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Not in CISA KEV
LOW severity

MobSF has SSRF port restriction bypass in assetlinks_checkGHSA-95px-34x5-p37h

LOWFix: MobSF/Mobile-Security-Framework-MobSF#2627

GHSA-95px-34x5-p37h is a low-severity (CVSS 3) Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in mobsf. A fix is available for mobsf — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Also known asCVE-2026-68927PYSEC-2026-3690
Published
Updated
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Nov 15, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

Proof-of-concept exploit code exists

  • CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-95px-34x5-p37h.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.3%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs27th percentile — riskier than 27% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.00%0.28%0.55%0.83%0.3%0.3%0.3%0.3%Sep 26Nov 26Nov 26

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

How urgent is this, really

Where this sits among everything scored

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🐍mobsf

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

MobSF's Android App Link assetlinks checker validates only the manifest android:host value with valid_host(), but then appends the separate android:port value into the URL used for the server-side request. This bypasses the current port restriction in valid_host() and lets a crafted APK cause MobSF to fetch http://host:<attacker-port>/.well-known/assetlinks.json or https://host:<attacker-port>/.well-known/assetlinks.json.

Impact

An authenticated user who can upload or trigger analysis of a crafted APK can cause the MobSF server to make an outbound request to an attacker-selected port during Android manifest analysis. When the host is controlled by the attacker and uses DNS rebinding, the validation lookup can resolve to a public IP while the later HTTP client lookup resolves to an internal address, allowing SSRF to internal services on non-80/443 ports.

This is not arbitrary URL SSRF. The path remains fixed to /.well-known/assetlinks.json, and redirects are disabled. The bypass is that the final fetched URL is assembled after the host-only validation, so the current port guard is not applied to the actual URL.

Root cause

valid_host() rejects ports other than 80 and 443 when a port is included in the string being validated:

port = parsed.port
...
if port and port not in (80, 443):
    return False

In get_browsable_activities(), only the host attribute is passed to valid_host():

host = data.getAttribute(f'{ns}:host')
port = data.getAttribute(f'{ns}:port')
...
if not valid_host(host):
    logger.warning('Invalid Host: %s', host)
    continue
shost = f'{scheme}://{host}'
if port and is_number(port):
    c_url = f'{shost}:{port}{WELL_KNOWN_PATH}'
else:
    c_url = f'{shost}{WELL_KNOWN_PATH}'
well_known[c_url] = shost

_check_url() then fetches the assembled URL after checking only path, query, and params:

purl = urlparse(url)
if (purl.path != WELL_KNOWN_PATH
    or len(purl.query) > 0
        or len(purl.params) > 0):
    logger.warning('Invalid Assetlinks URL: %s', url)
    continue
r = requests.get(url,
                 timeout=5,
                 allow_redirects=False,
                 proxies=proxies,
                 verify=verify)

Reproduction

Use an Android manifest with a browsable App Link data tag that has a benign-looking host and a restricted port:

<activity android:name=".DeepLink" android:exported="true">
  <intent-filter>
    <action android:name="android.intent.action.VIEW" />
    <category android:name="android.intent.category.BROWSABLE" />
    <category android:name="android.intent.category.DEFAULT" />
    <data android:scheme="http" android:host="rebind.example" android:port="22" />
  </intent-filter>
</activity>

A safe local proof with DNS and HTTP monkeypatching shows that MobSF validates only rebind.example, then fetches a URL that preserves the unchecked port:

well_known map: {'http://rebind.example:22/.well-known/assetlinks.json': 'http://rebind.example'}
requests.get calls: [('http://rebind.example:22/.well-known/assetlinks.json', {'timeout': 5, 'allow_redirects': False, 'proxies': None, 'verify': True})]
findings: [{'url': 'http://rebind.example:22/.well-known/assetlinks.json', 'host': 'http://rebind.example', 'status_code': 200, 'status': True}]
VULNERABLE: valid_host validated only rebind.example, but assetlinks_check fetched unchecked port 22 via http://rebind.example:22/.well-known/assetlinks.json

The same code pattern is present in latest release v4.4.6 and current main.

Remediation

Validate the final URL after all manifest components have been applied. In particular:

  1. Build c_url, then run validation on the full URL, including scheme, hostname, port, path, query, and params.
  2. Reject android:port values other than 80 and 443 before appending them to the URL.
  3. Prevent DNS rebinding by pinning the validated DNS result to the outbound connection or otherwise ensuring the actual HTTP request cannot resolve to a different address than the validation step.
  4. Keep allow_redirects=False for the existing redirect mitigation.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐍PyPImobsfall versions4.5.1pip install --upgrade 'mobsf==4.5.1'

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for mobsf, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update mobsf to 4.5.1 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-95px-34x5-p37h is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    Restrict outbound requests from the affected component to an allowlist of hosts, block access to link-local and internal address ranges at the network layer, and require authentication on internal services so a forged request cannot reach them unauthenticated.

Frequently Asked Questions

## Summary MobSF's Android App Link assetlinks checker validates only the manifest `android:host` value with `valid_host()`, but then appends the separate `android:port` value into the URL used for the server-side request. This bypasses the current port restriction in `valid_host()` and lets a crafted APK cause MobSF to fetch `http://host:<attacker-port>/.well-known/assetlinks.json` or `https://host:<attacker-port>/.well-known/assetlinks.json`. ## Impact An authenticated user who can upload or trigger analysis of a crafted APK can cause the MobSF server to make an outbound request to an att
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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