GHSA-8hf7-h89p-3pqj
HIGHMobSF has Stored XSS via Manifest Analysis - Dialer Code Host Field
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
Blast Radius
mobsfReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
A Stored Cross-site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability in MobSF's Android manifest analysis allows an attacker to execute arbitrary JavaScript in the context of a victim's browser session by uploading a malicious APK. The android:host attribute from <data android:scheme="android_secret_code"> elements is rendered in HTML reports without sanitization, enabling session hijacking and account takeover.
Details
When MobSF analyzes an Android APK containing a <data> element with android:scheme="android_secret_code", it extracts the android:host attribute and inserts it directly into the analysis report without HTML escaping.
Vulnerable Code Path
1. Data Extraction - mobsf/StaticAnalyzer/views/android/manifest_analysis.py (line 776):
xmlhost = data.getAttribute(f'{ns}:host')
ret_list.append(('dialer_code_found', (xmlhost,), ()))
2. Template String Formatting - mobsf/StaticAnalyzer/views/android/manifest_analysis.py (line 806):
'title': a_template['title'] % t_name, # XSS payload inserted here unescaped
3. Template Definition - mobsf/StaticAnalyzer/views/android/kb/android_manifest_desc.py (line 200):
'dialer_code_found': {
'title': 'Dailer Code: %s Found <br>[android:scheme=\"android_secret_code\"]',
...
}
4. Unsafe Rendering - mobsf/templates/static_analysis/android_binary_analysis.html (line 1143):
{{item|key:"title" | safe}}
The |safe Django template filter bypasses auto-escaping, allowing the unescaped android:host value to be rendered as raw HTML.
PoC
Step 1: Create Malicious APK
Create an APK with the following AndroidManifest.xml:
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<manifest xmlns:android="http://schemas.android.com/apk/res/android"
package="com.poc.xsstest"
android:versionCode="1"
android:versionName="1.0">
<application android:label="XSS PoC Test">
<receiver android:name=".SecretCodeReceiver" android:exported="true">
<intent-filter>
<action android:name="android.provider.Telephony.SECRET_CODE"/>
<data android:scheme="android_secret_code"
android:host="<img src=x onerror=alert(document.domain)>"/>
</intent-filter>
</receiver>
</application>
</manifest>
Step 2: Build the APK
Use apktool or Android build tools to create a valid APK with this manifest.
Step 3: Upload to MobSF
Upload the malicious APK to MobSF for static analysis.
Step 4: Trigger XSS
View the static analysis report in a browser. The JavaScript payload executes automatically.
Confirmed HTML Output
<td>
Dailer Code: <img src=x onerror=alert(document.domain)> Found <br>[android:scheme="android_secret_code"]
</td>
PoC APK Details
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Filename | POC_XSS_APK.apk |
| MD5 Hash | 647258656ed03a7e6a0f2acce4ec6a5b |
| Location | https://github.com/smaranchand/poc/raw/refs/heads/main/POC_XSS_APK.apk |
Impact
This is a Stored Cross-site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability affecting all MobSF users who analyze the results of the malicious APK file.
Attack Scenario
- Attacker crafts a malicious APK with XSS payload in the manifest
- Attacker submits APK to a shared MobSF instance or private mobsf instance.
- When any user views the analysis report, the XSS payload executes in their browser
Tested in MobSF Public Instance as well. https://mobsf.live/static_analyzer/647258656ed03a7e6a0f2acce4ec6a5b/
<img width="1440" height="780" alt="Screenshot 2026-01-15 at 12 24 57 AM" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/8673b76a-954a-45e7-833a-a64e0a972f2e" />Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐍PyPI | mobsf | all versions | 4.4.5 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for mobsf. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update mobsf to 4.4.5 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-8hf7-h89p-3pqj is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-8hf7-h89p-3pqj is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-8hf7-h89p-3pqj. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-8hf7-h89p-3pqj in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-8hf7-h89p-3pqj across PyPI dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.