exposes some process-wide observability builtins when they are allowed through require.builtin.

The following builtins are not blocked by the dangerous builtin denylist:

diagnostics_channel
async_hooks
perf_hooks

These modules are process-wide, not sandbox-local. Sandboxed code can use them to observe host application data across the vm2 boundary.

Note: It is a host data exposure issue. The impact depends on whether the host application allows these builtins and uses HTTP, async request context, diagnostics channels, or performance marks in the same process.

Details

Non-denied builtins are exposed to the sandbox through lib/builtin.js:

builtins.set(key, special ? special : vm => vm.readonly(hostRequire(key)));

diagnostics_channel, async_hooks, and perf_hooks are not denied. These modules expose host process state rather than sandbox-local state.

Confirmed examples:

  1. diagnostics_channel lets sandboxed code subscribe to Node.js HTTP diagnostic channels such as http.server.request.start. The sandbox receives host HTTP request objects and can read headers such as Authorization or session tokens.
  2. async_hooks.executionAsyncResource() lets sandboxed code read the current host AsyncResource. If the host stores request/user data on that resource, the sandbox can read it.
  3. perf_hooks.performance.getEntriesByType('mark') lets sandboxed code read host performance timeline entries.

PoC

Run from the vm2 repository root:

node poc/observability-builtins-info-leak.js

observability-builtins-info-leak.js

The PoC uses only the specific builtin being tested in each section.

It confirms:

diagnostics_channel: sandbox reads host HTTP request headers
async_hooks: sandbox reads host AsyncResource data
perf_hooks: sandbox reads host performance mark names

Example impact from the PoC:

authorization: Bearer HOST_HTTP_SECRET_...
x-session-token: HOST_HTTP_SECRET_...

These values are sent to a host HTTP server, but the sandbox reads them through diagnostics_channel.

<img width="997" height="566" alt="Screenshot 2026-05-10 at 1 13 20 PM" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/36a7d600-8b53-4bfe-ab06-4e6dcfad5015" />

Impact

An attacker who can run untrusted JavaScript inside NodeVM with affected builtin settings can observe data from the host process.

In a real application, this may expose HTTP request headers, authorization tokens, session tokens, request context values, user identifiers, or other sensitive diagnostics data from the host application or from other users.

Suggested fix

Treat process-wide observability modules as dangerous builtins for untrusted sandboxes.

At minimum, consider blocking:

diagnostics_channel
async_hooks
perf_hooks

These modules are not sandbox-local and can expose host process state across the vm2 boundary.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
📦npmvm2all versions3.11.4

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for vm2. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update vm2 to 3.11.4 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-9g8x-92q2-p28f is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-9g8x-92q2-p28f is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-9g8x-92q2-p28f. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

## Summary `NodeVM` exposes some process-wide observability builtins when they are allowed through `require.builtin`. The following builtins are not blocked by the dangerous builtin denylist: ```text diagnostics_channel async_hooks perf_hooks ``` These modules are process-wide, not sandbox-local. Sandboxed code can use them to observe host application data across the vm2 boundary. **Note**: It is a host data exposure issue. The impact depends on whether the host application allows these builtins and uses HTTP, async request context, diagnostics channels, or performance marks in the same p
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-9g8x-92q2-p28f in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-9g8x-92q2-p28f across npm dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.