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GHSA-59xv-588h-2vmm

NONE

@saltcorn/data vulnerable to SQL Injection via jsexprToSQL Literal Handler

Published
Apr 10, 2026
Updated
Apr 10, 2026
Affected
3 pkgs
Patched
3 / 3
Exploits
None indexed

Blast Radius

3 pkgs affected
📦@saltcorn/data📦@saltcorn/data📦@saltcorn/data

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects npm packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

The jsexprToSQL() function in Saltcorn converts JavaScript expressions to SQL for use in database constraints. The Literal handler wraps string values in single quotes without escaping embedded single quotes, allowing SQL injection when creating Formula-type table constraints.

Vulnerable Component

File: packages/saltcorn-data/models/expression.ts, lines 117-118

Literal({ value }: { value: ExtendedNode }) {
  if (typeof value == "string") return `'${value}'`;  // NO ESCAPING!
  return `${value}`;
},

Call chain: Formula constraint creation → table_constraints.ts:127jsexprToSQL()Literal()db.query() executes unsanitized SQL.

Proof of Concept

Injection via Formula Constraint

When an admin creates a Formula-type table constraint with the expression:

name === "test' OR '1'='1"

The jsexprToSQL() function generates:

(name)=('test' OR '1'='1')

This is then executed as:

ALTER TABLE "tablename" ADD CONSTRAINT "tablename_fml_1" CHECK ((name)=('test' OR '1'='1'));

The single quote in the string literal is not escaped, breaking out of the SQL string context.

More Dangerous Payload

name === "'; DROP TABLE users; --"

Generates:

(name)=(''; DROP TABLE users; --')

Verified on Saltcorn v1.5.0 (Docker)

Direct invocation of jsexprToSQL() inside the running container confirms the vulnerability:

Input:  name === "hello"
Output: (name)=('hello')                          ← Normal

Input:  name === "test' OR '1'='1"
Output: (name)=('test' OR '1'='1')                ← Single quote NOT escaped, OR injected

Input:  name === "'; DROP TABLE users; --"
Output: (name)=(''; DROP TABLE users; --')         ← DROP TABLE injected

The test was performed on a completely fresh Saltcorn installation (zero user-created tables, default Docker setup).

PoC Screenshot

  1. Create a table after moving to the table menu
<img width="1194" height="559" alt="SCR-20260307-edqn" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/a2d11102-f49b-4b2b-88ff-fced37476b6f" />
  1. Go to the table and then to Constraits
<img width="1180" height="600" alt="SCR-20260307-edsg" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/b55ddace-01be-4a53-8f62-cbec98172cd7" />
  1. Go to Formula
<img width="1130" height="518" alt="SCR-20260307-edud" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/8a5addc6-e681-401b-91ea-bce3b0eece54" />
  1. Create a test table for verification
<img width="857" height="294" alt="SCR-20260307-eetw" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/debc8581-8145-44cb-a684-2bc3eb7adbcf" />
  1. Input the payload and save
<img width="763" height="383" alt="SCR-20260307-ehcz" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/f7a3aa34-7b0b-48ea-b1df-f852f137c37f" />
  1. Check the table for testing
<img width="549" height="256" alt="SCR-20260307-ehuh" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/8f6da842-0275-4729-93bf-96575f3fe963" />

Impact

  • Arbitrary SQL execution via crafted CHECK constraints
  • Data exfiltration through error-based or time-based SQL injection
  • Database schema manipulation (DROP TABLE, ALTER TABLE)
  • Potential privilege escalation via direct users table modification

Suggested Remediation

Escape single quotes in the Literal handler:

Literal({ value }: { value: ExtendedNode }) {
  if (typeof value == "string") return `'${value.replace(/'/g, "''")}'`;
  return `${value}`;
},

Alternatively, use parameterized queries for constraint creation instead of string interpolation.

Affected Packages

3 total 3 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
📦npm@saltcorn/dataall versions1.4.5
📦npm@saltcorn/data1.5.0&&< 1.5.51.5.5
📦npm@saltcorn/data1.6.0-alpha.0&&< 1.6.0-beta.41.6.0-beta.4

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for @saltcorn/data. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update @saltcorn/data to 1.4.5 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-59xv-588h-2vmm is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-59xv-588h-2vmm is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-59xv-588h-2vmm. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

## Summary The `jsexprToSQL()` function in Saltcorn converts JavaScript expressions to SQL for use in database constraints. The `Literal` handler wraps string values in single quotes without escaping embedded single quotes, allowing SQL injection when creating Formula-type table constraints. ## Vulnerable Component **File:** `packages/saltcorn-data/models/expression.ts`, lines 117-118 ```typescript Literal({ value }: { value: ExtendedNode }) { if (typeof value == "string") return `'${value}'`; // NO ESCAPING! return `${value}`; }, ``` **Call chain:** Formula constraint creation → `t
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-59xv-588h-2vmm in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-59xv-588h-2vmm across npm dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.