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🐍 PyPI

GHSA-8qpw-xqxj-h4r2

MEDIUM

aiohttp's HTTP parser (the python one, not llhttp) still overly lenient about separators

Also known asCVE-2024-23829PYSEC-2024-26
Published
Jan 29, 2024
Updated
Feb 4, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
1 known

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
1.0%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk59th percentile+0.53%
0.00%0.51%1.01%1.52%0.4%1.0%Dec 25Apr 26Jun 26

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected
🐍aiohttp

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

Security-sensitive parts of the Python HTTP parser retained minor differences in allowable character sets, that must trigger error handling to robustly match frame boundaries of proxies in order to protect against injection of additional requests. Additionally, validation could trigger exceptions that were not handled consistently with processing of other malformed input.

Details

These problems are rooted in pattern matching protocol elements, previously improved by PR #3235 and GHSA-gfw2-4jvh-wgfg:

  1. The expression HTTP/(\d).(\d) lacked another backslash to clarify that the separator should be a literal dot, not just any Unicode code point (result: HTTP/(\d)\.(\d)).

  2. The HTTP version was permitting Unicode digits, where only ASCII digits are standards-compliant.

  3. Distinct regular expressions for validating HTTP Method and Header field names were used - though both should (at least) apply the common restrictions of rfc9110 token.

PoC

GET / HTTP/1ö1 GET / HTTP/1.𝟙 GET/: HTTP/1.1 Content-Encoding?: chunked

Impact

Primarily concerns running an aiohttp server without llhttp:

  1. behind a proxy: Being more lenient than internet standards require could, depending on deployment environment, assist in request smuggling.
  2. directly accessible or exposed behind proxies relaying malformed input: the unhandled exception could cause excessive resource consumption on the application server and/or its logging facilities.

Patch: https://github.com/aio-libs/aiohttp/pull/8074/files

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐍PyPIaiohttpall versions3.9.2
Exploits & PoCs
1

Research use only. For defensive security, authorized penetration testing, and academic research only. Never execute exploit code against systems without explicit written authorization.

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for aiohttp. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update aiohttp to 3.9.2 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-8qpw-xqxj-h4r2 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-8qpw-xqxj-h4r2 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-8qpw-xqxj-h4r2. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary Security-sensitive parts of the *Python HTTP parser* retained minor differences in allowable character sets, that must trigger error handling to robustly match frame boundaries of proxies in order to protect against injection of additional requests. Additionally, validation could trigger exceptions that were not handled consistently with processing of other malformed input. ### Details These problems are rooted in pattern matching protocol elements, previously improved by PR #3235 and GHSA-gfw2-4jvh-wgfg: 1. The expression `HTTP/(\d).(\d)` lacked another backslash to clarify that
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-8qpw-xqxj-h4r2 in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-8qpw-xqxj-h4r2 across PyPI dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.