GHSA-8v2v-wjwg-vx6r
actix-files has a possible exposure of information vulnerability
Blast Radius
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Description
Summary
When passing a non-existing folder to the actix_files::Files::new() method causes the actix server to expose unexpected files.
Details
The actix-files library exposes a Files struct that configures an actix service to serve the files in a folder as static assets. Below you can find the signature of the Files::new method:
pub fn new<T: Into<PathBuf>>(mount_path: &str, serve_from: T) -> Files
When the mount_path you pass to Files doesn't exist, it defaults to an empty path (Path::new()). When the service receives a HTTP request, it joins the request information with the empty path and calls canonicalize. Rust resolves this path as relative and returns any file that matches it.
This behavior causes the library to expose unexpected files when the folder is not present.
PoC
There is a working PoC on https://github.com/Angelmmiguel/actix-files-vuln, although the next steps can be followed to reproduce the issue
-
Clone the https://github.com/actix/examples repository.
-
Change your directory to the
basics/static-filesfolder. -
Edit the
src/main.rsfile and change the line 13 to mount a non-existing folder:- .service(Files::new("/images", "static/images/").show_files_listing()) + .service(Files::new("/images", "static/missing/").show_files_listing()) -
Run the project with
cargo run. -
Access the http://localhost:8080/images/Cargo.toml URL.
Impact
This is an exposure of information vulnerability. It affects anyone using the actix-files::Files library that mounts a non-existing folder for any reason.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🦀crates.io | actix-files | all versions | 0.6.10 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for actix-files. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update actix-files to 0.6.10 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-8v2v-wjwg-vx6r is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-8v2v-wjwg-vx6r is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-8v2v-wjwg-vx6r. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-8v2v-wjwg-vx6r in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-8v2v-wjwg-vx6r across crates.io dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.