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Not in CISA KEV
HIGH severity

GHSA-97wc-2hqc-cjgr

HIGH

GHSA-97wc-2hqc-cjgr is a high-severity (CVSS 7.3) remote code execution vulnerability in smallbitvec. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-97wc-2hqc-cjgr is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.

smallbitvec: Integer overflow in safe API leads to heap buffer overflow

Also known asCVE-2026-44983
Published
May 9, 2026
Updated
Jun 8, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
None yet
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Jun 8, 2026 · OSV.dev, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🦀smallbitvec

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects crates.io packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

An integer overflow in the internal capacity calculation of smallbitvec can lead to an undersized heap allocation, resulting in a heap buffer overflow through safe APIs only. This allows memory corruption without requiring unsafe code from the caller.

Details

The issue originates from unchecked arithmetic in the internal helper function responsible for computing the required buffer size:

(cap + bits_per_storage() - 1) / bits_per_storage()

When cap is close to usize::MAX, the addition:

cap + bits_per_storage() - 1

can overflow in release builds and wrap around due to Rust’s default wrapping semantics for integer overflow in optimized builds.

As a result:

  • buffer_len(cap) may return a value significantly smaller than required.
  • The backing storage is allocated with insufficient size.
  • Internal metadata (logical length/capacity) reflects a much larger size than the actual allocation.

Subsequent safe API calls (e.g., set, push, reserve) rely on this corrupted metadata and perform index computations that assume sufficient backing storage. These operations eventually reach unsafe internal code paths (e.g., pointer arithmetic and unchecked indexing), leading to out-of-bounds memory access.

Summary of the issue: integer overflow → undersized allocation → inconsistent metadata (len/cap vs actual buffer) → unsafe internal access using corrupted metadata → heap buffer overflow (UB)

PoC

PoC 1: Out-of-bounds write via from_elem

#![forbid(unsafe_code)]

use smallbitvec::SmallBitVec;

fn main() {
    // Triggers overflow in buffer_len(cap)
    let mut v = SmallBitVec::from_elem(usize::MAX, false);

    // Logical length is large, but backing storage is undersized
    // This leads to out-of-bounds write in unsafe internals
    v.set(0, true);
}

PoC 2: Overflow via reserve

#![forbid(unsafe_code)]

use smallbitvec::SmallBitVec;

fn main() {
    let mut v = SmallBitVec::new();
    v.push(true);

    // Triggers overflow in capacity computation
    v.reserve(usize::MAX - 10);
}

Impact

  • Heap buffer overflow via safe API only
  • ASAN-observable heap-buffer-overflow
  • Undefined Behavior detectable with Miri (e.g., out-of-bounds indexing due to corrupted metadata)

Tested on

  • rustc 1.96.0-nightly (9602bda1d 2026-04-05)
  • Target: x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu
  • Build: release
  • ASAN: RUSTFLAGS="-Z sanitizer=address" cargo +nightly run --release
  • Miri: cargo +nightly miri run --release

Affected Packages

1 total
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🦀crates.iosmallbitvec1.0.1No fix

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for smallbitvec. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Remediation status

    No patched version of smallbitvec has shipped for GHSA-97wc-2hqc-cjgr yet. Where your build allows, override or pin the dependency away from the vulnerable range, and apply any maintainer-recommended mitigation.

  3. Mitigate without a patch

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-97wc-2hqc-cjgr is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-97wc-2hqc-cjgr. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary An integer overflow in the internal capacity calculation of `smallbitvec` can lead to an undersized heap allocation, resulting in a heap buffer overflow through safe APIs only. This allows memory corruption without requiring `unsafe` code from the caller. ### Details The issue originates from unchecked arithmetic in the internal helper function responsible for computing the required buffer size: ``` (cap + bits_per_storage() - 1) / bits_per_storage() ``` When `cap` is close to `usize::MAX`, the addition: ``` cap + bits_per_storage() - 1 ``` can overflow in release builds and w
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-97wc-2hqc-cjgr in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-97wc-2hqc-cjgr across crates.io dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.

GHSA-97wc-2hqc-cjgr: smallbitvec Memory… | O3 Security