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HIGH severity

GHSA-8pmx-p244-g88h

HIGHFix: tensorflow/tensorflow@698e015

GHSA-8pmx-p244-g88h is a high-severity (CVSS 7.1) CWE-665 vulnerability in tensorflow. 1 public exploit reference exists, so weaponization risk is real. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-8pmx-p244-g88h is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.

Interpreter crash from `tf.io.decode_raw`

Also known asBIT-tensorflow-2021-29614CVE-2021-29614PYSEC-2021-251PYSEC-2021-542PYSEC-2021-740
Published
May 21, 2021
Updated
Mar 13, 2026
Affected
12 pkgs
Patched
12 / 12
Exploits
1 known
Exploitation data as of Mar 13, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Real-World Exposure

12 pkgs affected
🐍tensorflow🐍tensorflow🐍tensorflow🐍tensorflow🐍tensorflow-cpu🐍tensorflow-cpu🐍tensorflow-cpu🐍tensorflow-cpu+4 more

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Impact

The implementation of tf.io.decode_raw produces incorrect results and crashes the Python interpreter when combining fixed_length and wider datatypes.

import tensorflow as tf

tf.io.decode_raw(tf.constant(["1","2","3","4"]), tf.uint16, fixed_length=4)

The implementation of the padded version is buggy due to a confusion about pointer arithmetic rules.

First, the code computes the width of each output element by dividing the fixed_length value to the size of the type argument:

int width = fixed_length / sizeof(T);

The fixed_length argument is also used to determine the size needed for the output tensor:

TensorShape out_shape = input.shape();
out_shape.AddDim(width);
Tensor* output_tensor = nullptr;
OP_REQUIRES_OK(context, context->allocate_output("output", out_shape, &output_tensor));

auto out = output_tensor->flat_inner_dims<T>();
T* out_data = out.data();
memset(out_data, 0, fixed_length * flat_in.size());

This is followed by reencoding code:

for (int64 i = 0; i < flat_in.size(); ++i) {
  const T* in_data = reinterpret_cast<const T*>(flat_in(i).data());

  if (flat_in(i).size() > fixed_length) {
    memcpy(out_data, in_data, fixed_length);
  } else {
    memcpy(out_data, in_data, flat_in(i).size());
  }
  out_data += fixed_length;
}

The erroneous code is the last line above: it is moving the out_data pointer by fixed_length * sizeof(T) bytes whereas it only copied at most fixed_length bytes from the input. This results in parts of the input not being decoded into the output.

Furthermore, because the pointer advance is far wider than desired, this quickly leads to writing to outside the bounds of the backing data. This OOB write leads to interpreter crash in the reproducer mentioned here, but more severe attacks can be mounted too, given that this gadget allows writing to periodically placed locations in memory.

Patches

We have patched the issue in GitHub commit 698e01511f62a3c185754db78ebce0eee1f0184d.

The fix will be included in TensorFlow 2.5.0. We will also cherrypick this commit on TensorFlow 2.4.2, TensorFlow 2.3.3, TensorFlow 2.2.3 and TensorFlow 2.1.4, as these are also affected and still in supported range.

For more information

Please consult our security guide for more information regarding the security model and how to contact us with issues and questions.

Affected Packages

12 total 12 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐍PyPItensorflowall versions2.1.4
🐍PyPItensorflow2.2.0&&< 2.2.32.2.3
🐍PyPItensorflow2.3.0&&< 2.3.32.3.3
🐍PyPItensorflow2.4.0&&< 2.4.22.4.2
🐍PyPItensorflow-cpuall versions2.1.4
🐍PyPItensorflow-cpu2.2.0&&< 2.2.32.2.3
Exploits & PoCs
1

Research use only. For defensive security, authorized penetration testing, and academic research only. Never execute exploit code against systems without explicit written authorization.

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for tensorflow. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update tensorflow to 2.1.4 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-8pmx-p244-g88h is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-8pmx-p244-g88h is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-8pmx-p244-g88h. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Impact The implementation of `tf.io.decode_raw` produces incorrect results and crashes the Python interpreter when combining `fixed_length` and wider datatypes. ```python import tensorflow as tf tf.io.decode_raw(tf.constant(["1","2","3","4"]), tf.uint16, fixed_length=4) ``` The [implementation of the padded version](https://github.com/tensorflow/tensorflow/blob/1d8903e5b167ed0432077a3db6e462daf781d1fe/tensorflow/core/kernels/decode_padded_raw_op.cc) is buggy due to a confusion about pointer arithmetic rules. First, the code [computes](https://github.c
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-8pmx-p244-g88h in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-8pmx-p244-g88h across PyPI dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.