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CRITICAL severity

GHSA-95mq-xwj4-r47p — v25

CRITICAL

GHSA-95mq-xwj4-r47p is a critical-severity (CVSS 9.4) Information Exposure vulnerability in github.com/dgraph-io/dgraph/v25. A fix is available for github.com/dgraph-io/dgraph/v25 — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Dgraph: Unauthenticated /debug/pprof/cmdline discloses admin auth token, enabling unauthorized access to protected Alpha admin endpoints

Also known asCVE-2026-40173GO-2026-5274
Published
Apr 16, 2026
Updated
Sep 10, 2026
Affected
3 pkgs
Patched
1 / 3
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Sep 19, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

Proof-of-concept exploit code exists

  • CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
  • CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
  • A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-95mq-xwj4-r47p.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.5%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs42th percentile — riskier than 42% of all scored CVEsHighest risk

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

How urgent is this, really

GHSA-95mq-xwj4-r47p plotted by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). The shaded corner — EPSS 50%+ and CVSS 7.0+ — is where this CVE doesn't sit, though severity or exploitability alone can still warrant action.

Where this sits among everything scored

Of 377,166 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Real counts from FIRST.org, not a sample — log-scaled since the landscape is heavily right-skewed.

Real-World Exposure

3 pkgs affected
🐹github.com/dgraph-io/dgraph/v25🐹github.com/dgraph-io/dgraph/v24🐹github.com/dgraph-io/dgraph

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

An unauthenticated debug endpoint in Dgraph Alpha exposes the full process command line, including the configured admin token from --security "token=...".

This does not break token validation logic directly; instead, it discloses the credential and enables unauthorized admin-level access by reusing the leaked token in X-Dgraph-AuthToken.

Details

The behavior occurs entirely within core Alpha HTTP routing and does not require any external proxy, plugin, or non-core integration.

The core issue is not that admin token protection is absent, but that the protected secret is exposed in cleartext through an unauthenticated core debug endpoint.

Relevant code paths:

  • dgraph/cmd/alpha/run.go:17 imports net/http/pprof, which registers /debug/pprof/* handlers on the default mux.
  • dgraph/cmd/alpha/run.go:533 uses http.Handle("/", audit.AuditRequestHttp(baseMux)), so default-mux handlers remain reachable.
  • dgraph/cmd/alpha/admin.go:52 enforces admin token checks in adminAuthHandler for admin endpoints.
  • dgraph/cmd/alpha/admin.go:74 shows /admin/config/cache_mb behind adminAuthHandler.

Credential-exposure chain:

  1. /debug/pprof/cmdline is reachable without authentication.
  2. Its output includes the configured admin token from process arguments.
  3. The disclosed token is accepted by adminAuthHandler when sent as X-Dgraph-AuthToken.
  4. An attacker gains unauthorized access to admin-only functionality.

Observed local evidence (safe validation):

  • Request: GET /admin/config/cache_mb without token
    • Status: 200 (request rejected at application layer)
    • Body contains error: Invalid X-Dgraph-AuthToken
    • The endpoint returns HTTP 200 but indicates authentication failure in the response body.
  • Request: GET /debug/pprof/cmdline without token
    • Status: 200
    • Body excerpt includes: --security=token=TopSecretToken123;
  • Request: GET /admin/config/cache_mb with X-Dgraph-AuthToken: TopSecretToken123
    • Status: 200
    • Body: 4096

Important policy/triage clarification:

  • This issue persists even when the admin-token security feature is enabled: the token itself is exposed via an unauthenticated core debug endpoint, making this more than a misconfiguration-only concern.
  • Network restrictions (bind/whitelist/firewall) may reduce exposure, but they do not remediate the underlying credential disclosure behavior.

PoC

  • Branch: main
  • Commit: b15c87e93
  • Describe: v25.3.1

Preconditions:

  • Alpha HTTP port is reachable by attacker traffic.
  • Admin token is configured via supported startup flag: --security "token=...".
  • /debug/pprof/* is exposed on the same Alpha HTTP listener.
  • This behavior occurs with documented startup flags and without any non-default or unsupported configuration.

Reproduction steps:

  1. Start Zero and Alpha (example local setup):

    • dgraph zero --my=127.0.0.1:5280 --port_offset=200 --bindall=false --wal=./zw
    • dgraph alpha --my=127.0.0.1:7280 --zero=127.0.0.1:5280 --port_offset=200 --bindall=false --security "token=TopSecretToken123;" --postings=./p --wal=./w --tmp=./t

  2. Verify admin endpoint rejects unauthenticated request:

    • curl -i http://127.0.0.1:8280/admin/config/cache_mb
    • Expected body includes Invalid X-Dgraph-AuthToken.

  3. Read token from unauthenticated debug endpoint:

    • curl -s http://127.0.0.1:8280/debug/pprof/cmdline
    • Expected output includes --security=token=TopSecretToken123;.

  4. Reuse leaked token against admin endpoint:

    • curl -i -H "X-Dgraph-AuthToken: TopSecretToken123" http://127.0.0.1:8280/admin/config/cache_mb
    • Expected: successful response (example observed: 4096).

Note: The PoC uses 127.0.0.1 only for safe local validation. The vulnerable condition is unauthenticated reachability of /debug/pprof/cmdline; in any deployment where Alpha HTTP is reachable by untrusted parties, the same token disclosure and subsequent unauthorized admin access apply.

Impact

  • Unauthenticated disclosure of a sensitive admin credential via debug endpoint, enabling unauthorized privileged administrative access through token reuse
  • Operators running Dgraph Alpha with admin token configured, where Alpha HTTP/debug routes are reachable by untrusted users or networks.

The attack requires network reachability to the Alpha HTTP port. In deployments where this interface is exposed beyond trusted boundaries, the issue is remotely exploitable without authentication.

Depending on exposed admin functionality in deployment policy, this may allow configuration changes, operational control actions, and other privileged administrative operations exposed through /admin/*.

Affected Packages

3 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐹Gogithub.com/dgraph-io/dgraph/v25all versions25.3.2go get github.com/dgraph-io/dgraph/v25@v25.3.2
🐹Gogithub.com/dgraph-io/dgraph/v24all versionsNo fix
🐹Gogithub.com/dgraph-io/dgraphall versionsNo fix

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency

  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/dgraph-io/dgraph/v25, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update github.com/dgraph-io/dgraph/v25 to 25.3.2 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-95mq-xwj4-r47p is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 Security's impact-aware SCA analyses which vulnerable code paths your application actually calls, so a match like GHSA-95mq-xwj4-r47p can be triaged on real exposure rather than presence alone.

Tailored to GHSA-95mq-xwj4-r47p. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary An unauthenticated debug endpoint in Dgraph Alpha exposes the full process command line, including the configured admin token from `--security "token=..."`. This does not break token validation logic directly; instead, it discloses the credential and enables unauthorized admin-level access by reusing the leaked token in `X-Dgraph-AuthToken`. ### Details The behavior occurs entirely within core Alpha HTTP routing and does not require any external proxy, plugin, or non-core integration. The core issue is not that admin token protection is absent, but that the protected secret is e
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GHSA-95mq-xwj4-r47p: v25 (Critical 9.4) | O3 Security