Your RSA-2048 keys break in 2030. Find every one of them before attackers do.
📦 npm

GHSA-9237-rg5p-rhfw

@saltcorn/data: Tenant user role is used for tenant creation role check

Published
Apr 22, 2026
Updated
Apr 22, 2026
Affected
3 pkgs
Patched
3 / 3
Exploits
None indexed

Blast Radius

3 pkgs affected
📦@saltcorn/data📦@saltcorn/data📦@saltcorn/data

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects npm packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

When a tenant admin is logged out of the root domain (e.g., saltcorn.com) but logged in to their own tenant space as admin, they can simply append /tenant/create to their tenant URL. The system reads the role from the tenant context (admin), and a new tenant is created on the root domain (in PUBLIC SCHEMA > _sc_tenants), rather than in the tenant's own _sc_tenants table.

If the same logic applies to other routes, a tenant admin effectively gains admin rights on the root domain.

PoC

A tenant-created subtenant appears under the Saltcorn public schema instead of the tenant's own schema.

  • Even when role_id=1 is required for tenant creation on saltcorn.com (only admin can create tenants), existing tenant admins can still create new tenants because their local role_id:1 is evaluated against the root domain.
  • Even when role_to_create_tenant is set to 0 in the tenant's _sc_config schema, or removed entirely, the tenant admin can still create sub-tenants on the root domain — suggesting role_to_create_tenant is not being read at all.

Impact

Tenant admins gain unauthorized admin-level access to the root domain. Any authenticated tenant admin can perform privileged operations (e.g., creating tenants) on the root domain by exploiting the role context mismatch.

Affected Packages

3 total 3 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
📦npm@saltcorn/dataall versions1.4.4
📦npm@saltcorn/data1.5.0-beta.0&&< 1.5.21.5.2
📦npm@saltcorn/data1.6.0-alpha.0&&< 1.6.0-beta.21.6.0-beta.2

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for @saltcorn/data. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update @saltcorn/data to 1.4.4 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-9237-rg5p-rhfw is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-9237-rg5p-rhfw is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-9237-rg5p-rhfw. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

## Summary When a tenant admin is logged out of the root domain (e.g., saltcorn.com) but logged in to their own tenant space as admin, they can simply append `/tenant/create` to their tenant URL. The system reads the role from the tenant context (admin), and a new tenant is created on the **root domain** (in `PUBLIC SCHEMA > _sc_tenants`), rather than in the tenant's own `_sc_tenants` table. If the same logic applies to other routes, a tenant admin effectively gains admin rights on the root domain. ## PoC A tenant-created subtenant appears under the Saltcorn public schema instead of the te
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-9237-rg5p-rhfw in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-9237-rg5p-rhfw across npm dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.