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💎 RubyGems

GHSA-8p34-64r3-mwg8

Net::IMAP: Command Injection via non-synchronizing literal in "raw" argument

Also known asCVE-2026-47240
Published
Jun 9, 2026
Updated
Jul 6, 2026
Affected
2 pkgs
Patched
2 / 2
Exploits
None indexed

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.5%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk39th percentile0.00%
0.00%0.33%0.66%0.99%0.5%0.5%Jul 26Jul 26

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Blast Radius

2 pkgs affected
💎net-imap💎net-imap

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects RubyGems packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Several Net::IMAP commands accept a "raw data" argument that is sent verbatim after validation to prevent command injection. However, if a server does not support non-synchronizing literals, it may still be possible to inject arbitrary IMAP commands inside non-synchronizing literals.

Details

Raw data arguments support embedded literal values, both synchronizing and non-synchronizing. Non-synchronizing literals can only be safely sent when the server advertises any of the LITERAL+, LITERAL-, or IMAP4rev2 capabilities. But raw data arguments do not verify server support for non-synchronizing literals prior to sending.

Servers without support for non-synchronizing literals could handle them in several different ways: If a server sees a "}\r\n" byte sequence but can't parse the literal bytesize, it may cautiously decide to close the connection, blocking any command injection attacks. However, a server without support for non-synchronizing literals may instead interpret the "+}\r\n" as the end of a malformed command line and respond with a tagged BAD. In that case, the contents of the literal will be interpreted as one or more new pipelined commands, allowing a CRLF command injection attack to succeed.

This affects the following commands' string arguments:

  • criteria for #search and #uid_search
  • search_keys for #sort, #thread, #uid_sort, and #uid_thread
  • attr for #fetch and #uid_fetch

Prior to net-imap v0.6.4, v0.5.14, and v0.4.24, raw data arguments were not validated in any way, so they were also vulnerable to this attack. See CVE-2026-42257 (GHSA-hm49-wcqc-g2xg).

Impact

Fortunately, LITERAL- is supported by most modern IMAP servers. Even without support for non-synchronizing literals, cautious servers may handle invalid literal bytesize by closing the connection . However, servers which handle a non-synchronizing literal just like any other malformed command will enable this vulnerability.

If a developer passes an unvalidated user-controlled input for one of these method arguments, an attacker can append CRLF sequence followed by a new IMAP command (like DELETE mailbox). Although this does not directly enable data exfiltration, it could be combined with other attack vectors or knowledge of the target system's attributes, e.g.: shared mail folders or the application's installed response handlers.

Mitigation

Update to a version of net-imap which validates server support for non-synchronizing literals before sending them.

If upgrading net-imap is not possible:

  • Explicitly validate user-controlled inputs to prevent embedded non-synchronizing literals unless the server supports them.
  • For a simpler, more cautious approach: all embedded literals can be unconditionally prohibited, by checking that string inputs do not contain any CR or LF bytes.
  • Verify that the server advertises any of the LITERAL+, LITERAL-, or IMAP4rev2 capabilities before using untrusted string inputs for the affected "raw data" arguments.

Affected Packages

2 total 2 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
💎RubyGemsnet-imap0.6.0&&< 0.6.4.10.6.4.1
💎RubyGemsnet-imapall versions0.5.15

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for net-imap. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update net-imap to 0.6.4.1 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-8p34-64r3-mwg8 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-8p34-64r3-mwg8 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-8p34-64r3-mwg8. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

Several Net::IMAP commands accept a "raw data" argument that is sent verbatim after validation to prevent command injection. However, if a server does not support non-synchronizing literals, it may still be possible to inject arbitrary IMAP commands inside non-synchronizing literals. ### Details Raw data arguments support embedded literal values, both synchronizing and non-synchronizing. Non-synchronizing literals can only be safely sent when the server advertises any of the `LITERAL+`, `LITERAL-`, or `IMAP4rev2` capabilities. But raw data arguments do not verify server support for non-sy
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-8p34-64r3-mwg8 in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-8p34-64r3-mwg8 across RubyGems dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.